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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation critically examines whether and how the practices 
involved in the crafting of the European Union may be said to go beyond 
modern statecraft. European integration should in part be seen as an 
attempt to transcend the modern state. Among many of the early 
proponents of European integration, the nation state had become 
associated with militarism, jingoism and ultimately, at least partly, to the 
blamed for the many devastating wars on the European continent, and 
even a normative order that made the Holocaust possible. Most other 
studies that have dealt with the EU's alleged difference from the modern 
state have employed an understanding of the state which confers a certain 
ontological standing and status onto its purported object of study. This 
dissertation argues that a critical approach to European integration needs 
to go beyond such a representationalist, ontologizing understanding of a 
political entity. Instead, in order to start addressing the question of state 
violence that European integration emerged as a response to, the crafting 
of the Europe Union needs to be problematized in relation to practices of 
statecraft. The dissertation also contends that previous engagements of 
European integration in relation to the modern state have neglected 
engaging the broader normative horizon in which the modern Westphalian 
state is inscribed. The first chapter puts forward a way of understanding 
modern statecraft. The subsequent chapters examine four different 
legitimation discourses of European integration against such an 
  ii 
understanding: EU's failed Constitutional Treaty, EU's foreign policy 
discourse, European integration theory, and an instance of European 
migration policy. The dissertation concludes that the crafting of Europe in 
many ways resembles the crafting of the modern state. In fact, the crafting 
of the European Union is plagued by similar ethical dilemmas as the 
modern state, and ultimately animated by a similar desire to either expel 
or interiorize difference. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The tyranny of words is only 
slightly less absolute than that 
of men; but whereas elections, 
revolutions, or just the dreary 
passage of time can do away 
with human tyranny, patient 
analysis and redefinition are 
required to remedy the 
linguistic affliction.  
—Ernst B. Haas 
 
 
Why today bother studying whatever practices usually pass under the 
name of “European integration?” Isn’t the timing for such an undertaking 
unusually poorly chosen? Instead of grandiloquent proclamations and 
calls for further political, economic, and social integration as traditionally 
understood, the prevalent mood seems nowadays rather to be one of 
gloom and doom, and a general consensus of the desirability to settle for 
“consolidation” of taken for granted “historical achievements,” rather than 
“moving forward.” But if the European Union’s failed Constitutional 
Treaty in 2005 blatantly precipitated such sentiments among European 
elites, and at the present time of writing, the debt crisis experienced by 
several of the Euro members has even further exacerbated popular 
misgivings, the crisis of European integration is nothing new. Already at 
the beginning of the 1990s, a tension between two major tendencies in the 
project of European integration was becoming increasingly evident. At the 
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same time as the European Union’s (EU’s) competences were extended 
and the EU moved from intergovernmental to supranational modes of 
decision-making in a number of policy areas, “Euro skepticism” was 
seemingly on the rise across virtually all of its member states. The so-
called “permissive consensus”—i.e. the utilitarian belief that as long as 
European integration was understood to be correlated to increasing 
economic prosperity it was broadly supported at the mass level—that was 
thought to have allowed for European integration ever since the creation 
of the European Coal and Steel Community in the early 1950s, could no 
longer be taken for granted in the 1990s.1  
 
Largely due to widespread popular dissatisfaction with the European 
project of integration as witnessed in the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty 
in Denmark (1992); its narrow approval in France (1992); the rejection of 
the Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2008) Treaties in Ireland; the rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty in France (2005) and the Netherlands (2005), issues 
of popular legitimation became increasingly pressing. Undeniably, ever 
since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, which formally 
established the European Union, a general legitimation crisis has haunted 
                                                   
1 Edward Best, “In Search of the Lost Constitution: The EU between Direct Democracy 
and the Permissive Consensus,” EIPAScope 2 (2005): 5-13. The notion of a “permissive 
consensus” was first introduced by Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, in Leon N. 
Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the 
European Community (Englewood-Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), 41. 
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the project of European integration.2 Such a generalized crisis is to be 
expected whenever foundationalist rhetorical figures of polity foundation 
are deployed in an era where the facile appeal to such absolutes has 
become increasingly questioned. Indeed, European integration could in 
large part be seen as an attempt at polity foundation in the age of its 
impossibility—i.e., in an age where the theoretical vocabulary needed for 
such an endeavor has largely exhausted itself. This historical epoch, which 
is characterized by an, as Jean-François Lyotard famously put it, 
“incredulity to metanarratives,”3 usually goes under the name of 
postmodernity, and provides the historical backdrop to the attempted 
European unification. 
 
The generalized legitimation crisis in the project of European integration 
animates this dissertation. The dissertation critically engages some 
prominent discourses of legitimation of European integration. I 
understand such discourses as practices of Euro-crafting, that is, as 
attempts to ontologize “Europe.”4 By this, I mean that such discourses are 
                                                   
2 For an empirical assessment see Jacques Thomassen, ed., The Legitimacy of the 
European Union After Enlargement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
 
3 Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. 
Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1984), xxiv. 
 
 
4 Throughout the dissertation, and as will be elaborated upon below, “Europe” is textually 
understood as a contested and underdetermined signifier whose bounds and referents 
must always be put in quotation marks. For stylistic reasons, however, I will not always 
do so. To place a concept within quotation marks or under erasure means to resist 
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attempting to provide a secure content to Europe, so as to place Europe on 
a stable foundation, and craft it into a bounded unified entity. Those 
legitimation discourses, hence, are not understood as describing or 
referring to an already existing referent object, but as performative of such 
a referent. That is, they continuously enact “Europe.” Following Judith 
Butler, I understand the realm of performativity as always prior to the 
realm of constativity.5 Hence, whereas an ontologizing mode of speaking 
essentializes Europe by proclaiming that it only describes a finished, 
sutured, and self-identical entity, a non-ontologizing mode of speaking 
understands Europe to be formed and transformed, by the force of a desire 
in the form of an active judgment of what Europe might be/come. Desire, 
in other words, lies in the non-space “between” being and becoming—that 
which strictly speaking neither is nor is not. I have chosen to entitle this 
dissertation “The Desire for Europe” to indicate that I will treat the 
“Europe” invoked, mobilized, and appealed to in the process of European 
integration as nothing but desire.  
 
The main thesis of the dissertation could be stated as follows. The 
European Union is of course not “a state” in the legal or politico-
                                                                                                                                           
essentializing the concept. Also, it is to recognize the necessity of provisionally retaining it 
in order to be able to examine the discursive field in which it is deployed. See Gayatri C. 
Spivak, translator’s preface, Of Grammatology, by Jacques Derrida, trans. Gayatri C. 
Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), xiv. 
 
 
5 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York 
and London: Routledge, 1990). 
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institutional sense of the word. But what I make a case for in this 
dissertation is that instead of comparing the European Union to a state—
understood as a finalized, self-identical “thing,” possessing some sort of 
ontological standing and status—we should instead compare the crafting 
of the European Union  (what I call Euro-crafting) to the crafting of the 
modern state, i.e. to statecraft—which I understand as a desire-drive on-
going performance of identification, ordering and bordering. And what I 
empirically set out to show at length is that the crafting of the European 
Union reveals similar desires as the modern Western state: namely desires 
for order, stability, identity, and hierarchy. What is more, I show that the 
crafting of the European Union is firmly embedded in what Mathias Albert 
and Lothar Brock have referred to as the “normative structure” of the 
Westphalian system.6 A field of two polar opposites defines this normative 
structure: cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, around which the 
crafting of the modern state continuously and precariously oscillates.  
 
This is important since the constitution of the European Union faces 
similar ethical conundrums as those of the modern state. As I will 
elaborate further below, the dissertation is mainly concerned with the 
                                                   
6 Mathias Albert and Lothar Brock, “What Keeps Westphalia Together? Normative 
Differentiation in the Modern System of States,” in Identities, Borders, Orders-
Rethinking International Relations Theory, eds. Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and 
Yosef Lapid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 33. Indeed, as Chris 
Brown has shown, much of the normative thinking within Western thinking about 
international relations is adequately captured on a communitarian/cosmopolitan 
continuum. See Chris Brown, International Relations: New Normative Approaches 
(New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992). 
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ethical implications of Euro-crafting; ethics is here understood as a 
problem of how Europe is crafted in relation to difference. Just like the 
modern state, the European Union is caught between either a logic of 
particularizing itself, i.e. attempting to draw boundaries around its self 
and thereby inevitably having to create various constitutive outsides that 
will be excluded from Europe—the particularizing gesture of “community.” 
When this logic prevails, it will be difficult for various migrant 
communities or deviant groups to be able to claim belonging in Europe. 
The other pole of statecraft is that of trying to universalize a self, which 
means that no boundaries at all are acknowledged in the constitution of a 
self—the gesture of cosmopolitan “empire.” The problem with the 
universalizing logic, however, is that otherness risks being refused. In the 
case of Europe, this gesture is particularly problematic against the 
historical backdrop of imperialism and colonialism. The crafting of 
Europe, I contend, is caught in the same pendular movement as the 
modern state—between the particular and the universal.  
 
The tragedy of Europe, if one were to speak of such, stems from the fact 
that practitioners of integration (scholars, public intellectuals, and 
politicians) largely lack a vocabulary for thinking “beyond the state,” and 
the “Europe” of European integration immediately started taking on all of 
the discursive characteristics associated with the modern state. After the 
end of the Second World War, the nation state as the organizing principle 
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of global politics had become increasingly questioned, and European 
integration constituted an attempt to transcend the modern state, to many 
associated with nationalism, militarism, and ultimately violence itself. So 
tragically then, what “Europe” was intended to negate is once again 
returning, only this time at a bigger level. Although the problems that 
European integration emerged as a response to were some of the most 
serious and pressing, and could even be understood as the question of 
violence itself, the solution that emerged, European integration as 
currently conceived, is inadequate to deal with the problems that 
precipitated its emergence. Although often employing softer rhetoric, 
Euro-crafting ends up reiterating the basic schema of statecraft and should 
as such be seen as part of the problem rather than any long-term solution.  
 
This dissertation could further be described as a deconstructive critique of 
the notion of “Europe” upon which the project of European integration 
rests. I am primarily interested in the ethical implications for the space 
that is being enacted in the employment of certain foundationalist figures 
of “Europe” in discourses of European integration. My investigation of the 
project of European integration is guided by three major sets of issues. 
First, I explore the question of whether, and if so how, the construction of 
the EU, as is sometimes held, could be said to differ from that of the 
modern western state. This issue concerns the “novelty” of the EU—a 
question much debated within European integration studies. How are we 
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to conceptually understand the EU? To that end, I treat Europe as a 
signifier and bring some themes from deconstruction to the study of 
European integration. This allows me to shed some new light on the 
question of how one might understand the crafting of the European Union 
in relation to traditional statecraft. Second, I examine whether EU’s 
foreign policy discourse, as is also sometimes held, could be said to 
decisively break with that of the foreign policy discourse of the modern 
state. Here, I engage a lively debate about Europe as a “normative”7 or 
even “ethical”8 power. And third, I examine whether western liberal 
political theory is well equipped to theorize the emergence of an entity 
which proclaims itself to go “beyond the nation state” without persistently 
conjuring up the modern Westphalian state as yardstick, rendering such 
attempts ineffective. To be sure, all of those controversies have been 
extensively engaged with in the literature on the EU, which has grown 
exponentially in the last decades. However, there is to this day no 
systematic, comprehensive, and critical study of the logics of Euro-
crafting, which engages those questions from what one may provisionally 
                                                   
7 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (2002); Ian Manners, “The European Union as a 
Normative Power: A Response to Thomas Diez,” Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies 35, no. 1 (2006). 
 
 
8 Lisbeth Aggestam, “A European Foreign Policy? Role Conceptions and the Politics of 
Identity in Britain, France and Germany” (PhD diss., Stockholm University, 2004); 
Lisbeth Aggestam, “Introduction: Ethical Power Europe,” International Affairs 84, no. 1 
(2008). 
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call a deconstructive perspective employing a textual understanding of 
Europe.9 
 
This introductory chapter unfolds as follows. In the first part, I set out 
some of the major interpretive dispositions of this dissertation, and deal 
with the question of method. Here, I lay out some of the major theoretical 
commitments of a textual approach to the question of European 
integration and situate this endeavor in the context of European 
integration studies and critical International Relations theory. In the 
second section, I seek to justify the approach chosen in this dissertation in 
terms of ethics. Finally, I outline the chapters of the dissertation, in order 
to give the reader a roadmap of what to expect in the chapters that follow.  
 
Textualizing Europe: interpretive dispositions and the question of 
“method”  
 
To begin with, what do I mean by textuality? We might here begin by 
considering Jacques Derrida’s famous and often misunderstood claim in 
Of Grammatology that “there is nothing outside the text. [il n'ya pas de 
                                                   
9 My dissertation could be read as a substantiation of a point that Rob Walker made in 
2000, namely that “one of the important characteristics of the contemporary literatures 
of the New Europe is that they so often reproduce the practices of sovereignty even as 
they argue that the sovereignty of European states is being eroded, undermined, 
dissolved, superseded, transcended, or any of the many other terms that are so firmly 
implicated in sovereignties discourse and which now converge in claims about the 
integration of Europe at some higher level.” See Robert B. J. Walker, “Europe is Not 
Where it is Supposed to Be,” in International Relations and the Politics of European 
Integration, eds. Morten Kelstrup and Michael Williams (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 16-17. In addition, his After the Globe, Before the World (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2010) elaborates on the universality/particularity binary that has 
framed so much thinking about global politics and speaks to my project in several ways. 
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hors-texte.]”10 By this, Derrida does certainly not mean, as is sometimes 
claimed by his most superficial critics, that deconstruction denies the 
existence of anything but written text. As Simon Critchley puts is: “a 
generalized concept of the ‘text’ does not wish to turn the world into some 
vast library; nor does it wish to cut off references to some ‘extra-textual 
realm’. Deconstruction is not bibliophilia.”11 How then, does Derrida 
understand “text?” On a textual understanding of reality, signifiers—
spoken or written words—refer only to other signifiers and not to a 
signified, i.e. to a meaningful concept evoked by a word.12 To exemplify, 
consider a dictionary in which a word can only be defined in terms of other 
words.13 However hard one attempts to find the final meaning of a word, 
one is only left with other words, which in turn refers to yet other words 
and so on. As Arthur Bradley puts it: “every signifier relates to other 
signifiers that surround it in space and time and so we can never reach a 
pure thought or concept—a signified—that exists in and of itself 
independently of all signifiers: what is supposedly beyond language is 
                                                   
10 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1976), 158. 
 
 
11 Simon Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 39.  
 
 
12 See in particular Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade 
Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959); and Derrida, Of Grammatology, 27-73.  
 
 
13 Terry Eagleton uses this example in Literary Theory: An Introduction (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1983), 128. 
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plunged back into language.”14 The meaning, or the signified of the word, 
always slips under the chain of signifiers and the process of signification 
never comes to a halt. In Derrida’s deconstructive radicalization of 
Saussure, the signified appears only as an effect of the movement of the 
signifying chain, so that a signified is nothing but a signifier occupying a 
certain position in the signifying web by virtue of its relations to other 
signifiers.15 Meaning then emerges as a result of an endless play of 
signifiers, instead of the signified being intimately linked to a 
corresponding signifier as Saussure’s original scheme would have it.16 Or 
to be more precise, meaning emerges as a result of the movement of what 
Derrida calls différance—the flickering of differences and deferrals that 
constitutes the condition of possibility for the linkages between signifers 
and signifieds, which makes the world appear meaningful to us.17  
 
                                                   
14 Arthur Bradley, Derrida’s Of Grammatology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 
2008), 71.  
 
 
15 Hence, Derrida deconstructs Saussure’s signifier/signified binary by displacing the 
need to draw a strict border between the two—since signifiers are constantly being 
transformed into signifieds, and signifieds into signifiers—which then leads him to 
develop the textual infrastructure of trace. See Derrida, Of Grammatology, 27-73; and 
see the discussion in Geoffrey Bennington, “Saussure and Derrida,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Saussure, ed. Carol Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), 197. 
 
 
16 For a more critical take on Derrida’s reading of Saussure, see Anthony Giddens, Central 
Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 28-38. 
 
 
17 See Jacques Derrida, “Différance,” chap. 1 in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982). 
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What Derrida refers to as the “transcendental signified;” Ernesto Mouffe 
and Chantal Laclau as a “nodal point;” or what Jacques Lacan calls the 
“point de capiton” or “quilting point,” is that which seeks to get away with 
halting the movement of signification.18 To put it in other words; a 
transcendental signified is that which would not be defined in terms of 
something else, which would therefore be absolutely self-referential; in 
short, a foundation, which is the point at which further questioning simply 
comes to a halt. Such a sign would be unaffected by the play of signifiers, it 
would in other words not fall prey to the logics of textuality—it would be 
outside the text. In Laclau and Mouffe’s influential statement, hegemonic 
articulations are practices precisely seeking to impose closure on the chain 
of signification.19 As should be clear from the preceding discussion, such 
attempts are unstable and are, to use Derridean language, always already 
deconstructing themselves. Thus, when Derrida writes that there is 
nothing outside the text, he arguably means that there is no-thing that is 
prior to, enabling of, and exceeding the logic of textuality. No signifying 
practice, in other words, escapes the logics of textuality.20 In Derrida’s 
                                                   
18 As Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe write: “Any discourse is constituted as an 
attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct 
a centre. We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial fixation nodal points.” 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Verso, 2001), 112. 
 
 
19 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 105-114. 
 
 
20 However, as Derrida is well aware of, the claim that nothing escapes the logic of 
textuality would immediately deconstruct itself as totalizing, which for its very assertion 
depends on precisely that which would escape textuality. Negative or “weak” theologians 
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words, “the absence of a transcendental signified extends the domain of 
signification infinitely.”21 
 
A first implication for the study of European integration thus becomes 
apparent. “Europe” understood as a signifier can never achieve completion 
and close itself off, but always has to be made meaningful in terms of other 
signifiers (of what it is like, almost like, not like etc.), whose final meaning 
is perpetually deferred. Let us for a moment pause and reflect on the 
significance of this. “Europe” might be understood as competing with 
various signifiers over the claim to properly represent certain subjects and 
a certain territory. For instance, signifiers such as “the West,” “the Judeo-
Christian world,” “the North-Atlantic Community/NATO,” ‘”Ibero-
America,” “La Francophonie,” “the Commonwealth,” “Scandinavia,” as 
well as of course various nation states are all systems of representation 
which make loyalty claims over subjects. Every piece of territory and 
population is in these days subject to a range of representational claims 
with accompanying claims of loyalties. However, as we have seen, no 
signifier can entirely capture and control the signified (since the signified 
is nothing but a signifier, which in turn refers back to other signifiers and 
                                                                                                                                           
such as John Caputo and Mark C. Taylor perceive some sort of analogy between God and 
that which precedes, enables, and exceeds différance.  
 
 
21 Jacques Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in 
Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 
280. 
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so on). Hence, there will always be overlapping and competing systems of 
representation, trying to represent something which none of them can 
fully do.  
 
An event that might illustrate this reasoning is the controversy over 
potential alliances with the U.S. to invade Iraq in 2003, where some of 
those systems of representation came into conflict with one another, 
perhaps most importantly whether a “European” identity as the prime 
loyalty would win over a “transatlantic” identity. For some, like the Blair 
administration in the UK, the transatlantic and Anglo-American identity 
took precedence over a European identity and loyalty with, for instance, 
France and Germany. Hence, one may say that the identity of Europe was 
prevented from being sutured because there were, and will always be, 
other signifiers (e.g., “NATO”) that struggle for precedence over the 
subjects and territory that the European Union claims to represent. Since 
no signifier can suture itself, “Europe” can never reach closure. What those 
who claim to speak in its name can do, however, and which arguably is an 
important purpose of the project of European integration, is to make 
Europe appear at the top of the hierarchy of various systems of 
representation with accompanying loyalty claims, so as to make “Europe” 
appear hegemonic. So for example, in the case of a new transatlantic rift, 
“Europe” would triumph over a “Transatlantic community.”  
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Thus, “Europe” will in this dissertation be treated as a signifier.22 The 
“method,” or, for reasons which will soon become apparent, should rather 
be called interpretive dispositions intended to guide the dissertation, 
could be described as deconstructive textual analysis. Textual analysis as 
understood here resembles what is often called discourse analysis and has 
been mostly employed in recent decades within critical International 
Relations (IR).23 I prefer the looser designation “textual analysis” since 
discourse analysis in critical IR has in recent years become associated with 
research practices which too much resemble a traditional methodology. In 
a “second wave” of critical IR scholarship, seeking to extend early critical-
                                                   
22 On “Europe” as a signifier, see also the pioneering piece by Thomas Diez, “Speaking 
‘Europe:’ The Politics of Integration Discourse,” The Social Construction of Europe, eds. 
Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen and Antje Wiener (London: SAGE, 2001): 
85-100. 
 
 
23 See for instance David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and 
the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992); Roxanne L. 
Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US 
Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines,” International Studies Quarterly 37, no. 3 
(1993). (1993); Roxanne L. Doty. Imperial Encounters – The Politics of Representation 
in North-South Relations (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Iver B. 
Neumann, Uses of the Other: “The East” in European Identity Formation (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Lene Hansen and Ole Waever, eds. European 
Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic States (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2002); Lene Hansen, Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the 
Bosnian War (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); and for an assessment see 
Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of 
Research and Methods,” European Journal of International Relations 5, no. 2: (1999). 
This understanding of discourse analysis comes close to what is sometimes known as the 
“Essex School,” influenced by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy, and more recently developed by people such as David Howarth, Aletta 
Norval, and Jacob Torfing. For an overview of the concept of discourse employed by the 
“Essex School”, see David Howarth, Discourse (Buckingham: Open University Press, 
2000).  
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textual advances,24 several IR scholars have sought to turn discourse 
analysis into a more self-consciously methodological practice.25 They have 
arguably in part done so in order to make discursive approaches more 
acceptable within traditional International Relations, i.e., for strategic 
purposes. In part, however, such attempts seem also to have been guided 
by the enticement of having their own “research programme.” Ole Waever, 
for instance, has sought to turn discourse analysis into a general 
methodological framework, and even derive predictions from a certain 
foreign policy “discourse” which may be “tested” empirically against 
predictions derived from competing theories.26 Before moving on, let me 
take a step back and elaborate further on this unfortunate 
methodologization of discourse analysis in International Relations. 
 
                                                   
24 See in particular James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro, eds. 
International/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989); Doty, “Foreign Policy as Social Construction;” 
Doty, Imperial Encounters. The first generation of scholars informed by Foucault, 
Derrida etc. quite explicitly rejected critical scholarship in IR to be transformed into a 
program. See Richard K. Ashley and Robert B. J. Walker, “Conclusion: Reading 
Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in 
International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 3 (1990), 398. 
 
 
25 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations”; Ole Waever, “Identity, 
communities and foreign policy: discourse analysis as foreign policy theory,” European 
Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic States, eds. Lene Hansen 
and Ole Waever, 20-49 (London and New York: Routledge, 2002); Hansen, Security as 
Practice. 
 
 
26 Waever, “Identity, communities and foreign policy,” 28, 32. 
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Christopher Norris was once lamenting that French structuralism in 
literary criticism was quickly domesticated in the UK and the U.S., seeing 
its radical potential diffused by Anglo-American writers: “What started as 
a powerful protest against ruling critical assumptions ended up as just one 
more available method for saying new things about well-worn texts.”27 
Norris continued by pointing out that “to trace this history in detail would 
provide an instructive example of Anglo-American academic criticism to 
absorb and homogenize any new theory that threatens its sovereign 
claim.”28 It is indeed possible to detect a similar trajectory of discourse 
analysis in IR and European integration studies. Two examples of this 
rather unfortunate trend will suffice for our purposes. 
 
First of all, one may consider Jennifer Milliken’s often-cited assessment of 
discourse analysis in IR from 1999.29 Following the pioneering and often 
highly theoretical work by the early critical voices in the 1980s,30 a 
plethora of textual approaches were thereafter developed by several 
writers to enable more empirical work on various aspects of global 
                                                   
27 Christopher Norris, Deconstruction. Theory and Practice, rev. ed. (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1991), 1.  
 
 
28 Norris, Deconstruction, 1. 
 
 
29 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations.“ 
 
 
30 One should here highlight the contributions made by a highly heterogeneous group of 
scholars such as Richard K. Ashley, Robert W. Cox, Robert J. Walker, and William E. 
Connolly. 
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politics.31 Milliken’s piece was one of the first explicitly to call for an 
increased methodologization of those textual approaches that had been 
proliferating in IR, which she lumps together under the label of “discourse 
analysis.” For her undertaking to be possible she must find enough 
coherence in whatever passes as “discourse analysis” in IR, and claims that 
although “this community lacks a paradigm of science meeting Kuhn’s 
criteria… it has paradigmatic elements.”32 And “discourse analysis can be 
seen to form a research programme that is evolving and being developed 
(progressive one might even argue).”33 The problem for Milliken is that 
“no common understanding has emerged in International Relations about 
the best ways to study discourse [my emphasis].”34 Milliken therefore 
seeks to “elucidate some of the basic commitments of this community and, 
given its commitments, to evaluate and critique existing research within it, 
and to draw out criteria for and exemplars of different types of discourse 
studies,”35 calling for a “normal science” of discourse analysis.36 Milliken 
                                                   
31 Here, works by scholars such as Roxanne L. Doty, David Campbell, and Cynthia Weber 
have been particularly influential. 
 
 
32 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations,“ 226. 
 
 
33 Ibid., 228. 
 
 
34 Ibid., 226. 
 
 
35 Ibid. 
 
 
36 Ibid., 227, 230. 
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justifies her endeavor by claiming that “in order to advance its critical 
agenda, discourse scholars could benefit from more serious reflection on 
how to do discourse studies well [my emphasis].”37  Milliken believes that 
it is a serious mistake to refuse to engage the question of method: “First, it 
puts discourse analysts and their critics essentially on the same side with 
respect to social science standards (what these are and what it means to 
meet them), and thereby makes them fellow travellers in the assessment of 
discourse analysis, in the sense that both conclude that this type of 
approach is not fundamentally about doing rigorous empirical research or 
developing better theories [my emphasis].38 
 
So, by refusing to elaborate on a research program along with what their 
critics demand, “discourse analysts”—specifically and somewhat oddly 
referring to Richard Ashley and Rob Walker’s article from 199039—deny 
what Milliken takes as self-evident, namely that all serious research is 
“about doing rigorous empirical research or developing better theories.” 
All serious research, thus, must buy into a desire to establish hierarchies 
between what is “good, serious, rigorous” and what is “bad, unserious, and 
non-rigorous,” which of course presupposes a sovereign point over and 
                                                                                                                                           
 
37 Ibid., 226. 
 
 
38 Ibid., 228. 
 
 
39 Richard K. Ashley and Robert B. J. Walker, “Speaking the Language of Exile:  Dissident 
Thought in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 34, no. 2 (1990). 
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beyond various interpretations of what “good science” is from which such 
assessments may be undertaken. In defending predicate and metaphorical 
analyses, as shall we presume, methodologically sound forms of discourse 
analysis, Milliken claims that “using a method of ‘reading’ or ‘seeing’ can 
make research better organized and, therefore, easier to carry through.”40 
And “through its control over interpretive procedures, it can also bring 
greater insight into how a discourse is ordered, and into how discourses 
differ in their construction of social reality. Not insignificantly, it can also 
be shared to facilitate communication and debate among scholars [my 
emphasis].”41 
 
What is really at stake here? First of all, it is hard to imagine anyone 
objecting to Milliken’s claim that all social scientific research is, in a loose 
sense, about conducting rigorous theoretical and/or empirical work. What 
is more problematic, however, is the question of what constitutes “good” 
and “serious” research. The critical researcher might be less inclined to 
give in to the desire to impose strict axiological hierarchies between “bad,” 
“unserious,” and “regressive” discourse analysis on the one hand, and 
“good,” “serious,” and “progressive” discourse analysis on the other. 
Instead, a critical researcher, having read and digested Michel Foucault’s 
                                                   
40 Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations,” 235. 
 
 
41 Ibid., 235-236. 
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writings on power, not to mention Thomas Kuhn’s discrediting of any 
facile notion of progress within the natural sciences, would be attentive to 
the fact that all knowledge claims are not only contingent upon time and 
place, but also imbued by, and embedded within certain relations of 
power.42 The question of what constitutes good research is, at least in part, 
a political question, and cannot be settled from some “neutral,” 
“impartial,” or “objective” vantage point somehow beyond the workings of 
power. Milliken’s desire for secure standards against which research can 
be impartially assessed rather reveals one of the most deep-seated 
prejudices of traditional social scientific methodology: the enticement of 
belonging to a “flourishing research program,” to which the scholar may 
appeal when asked about the “point” or “value” of his or her work. 
 
As a second example of this desire to methodologize discourse analysis in 
critical IR, one may consider a more recent chapter on discourse analysis 
by Ole Waever.43 Waever sets out to discuss the “value and limitations” of 
discursive approaches in European integrations studies,44 and ends with a 
call for discursive approaches to reflect further on questions of method. 
                                                   
42 See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert 
Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990); Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). 
 
 
43 Ole Waever, “Discursive Approaches,” European Integration Theory, eds. Antje 
Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 197-215.  
 
 
44 Ibid., 197. 
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Without much substantiation, Weaver claims that “there is a widespread 
sense that it is time to be more ‘disciplined’ and self-reflective about how 
discourse analysis is carried out.”45 Though striking a more impersonal 
tone, Waever’s concerns are similar to those of Milliken. Waever implies 
that sound theory is to guide the reading of the text that the researcher 
undertakes. Otherwise, one may infer, the university becomes too 
dependent on the “personal” idiosyncrasies of the reader. In fact, Waever 
defends discourse analysis in its most conservative sense; a text possesses 
stable meanings that the reader/student/researcher, following a manual 
authored by the heroic theorist, is to pick out. The reader is, using 
Christopher Norris phrasing, cast as the “mere attendant” of the sovereign 
text.46  Such an understanding is at odds with deconstruction, which after 
all is a form of radical hermeneutics, in which reader and text can never be 
clearly separated, since neither a text (such as a book, an article, or a 
newspaper) or an individual are understood as self-enclosed and fully-
formed entities. 
 
But what is really at risk here? Waever never spells it out, but the fear 
seems to be that an injection of “personal” idiosyncrasies may threaten the 
disciplined thought deemed necessary for scholarly advancement. This 
                                                   
45 Ibid., 213. 
 
 
46 Norris, Deconstruction, 24. 
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position is in fact not all that distant from the one expressed by King, 
Keohane, and Verba in their highly influential Designing Social Inquiry.47 
Method is ultimately defended since it supposedly aids progress within its 
field of study. To put it simply, method makes science better. Likewise, 
Waever implicitly champions discourse analysis as an instrument for 
disciplinary advancement, in order to finally arrive at some truth about 
how things “really” work within a demarcated sphere of the world, i.e. a 
discipline. And as Jonathan Culler observes, a discipline “is the idea of an 
investigation in which writing might be brought to an end.” 48 Waever’s 
fear is in fact nothing but a manifestation of the desire to bring closure to 
writing itself, or in other words, a desire to bring writing to an end. 
 
But any student well knows that writing in fact never comes to an end. On 
the contrary, the stronger appeals to scientific authority that an 
interpretation makes, the more writing it tends to generate. No student of 
European integration has failed to notice that Andrew Moravcsik’s strong 
claims to scientific legitimacy in establishing his findings about what 
drives European integration, have in fact led to more resistance to his 
interpretations, from all possible quarters, traditional and non-traditional 
                                                   
47 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific 
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
 
 
48 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction. Theory and Criticism after Structuralism 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 90. 
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alike.49 The more persistent or power-full the truth claim, the stronger the 
resistance to such truth claim, and the increased proliferation of 
interpretations. In other words, the harder one tries to put an end to the 
proliferation of interpretations, the more interpretation it tends to 
generate. And, again gesturing to sociologists of knowledge such as Kuhn 
and Foucault, this process cannot be understood dialectically, as resulting 
in “a self-perspicuous moment of total illumination,” to speak with John 
Milbank.50 Let me however, more fully, clarify why deconstructive textual 
analysis resists all attempts at methodologization. 
 
Deconstructive textual analysis as understood here can never limit itself to 
the application of a set of methodological rules, given prior to the specific 
text under examination. In common usage, a “method” is usually 
understood as a body of rules and principles, which are applied to an 
object from some position of exteriority to that object.51 As Derrida has 
emphasized, deconstruction cannot be seen as a method in this sense since 
each deconstructive reading is singular to the text under consideration, 
                                                   
49 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
 
 
50 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 344.   
 
 
51 Rodolphe Gasché, The Tain of the Mirror (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986), 121-24. 
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and a deconstructive reading does not feign a position of exteriority to that 
text. To this extent, deconstruction is hermeneutical. As Derrida writes: 
 
Deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into 
one.  Especially if the technical and procedural significations of the 
word are stressed. … It is not enough to say that deconstruction 
could not be reduced to some methodological instrumentality or to 
a set of rules and transposable procedures. Nor will it do to claim 
that each deconstructive “event” remains singular or, in any case, as 
close as possible to something like an idiom or a signature. It must 
also be made clear that deconstruction is not even an act or an 
operation.52 
 
Deconstruction rather emphasizes the instability of writing, thus 
invalidating all attempts at imposing some ready-made categories of 
interpretation upon a text. Due to the refusal of drawing a boundary 
between deconstruction and the text being read, deconstruction can “never 
set [itself] up independently as a self-enclosed system of operative 
concepts,”53 and should instead be regarded as “parasitic, because 
[deconstructive readings] draw their sustenance from within the flesh of 
their host.”54 In fact, as Derrida claims at the end of the above quoted text, 
                                                   
52 Jacques Derrida, “Letter to a Japanese Friend,” Derrida and Différance, eds. David 
Wood and Robert Bernasconi, 1-5, trans. David Wood and Andrew Benjamin (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1988), 3. Compare Derrida’s remarks elsewhere: “The 
incision of deconstruction, which is not a voluntary decision or an absolute beginning, 
does not take place just anywhere, or in an absolute elsewhere. An incision… can be made 
only according to lines of forces and forces of rupture that are localizable in the discourse 
to be deconstructed.” Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981), 82. See also Norris, Deconstruction, 31; and Derrida, Of 
Grammatology, 24.  
 
 
53 Norris, Deconstruction, 31. 
 
 
54 Critchley, The Ethics of Deconstruction, 23. 
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deconstruction is not something that a sovereign author does to a text 
from some position of exteriority to the text. A text always deconstructs 
itself.55 Thus, the understanding of discourse analysis as a ready-made 
conceptual grid of intelligibility that the sovereign theorist slavishly 
imposes on the text is arguably at odds with deconstruction.  
 
Having said that, it is still perfectly feasible to provisionally tease out 
certain strategies of readings, or what could be called interpretive 
dispositions, of deconstructive textual analysis. Consider Jonathan Culler’s 
understanding of deconstruction as “to deconstruct a discourse is to show 
how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical 
oppositions on which it relies, by identifying in the text the rhetorical 
operations that produce the supposed ground of argument.”56 Clearly, on 
such an understanding of deconstruction, certain ways of reading seem to 
command themselves. Drawing on other scholars’ work, the reader will for 
instance be attentive to classical logocentric gestures that are found in 
much of western thought. One would however always be wary of trying to 
impose such gestures on the text, to which the desire to methodologize 
tends,—which would invalidate the “spirit” of deconstruction by a highly 
                                                   
55 See Derrida, “Letter to a Japanese Friend,”and Derrida, Of Grammatology, 157-64. 
 
 
56 Culler, On Deconstruction, 86. 
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irresponsible way of applying a ready-made formula, i.e. to turn 
deconstruction into a program.  
 
Having cautioned against the desire to methodologize, a deconstructive 
approach to European integration does nevertheless, like all approaches, 
carry certain a priori commitments, which inspire the reading of the texts 
under consideration in this dissertation. To begin with, on a textual 
understanding of Europe the question is not whether the “Europe” 
inscribed within the official discourse of the European Union is 
established and differentiated in opposition to other categories, since as 
noticed above, such differentiation is a condition of possibility for all 
systems of signification. The question is instead what the effects might be 
of the establishment of certain boundaries of differentiation for concrete 
sets of social relations. Most important perhaps is the question of whether 
a certain node of differentiation has to imply an imposition of a hierarchy.  
 
To elaborate, one may briefly recall Henry Staten’s notion of the 
constitutive outside, which he extrapolated from Derrida’s critique of 
logocentrism.57 Staten posits the general concept—or textual 
infrastructure—of a constitutive outside as Derrida’s alternative to “the 
fundamental philosophical concept of essence or form,—that is of unity 
                                                   
57 Henry Staten, Wittgenstein and Derrida (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1984). 
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and self-identity as the most general and inviolable boundaries of being 
and knowledge.”58 Derrida arrives at this understanding through a 
deconstruction of the Aristotelian essence/accident binary and shows that 
instead of accident being somehow parasitical and an aberration to be kept 
shielded from essence, accident is a possibility condition for essence—that 
is, prior to, enabling of, and exceeding that of essence—without which 
essence would be unsignifiable. Hence, as a condition of its possibility, 
essence is from the very beginning inevitably opened up to the possibility 
of accident—accident must remain a possibility for essence to be. Staten 
thus generalizes the notion of the constitutive outside: ”X is constituted by 
non-X. X here means essence or self-identity as conceived by philosophy, 
and non-X is what functions as ‘outside’, or limit, to the positive assertion 
of this self-identity, that which keeps ideality from complete closure, yet in 
limiting it remains the positive condition of the possibility of the positive 
assertion of essence.”59 Thus, as Rodolphe Gasché notes, not only are 
concepts what they are because of their differentiation from other 
concepts. The self-constituting otherness, i.e. their constitutive outsides, 
must always be inscribed within themselves.60 Throughout many of his 
writings, Derrida generalizes the structural relationship identified in the 
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essence/accident binary and argues that the characteristic move of 
Western metaphysics is to impose a binary opposition along with an 
axiological hierarchy between the two terms.61 
 
Extrapolating this Derridean critique of ontology, what follows is that in 
the signification of “Europe” a residual category, a “non-Europe,” 
inevitably emerges. Such a non-Europe is a necessary condition for the 
establishment of Europe in the first place, and is always prior to, enabling 
of, and exceeding that of any positive enunciation of what Europe is or 
might be/come. Europe “is” only Europe by the constant performance of 
exclusion of non-Europe. Thus, Europe is indeed always put at risk in this 
ontologizing gesture of self-enactment. Any answer to the question what 
Europe is will be an ontological one, insofar as it asks for the essence or 
Being of Europe, and entail an inside/outside schema of differentiation. 
However, granting this important point, a more difficult issue regards that 
of the establishment of an axiological relation between the terms of the 
binary. Two writers who did a lot to bring the idea of the necessity of 
differentiating between inside and outside in state formation, and the 
pivotal function of foreign policy in this process into IR, William Connolly 
and David Campbell considered the establishment of a hierarchy as a 
                                                   
61 E.g. Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc., ed. Gerald Graff, trans. Jeffrey Mehlman and 
Samuel Weber (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 93. 
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“temptation” rather than an eternal condition.62 Yet, as Bahar Rumelili 
aptly noticed and began addressing, they did not discuss the conditions 
under which this “temptation” might be resisted.63 Arguably, critical 
scholarship has been mostly inclined to emphasize encounters where there 
is or has been a clear imposition of axiological hierarchy, since such a 
relation most evidently enacts a relation of power. In this dissertation too, 
I shall mostly be preoccupied with the establishment of axiological 
hierarchies when Europe is enacted. 
 
However, unlike a number of discursive studies in IR employing some 
form of textual analysis, I am less interested in mapping out a discourse in 
anything approaching to its entirety than to disrupt and destabilize certain 
recurring motifs within it. Nor is my main concern to systematically map 
out self/other relationships, which has been a major concern of a lot of 
critical scholarship employing discourse analysis in critical IR, as well as in 
European integration studies.64 When it comes to the European Union, 
such discursive mapping hardly seems feasible since it will no doubt all 
                                                   
62 William E. Connolly, Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political 
Paradox (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 8; David Campbell, 
Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, rev. ed. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 78. 
 
 
63 Bahar Rumelili, “Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding EU’s 
mode of differentiation,” Review of International Studies 30, no. 1 (2004). 
 
 
64 For an overview in European integration studies see Waever, “Discursive Approaches.” 
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depend on what material one chooses to examine. Moreover, however 
valuable in laying bare hierarchical relations such mappings are, they risk 
partaking in the performance of the hierarchies those very relationships 
enact.65 Such studies often end up inflating the importance of the 
discourses they examine, since if those discourses were not particularly 
widely disseminated, the interest in studying them would be somewhat 
unclear. And in doing so, such studies might actually contribute to a wider 
dissemination of such discourses, hence incurring a share of responsibility 
for their perpetuation. 
 
To sum up the foregoing discussion, I will in this dissertation treat Europe 
as a highly contested signifier. In the chapters that follow, I conduct a 
series of readings of the textual time-space in which European integration 
takes place. Further, it should be clear that I find recent trends towards 
methodologization of textual approaches in IR unpersuasive and opposed 
to the “spirit” of deconstruction. While I shall exercise the greatest care in 
the chapters that follow, the readings follow no particular “school” of 
discourse analysis.  
                                                   
65 In the EU case, an example would be a work by Gerard Delanty on how Europe as a 
subject emerged historically. While his historical account is rather convincing, his bleak 
assessment of the ways in which Europe is being differentiated after the fall of Soviet 
communism is less helpful: European identity, Delanty claims using the broadest possible 
brush, is “rapidly becoming a white bourgeois populism defined in opposition to the 
Muslim world and the Third World.” Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, 
Reality (Houndmills and London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 155. Such blanket assessments 
entirely overlook not only various progressive, but also mainstream liberal narratives 
highly influential in many European countries, and arguably inadvertently rather 
contributes to the dissemination of much nastier narratives of Europe. 
 
 
  32 
 
 
 
Beyond the boundaries of negativity: The ethics of deconstruction and the 
colonial connection 
 
If, as indicated above, I am not willing to defend this dissertation in terms 
of a gap- filling exercise in some “progressive” research program, on what 
grounds shall I defend it? Ole Waever once described “postmodern” 
approaches as “beyond the boundary of negativity.”66 While most scholars 
working within the major traditions of continental thought would object to 
the label of “postmodernism,” a fairly common charge against works 
inspired by the more explicitly political work of Jacques Derrida and other 
scholars working in a deconstructive tradition is indeed that such work 
fails to make a “positive contribution” to a scholarly field. This question 
brings us to the often-asked question of “the point” of one’s research. To 
start recovering the radicalism of textual approaches in IR in general and 
European integration studies in particular, a first step involves clarifying 
the purpose—political, ethical, aesthetical, analytical, or other—of one’s 
writing.  
 
To give a recent example from European integration studies, James 
Rogers, gesturing to Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy undertakes a discourse analysis of EU’s foreign policy 
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discourse.67 Rogers argues that there has been a shift from a “civilian 
power Europe” discourse to a “global power discourse.” In short, the 
officials speaking in the name of the European Union are these days less 
inclined to speak about a norms-based foreign policy, and more 
comfortable with using a more traditional power political discourse when 
speaking about Europe in relation to the rest of the world.  Be that as it 
may, it is not altogether clear what “discourse analysis” adds here. 
Rogers’s argument is couched in analytical terms, so that the appeal to 
“discourse analysis” merely risks serving the legitimizing purpose of 
adding a bit of highbrow theoretical vocabulary to a descriptive, and 
uncritical, piece of work. Similarly, in Ole Waever’s piece cited above 
where he discusses discourse analysis in European integration studies,68 
he almost entirely omits the critical dimension of discourse analysis, 
insofar as it is indebted to the works of Foucault and Derrida, and in what 
remains the most fully worked out poststructuralist understanding of 
discourse, namely Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy.69 
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So what is really the point of deconstructive textual analysis as conceived 
here? Let me attempt to address that question by considering a fairly 
common line of criticism. If we approach a text aspiring to discipline 
meaning, or impose closure on any mode of identity, with a Derridean 
meta-model of interpretation, isn’t it then inevitable what a deconstructive 
reading will end up telling us (closure is impossible, the outside is already 
on the inside, meaning emerges through a process of differing and deferral 
where ultimate meaning is for ever deferred etc.)? In that sense, wouldn’t 
our “findings” or “results” be contained in the way we read the text—
especially considering that deconstruction isn’t really something a 
purportedly sovereign agent does to a text, one simply points to the 
instances in which the text deconstructs itself.70 First of all, it should once 
again be noted that the characterization of deconstruction as a “meta 
model of interpretation” is not fortunate, since it comes too close to 
sounding like a framework above and beyond the subject of study, which 
deconstruction would resist. Nor is arguably “interpretation” a particularly 
well-chosen word, since it reinstates the binary between reader and text, a 
binary that textuality rejects.  
 
Nevertheless, having noticed the problematic phrasing of such an 
objection, the question of the value or “point” of deconstruction could be 
addressed by considering what has become known as the “ethical turn” in 
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deconstruction.71 Arguably, deconstructive textual analysis could and 
should be justified ethically. As Simon Critchley puts it: “the textual 
practice of deconstructive reading can and, moreover, should be 
understood as an ethical demand.”72 While not entering into the complex 
debate of whether there is a “normative void” at the core of 
poststructuralist notions of discourse,73 I understand deconstructive 
textual analysis as primarily having to do with ethics. This understanding 
also amounts to a tentative defense of the “point” of my undertaking in 
this dissertation. Thus, in this dissertation, deconstruction is understood 
as a strategic way of reading that seeks to expose the dangers of, as well as 
disable, foundationalist desires for Europe to have a stable content, and 
an ethical demand to keep the problem of Europe as an opening rather 
than as a state/ment, which inevitably entails a number of repressions, 
marginalizations, and exclusions, and quite frankly severely limits an 
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ethico-political imagination of how collective life on the continent of 
Europe might be organized in perhaps more ethically responsible ways. 
And here, the question of “the state” is obviously of fundamental 
importance, since as I will elaborate on in the first chapter, European 
integration was from its inception a critical, indeed even a radical project. 
Within the intellectual circles where ideas of European integration took 
hold, the state had been thoroughly discredited after the Second World 
War, and the task at hand was precisely to break with the violence that the 
state was thought to be closely associated to. A critique of state violence 
then lies at the very core of the ethos that originally animated European 
integration. This critical dimension of the European project has largely 
been lost in the contemporary academia imbued with notions of “political 
neutrality” and “objectivity.” The dissertation thus is also an attempt to 
reconnect with, and bring to the fore, the critical roots of European 
integration discourse.  
 
How then, is ethics understood in this dissertation? Ethics is here 
understood in the tradition of Levinas and Derrida as something that 
occurs when the purported self-identity of the knowing subject is put into 
question by its inability to assimilate, domesticate, and fully comprehend 
alterity. The other summons me—calls me to justice—to justify myself 
before the face of the other. This understanding of ethics could be 
contrasted to what Levinas refers to as the dominant tradition of western 
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philosophy as ontology, which strives to reduce otherness to sameness. As 
Critchley puts it: “Philosophy qua ontology is the reduction of the other to 
the Same, where the other is assimilated like so much food and drink—‘O 
digestive philosophy!’ as Sartre exclaimed against French neo-
Kantianism.”74  
 
As Critchley further makes clear; deconstruction, as a way of reading, 
attempts to locate alterities within a text, from which a dominant 
interpretation wedded to a logocentric tradition may be decentred: 
 
The very activity of thinking, which lies at the basis of 
epistemological, ontological, and veridical comprehension, is the 
reduction of plurality to unity and alterity to sameness. The activity 
of philosophy, the very task of thinking, is the reduction of 
otherness. In seeking to understand the other, its otherness is 
reduced or appropriated to our understanding. To think 
philosophically is to comprehend–comprendre, comprehendere, 
begreifen, to include, to seize, to grasp–and master the other, 
thereby reducing its alterity … As the attempt to attain a point of 
exteriority to logocentrism, deconstruction may therefore be 
“understood” as the desire to keep open a dimension of alterity 
which can neither be reduced, comprehended, nor, strictly 
speaking, even thought by philosophy.75 
 
Deconstructive reading, or what Critchley calls clôtural reading, seeks to 
bring the self-certainly of a dominant textual logic into question, and 
demonstrate its indebtedness to expelled, repressed, and marginalized 
alterity. Deconstruction therefore amounts to “in a complex sense, ethical 
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history.”76 “Deconstructive reading responds to political topics by giving a 
rigorous clôtural reading of a text (in the general sense) and by showing 
how the undecidability of reading has its horizon in the thought of 
irreducible responsibility, an affirmation of alterity.”77 In terms of the 
subject matter of this dissertation, this brings us to the question of 
Europe’s colonial past—the many historically repressed and marginalized 
others of Europe. 
 
When writing of European integration, it is a serious omission for anyone 
wanting to write critically to neglect speaking of Europe’s colonial 
heritage, and the postcolonial world in which European integration now 
takes place. A few authors have insisted that European integration should 
be understood against the historical background of European colonialism 
and the contemporary postcolonial condition.78 Peo Hanson for example 
suggests that in order to construct a narrative of European integration as 
most fundamentally concerned with peace, the violent colonial practices 
that many of its founding members were engaged in, such as the French 
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war in Algeria and Indochina, had to be forgotten.79 On the deconstructive 
approach taken in this dissertation, “Europe” and “European identity” 
emerges as an effect of the many constitutive outsides to Europe. 
Whatever foundationalist figures of “Europe” one may want to evoke, such 
a figure is shot through with traces of what it is not. So by studying 
“Europe” as something that emerges “from within” so to speak, I will once 
again risk erasing the traces of the many constitutive outsides to Europe—
to which Europe owes an elemental debt. This otherness, however, cannot 
be treated as a new origin, which would simply be to revert the old colonial 
hierarchy between Europe and non-Europe, and the constitutive outsides 
to Europe cannot be conceptualized as anything but effects. This rendition 
presents us with a problem. Although basically in agreement with Derrida 
concerning his insistence on the radical historicity of the present, Homi 
Bhabha has argued that deconstruction deprives colonial otherness of 
agency, so that the (colonial) other is not to be understood as anything but 
an effect of an assertion of the Westerner.80 Once again, Bhabha has 
argued, western academia is turning otherness into a passive subject, 
entirely in the hands of the West.  
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In this dissertation, I seek to be attentive to postcolonial arguments in two 
basic ways. First, while writing about European integration, I will also seek 
to as Dipesh Chakrabarty puts it, “provincialize Europe.”81 By this, I mean 
that I will treat as problematic Euro-centric modernist narrations of 
“progress,” “development,” and “civilization.” While few public 
intellectuals, scholars, or even serious politicians on the European 
continent embrace a simplistic modernist notion of progress and universal 
history à la Fukuyama, as we shall see in this dissertation, rhetorical 
figures are still to be found in EU’s official discourse that are clearly 
indebted to such developmentalist thinking. Since such discourses enact 
relations of hierarchy between the “Europe” that emerges in European 
integration and modes of subjectivity outside of the territorial boundaries 
of Europe, I will seek to problematize such figures. Second, in the sixth 
chapter of the dissertation, I think the problem of European integration 
through the prism of migration, and seek to open up the contestation of 
the signifier of “Europe” to subject positions marginalized by the statist 
desires within the official discourse of European integration.  In the voice 
of those migrants lay the promise of an other “Europe” and “European 
integration,” since in the subversion of official narrations of Europe in 
everyday practice, one may perhaps glimpse more ethically responsible 
deployments of “Europe.” However flawed and incomplete, this 
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dissertation is ultimately an attempt to write but a few chapters of a 
contemporary ethical history of European integration. 
 
 
Outline of chapters 
 
In the second chapter, entitled Statecraft, Desire, and the Question of 
European Integration “Beyond the State,” I argue that European 
integration needs to be problematized, and thought through in relation to-
⎯rather than a priori postulated to radically depart from—modern 
statecraft. Instead of conceptualizing the crafting of Europe as 
qualitatively different from modern statecraft, a critical understanding of 
European integration should highlight their many similarities, and grapple 
with the politico-ethical implications of those. The central question here is 
whether and to what extent discourses of European integration merely 
reproduces statecraft at a bigger level, something which functionalist 
David Mitrany famously charged Ernest Haas’s neofunctionalism of 
doing.82 And like Mitrany, I understand this to be important primarily as 
an ethico-political rather than as an analytical problematic. By drawing on 
various critical literatures and an understanding of the state made explicit 
by Roxanne Doty, I put forward an understanding of statecraft as desire.83 
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I contend that the European integration should be understood and 
thought through as an on-going problematic of analogy between statecraft 
and what I call Euro-crafting, i.e. the discursive crafting of Europe. 
 
In the third chapter, entitled In Search of a Foundation for Europe: EU’s 
Failed Constitution, I offer a deconstructive reading of the failed European 
Constitutional Treaty, the most authoritative attempt to bound Europe’s 
self ever since the inception of European integration. I show that the 
Constitutional Treaty attempts to establish Europe as a community of 
values by linking it to a transcendental signified in the shape of a set of 
universal values. This is problematic since a close reading of the 
Constitution reveals that the major condition of possibility of Europe-as-a-
unified-whole, namely Europe’s past resting on a set of universal values, 
coincide with its major condition of impossibility since this source 
simultaneously contains all that which has always torn Europe apart. In 
addition, and what I will come back to in the fourth chapter, the 
Constitutional Treaty expresses one of the defining gestures of modern 
statecraft: the universal is being compacted into a particular. Although 
Europe is defined by reference to a particular set of values, as proper to 
Europe, those values are simultaneously said to be universal. 
 
In the fourth chapter, Solana’s Struggle: Universality, Particularity, and 
Exemplarity in the Crafting of the European Union, a deconstructive 
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reading of the collected speeches by the person authorized to speak on 
behalf of Europe between 1999 and 2009, namely Javier Solana, follows. 
This chapter engages EU’s foreign policy discourse, and the academic 
debate surrounding it. I demonstrate that the values that are said to 
sustain Europe’s identity and upon which Europe would be founded are 
simultaneously presented as distinctly European and universal. Europe is 
being crafted in a pendular oscillation between on the one hand 
particularizing and on the other hand universalizing the values upon 
which Europe allegedly rests. I argue that this very contradictory 
oscillation between particularizing and universalizing Europe’s values to 
an important extent mirrors modern statecraft. If anything could be 
deemed as common to the European experience of statecraft, it would be 
this very contradiction itself. I also spell out the risks in both 
universalizing and particularizing Europe. 
 
In the fifth chapter, European Integration Theory and the Problem of 
Statism: On the Limited Imagination of Neofunctionalism, I examine how 
political theorists have theorized European integration. The chapter 
focuses on the body of theory that goes under the name of 
neofunctionalism, and finishes with a critique of more contemporary 
political theory on European integration. I offer two readings of 
neofunctionalism, focusing on its understanding of political community 
and identity. The first reading could be referred to as the dominant logic of 
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neo-functionalist discourse—as a discourse which in its desire to 
depoliticize social relations ends up invoking a highly traditionally statist 
understanding of political community. Despite its wish to go “beyond the 
state,” it fails to conceptualize European integration in categories that 
break with the modalities of modern statecraft. I show in some detail that 
neofunctionalism is in fact heavily statist, and relies on the deeply 
problematic understanding of the state found in the social contract 
tradition. Instead of challenging the peculiar political organization of the 
modern western state, neofunctionalism has helped and is helping to 
retrench it and turn it into the implicit or explicit model, or “ideal-type,” in 
Weberian parlance, against which the European Union is perpetually 
evaluated.  
 
However, there is also a different reading of neofunctionalism that can be 
made. And here, I seek to unearth the radical impulse of neofunctionalism, 
as a theoretical body that emerged as a critique of the modern state, which 
had become much discredited after the Second World War. A discourse 
that is often read as depoliticizing social relations may in fact be read as 
inadvertently politicizing the question of political community and identity. 
On this reading, neofunctionalism may be read as demonstrating the lack 
of foundations for the Europe it seeks to perform, thus opening up for a re-
politicization of the question of Europe. This reading points us away from 
the essentializing identity understandings of Europe that we found in the 
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Constitutional Treaty and in EU’s foreign policy discourse. Rather, it 
points us towards imagining alternative ways of organizing social and 
political life, which may have little to do with “community” at all.  
 
In the penultimate chapter, Euro-Crafting at Border Zones: Desires for 
Europe at the Greco-Turkish Border, I explore the crafting of the 
European Union through the prism of migration. I examine the recent 
humanitarian crisis precipitated by irregular migration into the European 
Union through Greece. Taking what the UNHCR in 2010 called a 
“humanitarian crisis” at EU’s border to Turkey as a case study, the chapter 
draws on field research undertaken 2011 in Greece among members of 
what is arguably one of the most destitute migrant communities recently 
arrived to Europe⎯the Somali community in Athens. I also draw on 
interviews with members of EU’s border force team, FRONTEX, stationed 
in the border area between Greece and Turkey, as well as newspaper 
accounts, human rights reports, and other published material. Here I 
examine the contestation of the signifier “Europe” in a highly concrete 
setting. I show how the desire for Europe is constitutive of subject 
positions ranging from that of “European border guard” to “migrant 
wishing to come to Europe” and argue that far from challenging the 
characteristic gestures of statecraft, practices of European integration 
rather appears to be solidifying them. In short, the way the signifier 
“Europe” is deployed and circulated by migrants as well as members of 
EU’s border force in many ways mirrors modern statecraft. The 
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concluding chapter reflects on the significance of the findings of this 
dissertation for practices of European integration.  
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Chapter 2 
STATECRAFT, DESIRE, AND THE QUESTION OF A EUROPEAN 
UNION “BEYOND THE STATE” 
Countless academics, intellectuals, journalists, and politicians of all 
ideological stripes have celebrated European integration as something 
novel, innovative, and progressive. In its “Fourth Lesson about the 
European Union,” the EU’s website rehearses this familiar refrain: “The 
European Union is more than just a confederation of countries, but it is 
not a federal state. It is, in fact, a new type of structure that does not fall 
into any traditional legal category.”84  What is more, this “new type of 
structure” that the reader learns about in her Fourth Lesson about the EU, 
has been widely celebrated from almost all quarters and ideological 
persuasions. Cosmopolitan theorist David Held laments that the EU 
suffers from “something of an identity crisis” despite “all its extraordinary 
innovation and progress.”85 If the EU could somehow find a remedy to its 
“identity crisis” and “find herself,” the reader may quickly infer, the future 
prospects for global life would rapidly start to look much brighter. Neo-
Gramscian Robert W. Cox, contrasting the EU to bête-noire U.S. 
hyperpuissance, approvingly claims that the EU, by a skillful blend of 
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realpolitik and moral preference, “tend[s] to envisage a world political 
order … as the search for consensus and the elaboration of international 
law.”86 And perhaps most surprisingly, at the dawn of the U.S.-led 
invasion of Iraq in February 2003, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida 
jointly called for the development of a European common foreign policy, a 
pan-European identity, and argued that the European Union “offers itself 
as a form of ‘governance beyond the nation-state’, which could set a 
precedent in the postnational constellation.”87 
 
This dissertation will examine whether the European Union really could be 
said to represent something so novel, progressive, and exemplary as its 
innumerable supporters would have it. In order to start doing so, I will in 
this chapter⎯drawing on a variety of literatures in critical political and 
social theory⎯present a framework for thinking critically about European 
integration. Inspired by Roxanne Doty’s work, I will present an 
understanding of statecraft as desire.88 It will then in the chapters that 
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follow be possible to read various discourses on European integration 
against such an understanding of statecraft in order to address the 
question of EU’s alleged novelty, and start addressing the ethics of 
European integration discourse. My main contention here is that the 
question of European integration should be posited as a question of 
performative statecraft, rather than measured against any kind of 
purportedly finalized and selfsame entity referred to as “a state.” Before 
any proclamations of the EU as an entity that has moved “beyond the 
state” can be made, a more serious and critical understanding of “the 
state” than those currently on offer in European Integration Studies is 
called for. Second, why does it matter if the crafting of the European 
Union differs little from the desire-driven practices of modern statecraft? 
In response to this question, I will make clear that statecraft rests on a 
constitutive violence. Thus, the gestures made towards a greater degree of 
ethical awareness by some of the representatives of the European Union 
will largely remain futile, insofar as in the crafting of the European Union 
the constitutive violence of the modern state is reproduced.  
 
The chapter unfolds as follows. In the first section, I review the literature 
on the question of the EU and the problem of the state, which clarifies the 
overall contribution to the existing scholarship made by this dissertation. 
In the second section, drawing primarily on Ernesto Laclau’s and Chantal 
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Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, and some writings by Michel 
Foucault, I argue for a general shift from “state” to “statecraft,” that is 
analytically needed in order to think critically of European integration. In 
the third section, inspired by Doty’s work, and drawing on a variety of 
other critical writings, I put forward an understanding of “the state” as an 
effect of a plethora of practices of identification/bordering (i.e. statecraft), 
animated by a desire for order, stability, and foundation. In the final 
section, I seek to make explicit the problem with “the state,” in order to 
clarify why “the state” cannot be considered as an adequate solution to the 
problem of violence in the western tradition, which harks back to the 
understanding of ethics as outlined in the first chapter of the dissertation. 
 
European Union and the problem of the state 
Discourses promoting European integration gained prominence during 
the Second World War and would in the 1950s emerge as an 
institutionalized response and proposed solution to the tremendously 
bloody history of the European continent. 89 The “Europe” of the early 
European movement and the theorists of European integration, the so-
called neo-functionalists, started out as a negative signifier. What 
“Europe” sought to negate was the traditional construal of the nation state, 
which was understood to be intimately associated with nationalism, 
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militarism, and ultimately a normative order which made the two world 
wars, and even the Holocaust, possible.90 The signifier “Europe” assumed 
the form of a promise of a way of organizing political life beyond the state, 
hence to radically break with the violent past of European political life. 
Ernest B. Haas, arguably the first major theorist of European integration, 
entitled his magnum opus Beyond the State, a title largely indicative of 
this analytical bent that rested upon a normative anti-statism.91 Assumed 
in much of this discourse was that the violence associated with the two 
world wars and the Holocaust constituted a radical break with an 
“authentic” European identity that European integration would recover, 
safeguard, and rest upon.92  
 
Haas’s neofunctionalism fell out of favor as European integration stalled in 
the mid-1960s, while the normative anti-statism that imbued 
neofunctionalism was largely lost in the desire to put European 
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Integration Studies (EIS) on a scientific footing. In the lore of EIS, a 
theoretical position which became known as intergovernmentalism 
emerged as the main contender to neofunctionalism. 
Intergovernmentalism was most closely associated with the writings of 
Stanley Hoffmann, who in a much-cited article in 1966 argued that the 
nation state was still firmly in control of the process of European 
integration.93 The nation state, he argued, was not simply withering away 
as some of the neofunctionalists thought (and hoped), and the process of 
integration was not primarily driven by supranational institutions but 
instead by the national interests of the major states. The 
intergovernmentalist position would later on be merged with U.S. 
mainstream liberal political science by Andrew Moravcsik, whose The 
Choice for Europe proposed a “liberal intergovernmentalist” framework to 
explain European integration, and rapidly established itself as one of the 
most influential works in EIS in the late 1990s.94 In fact, it was in early 
2000 common to portray EIS as divided between neofunctionalists and 
intergovernmentalists. But even the hardline intergovernmentalist 
Moravcsik, did believe that the EU represented something rather different 
from an international organization.  
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Scholars viewing the EU purely as an international organization have in 
fact always been rare. Ever since the heyday of the European Coal and 
Steel Community in the 1950s, most observers have conceptualized the 
European Union and its predecessors as an entity somewhere “in between” 
an international organization and a federal state, often invoking a rather 
problematic teleological narration of political organization.95 An example 
of this way of approaching the EU is to be found in the writings of Simon 
Hix, who has been particularly influential in Comparative Politics, 
asserting that the EU is not a full-blown Weberian state but should still be 
theorized as an entity in its own right, mainly by using theories developed 
for and from national political systems.96 Hix thereby sought to bypass a 
question that has haunted EIS ever since its inception: the question of 
what the EU is. In 1985 former President of the European Commission 
Jacques Delors famously referred to the EU as an “Unidentified Political 
Object.”97 Fanciful images about everything from blind men touching 
different parts of an elephant to geese flying in formation had to be 
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resorted to in order to capture the alleged exceptionality of the EU.98 
Alberta Sbragia summed up this received wisdom: “the European 
Community is a political entity that does not fit into any accepted category 
of governance.”99 And although there is a massive amount of different 
takes on what the EU is, there is as Stefano Bartolini more recently wrote, 
almost perfect agreement that the EU is not a state. Rather, the EU is 
widely believed to be different from any other political arrangement. 100 So 
if the EU represents an exceptional way of organizing political life, wherein 
lies this exceptionality? In other words, how does it supposedly differ from 
the modern state? I will in what follows discuss some major interventions 
in this long-standing debate. My discussion here will focus on the 
analytical strands of this scholarship. It should be noticed that there is an 
openly normative body of work concerning the post-nationality of the 
EU.101  
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In an influential statement, John G. Ruggie argued that modernity is more 
than anything characterized by a specific way of organizing territory: “the 
distinctive feature of the modern system of rule is that it has differentiated 
its subject collectively into territorially defined, fixed, and mutually 
exclusive enclaves of political domination.”102 He further argued that 
European integration demonstrates a break in the modern form of 
organizing political space into “disjoint, mutually exclusive, and fixed” 
territories, of which the modern sovereign state is the institutional 
manifestation that is the hallmark of modernity.103 Due to the “social 
defects” of having territory organized into separate and mutually exclusive 
containers (“states”), the “unbundling of territoriality” has historically 
been a way of rectifying this. Ruggie argued that the European Community 
has taken the process of unbundling of territoriality further than anything 
hitherto seen; that is to break with the modern way of organizing political 
life. The EC, Ruggie believed, “may constitute nothing less than the 
                                                                                                                                           
Discourses and People's Views,” European Journal of Social Theory 11, no. 4 (2008). 
According to Antonsich: “In this view, a post-national Europe is a territorially vague and 
governmentally multiple space, filled with universal, cosmopolitan values, beyond the 
particularism of the nation state.” Ibid., 506. 
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emergence of the first truly postmodern international political form,”104 
precisely since the EU “may constitute the first ‘multiperspectival polity’ to 
emerge since the advent of the modern era.”105 This is so, argued Ruggie, 
since the policy of the EC, as well as within the member states, is no longer 
conducted from one single point but from 12 points:106  “the constitutive 
processes whereby each of the twelve defines its own identity … 
increasingly endogenize the existence of the other eleven.” This 
“reimagining,” however, Ruggie conjectured without offering any specific 
reasons, is unlikely to result in a federal state “which would merely 
replicate on a larger scale the typical modern political form.”107 Although 
Ruggie’s discussion of statehood focused on territory, his argument for the 
exceptionality of the EU was rather about sovereignty. Within the EU, 
sovereignty is unlike in the modern state dispersed so that the single 
viewpoint of the state is being replaced by several viewpoints. Hence, 
sovereignty in the EU is, according to Ruggie, de-centralized and 
dispersed. This argument, as will be made clear below, relies on a 
traditional, ontologizing top-down understanding of the state, which 
misconstrues the already dispersed character of “the sovereign state.” 
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A few years later, James Caporaso argued that the EU might be compared 
to different forms of state. He set out three forms of state; the 
Westphalian, the regulatory, and the post-modern state, and compared the 
EU to each of those forms. Rather than postulating a fixed constellation of 
institutional arrangements as characteristic of a state, a state form is 
understood as “clusters of institutions embedded within distinctive 
historical periods.”108 Caporaso argued that each state form captures some 
tendencies of what is going on in the EU. He noted that “the Westphalian 
model encourages us to see regional integration centering on the EU as a 
re-enactment of the traditional processes of state-building from the 
seventeenth to the twentieth centuries,” but argued that this is not a 
promising avenue since 1) the EU “falls short” of the Westphalian model; 
and 2) “activities [of the EU] go off in directions not captured by the 
Westphalian state.”109 Although Caporaso hinted at a processual 
understanding of the state, the processes that he considered were 
macrohistorical in nature. The state, as I will argue below, needs to be 
decentered more fully and treated as an effect of practices at the 
microlevel, rather than at the macrolevel. 
 
                                                   
108 James Caporaso, “The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory 
or Post-Modern?” Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no. 1 (1996), 31. 
 
 
109 Ibid., 36. 
 
 
  58 
In a more recent statement, Jan Zielonka has argued that the EU 
resembles a “neo-medieval empire.”110 Noticing the teleological orientation 
of much of the scholarship in EIS, he argues that the EU is most common 
conceptualized as on its way to become a “Westphalian federation” akin to 
the modern state. However, the EU will according to Zielonka not 
resemble the 19th century British empire or the 20th century American 
empire but rather a political constellation from the Middle Ages; a “neo-
medieval empire.” He further agued that “most of the literature applies 
statist analogies and terms when writing about the EU,”111 According to 
Zielonka, “the use of statist terms and analogies is quite misleading 
because the Union is anything but a state. It has no effective monopoly 
over the legitimate means of coercion. It has no clearly defined centre of 
authority. Its territory is not fixed. Its geographical, administrative, 
economic, and cultural borders diverge. And the Union is a very different 
kind of international actor than any of the states we know from history.”112 
Further, Zielonka asserted that the EU is hardly evolving into a Weberian 
state: “Although there are many parallels between the European-
integration process and the state-building process, the end product of the 
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former is anything but a Westphalian superstate.”113 Thus, Zielonka still 
held on to much of the received wisdom in EIS: 1) the EU cannot be 
considered a state; and 2) the EU’s way of organizing political life is, at 
least in the modern era, unprecedented. 
 
Among the more critically oriented scholarship, there have been a few 
voices skeptical of this celebratory position. Rob Walker, for example, has 
highlighted the difficulties of thinking about European integration in ways 
not beholden to a statist imagination: “if Europe is not appropriately 
conceived as a modern state, or a republic, or a polis writ large, then it is 
far from clear what it means to think about Europe as a site of political life 
at all.”114 He went on to suggest that European integration, insofar as it is 
ridden with western spatial assumptions, replicates statecraft: “Modern 
sovereignty affirms an account of politics in space. The modern sovereign 
state affirms an account of politics in a geographical territory. Europe 
names an alternative geographical territory and invites a reproduction of 
state sovereignty on a larger scale.”115  
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Few writers have empirically and systematically sought to substantiate 
Walker’s suggestion. Anthropologist Cris Shore’s body of work on the 
European Union certainly speaks to those issues, and his work will be 
examined in the sixth chapter of this dissertation. Political scientist Rainer 
Hülsse however has examined the German discourse on EU enlargement 
in the 1990s, and found that European identity was constructed more like 
a traditional modern national identity than in a “post-modern way.”116 
Hülsse starts by identifying two criteria for what it would mean to go 
“beyond the state.”117 First, he draws a distinction between civic and 
primordial sources of identity, and argues that a post-national entity 
would invoke civic rather than primordial sources of identity as a 
foundation for itself. A primordial identity would be based upon cultural 
sources, whereas a civic identity would be based upon political sources. 
This distinction, however, is problematic for several reasons. The U.S. 
“national identity” is for example more likely to invoke political (such as 
the U.S. Constitution) rather than cultural (such as ethnicity) sources. 
Despite largely drawing on political rather than cultural sources of 
identity, it would be difficult to characterize the U.S. as a “post-national” 
entity. 
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Hülsse’s second criterion for post-nationalism concerns the way in which 
self is differentiated from other. Here, he draws on a distinction between 
an “analog” a “digital” mode of differentiating self from other, made by 
Iver Neumann.118 A “digital” mode of differentiation seeks to define clear 
and unambiguous identities, where self is entirely separated from other, 
whereas an “analog” mode of differentiation produces more ambiguous 
and far less clear-cut identities. Hülsse suggests that if the EU is to be 
classified as a “postnational entity” it would have to operate on an “analog” 
mode of differentiation, and invoke civic sources of identity. He found that 
”The enlargement-metaphors employed in the German discourse 
construct a European identity very similar to national identities.”119 And he 
concludes that ”the metaphors by which we imagine Europe do not tell us 
a very post-modern story, but one that reminds us of the modern, national 
identities.”120  
 
Finally, Necati Polat has recently argued that European integration fails to 
transcend the modern state but rather resembles a “parody” of the 
European nation state. Polat argues: “The nation-state confined to the 
mimetic, a site dismissed by the EU as contingent and secondary, has 
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effectively subverted the EU in its colonizing, supranational authority. The 
EU, in its efforts to overwhelm the nation-stat, has been unsettled and 
shaped via a number of hybrid demands, as symbolized in the imagery tied 
to the nation-state, which the EU has incorporated; a European flag and a 
hymn, currency, citizenship, a constitution, and so on. Driven apparently 
by a policy of appropriating the cultural and political wherewithal of these 
insignia, the EU has in fact been trapped and undermined.”121  
 
Polat posits the nation-state as “the colonized” and the EU as “the 
colonizer” and drawing on Homi Bhabha’s notion of hybridity, argues that 
when the EU seeks to colonize the nation-state what emerges is a hybrid 
identity that ends up challenging the authority of the EU precisely because 
it has to appeal to the authority of the nation state. As in the case of the 
European citizenship ”the EU appears to seek a strengthening of its 
authority in its operations to subjugate the nation-state; but because the 
EU appeals in doing so to none other than the very acclaim and prestige of 
the nation-state, as reflected in the plagiarized notion of citizenship, the 
EU becomes mimetically subservient to the nation-state.”122 Since there is 
no other source of authority to appeal to than the old nation state, the logic 
of hybridity “that comes to define the supranational association means, 
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however, that the end-result of the integration may be no more than 
simply the nation-state set out on a larger scale, as distinct from an 
aspired post-national entity.”123 Polat finishes, rather hyperbolically, by 
suggesting that “the brutalities that marked the European past continue 
unabated, now unleashed simply on the non-EU nationals and immigrant 
workers.”124  
 
Decentering “the state:” from state to statecraft  
This dissertation seeks to add to the critical approaches to European 
Integration Studies, and in order to think critically about European 
integration, I argue in this section that a move from “state” to statecraft is 
needed. Unlike James Caporaso, who distinguishes between different state 
forms, I am more interested in distinguishing an actor model of the state 
from a performative understanding of statecraft. As Richard Devetak 
writes, a critical understanding of statecraft “focuses attention on the 
processes by which the state is constituted [and interrogates] the vast 
array of strategies, tactics techniques, practices and policies which create 
the effect of a completed state.”125 To approach European integration with 
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a notion of performative statecraft reinstates the state problematique at 
the center of an interrogation of European integration instead of a priori 
postulating any kind of exceptionality to the European Union. 
 
Traditional theories of “the state” confer a certain ontological standing 
onto its purported object of study. In other words, such theories infuse it 
either explicitly or implicitly, with a certain is-ness. In the Liberal, 
Pluralist, and Marxist theoretical traditions, “the state” is broadly speaking 
seen as an authoritative and controlling apparatus, obstructing or enabling 
the freedom of the⎯already constituted liberal possessive or naturally 
community desiring⎯individual.126 Further, “the state” is understood as a 
distinctly separate institution from the rest of society, which entails a clear 
distinction between the public and the private spheres, upon which it 
exercises a repressive negative power.127 In Max Weber’s famous 
definition, fully within the ontologizing social contract tradition and 
indeed rather Hobbesian, a “state” is defined by its monopoly to 
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legitimately exercise violence within a given territorially defined space.128 
When measured against such an understanding of “the state,” the EU 
clearly does not qualify for the designation of “a state.” This was for 
example made clear in a recent ruling by the German federal 
constitutional court over whether the Lisbon Treaty was compatible with 
Germany’s Basic Law.129 Within the terms of such a discourse of “the 
state,” it is hard to disagree with the Court’s definition of the EU as a 
“long-term association of states which remain sovereign, a treaty-based 
association which exercises public authority, but whose fundamental order 
is subject to the decision-making power of the Member States and in 
which the peoples, i.e. the citizens, of the Member States remain the 
subjects of democratic legitimation.” On such an understanding, the EU 
clearly falls short of a state, to use a metaphor that risks to slip into a 
certain teleology. This understanding of a state, however, is not terribly 
illuminating for the purposes of a critical understanding of how “the state” 
works and the ethical implications of statecraft, that is, what statecraft 
does to concrete sets of social relations in everyday life. 
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On a more critically oriented understanding of “the state,” “the state” is 
not understood as a “thing” but as a cobweb of practices, and critical 
authors point to ways in which one may so to speak crack the state open 
by examining the practices that enact it.130 Hence, by examining and laying 
out in the open the many discursive rationalities that are constitutive of it, 
the state is no longer conceived of as a singular political power but a loose 
assembly of various practices.131 Thus, a critical approach fundamentally 
decenters the state. “The state” is perceived as an outcome and effect of the 
various rationalities, discourses, and performances that make it up, and as 
such is a phenomenon that stands in need of an explanation, not a taken-
for-granted starting point for social, economic, or political analysis. Social 
order, or what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe refer to as hegemony, 
comes about as a result of the complex interplay between various social 
forces rather than as the product of some either beneficial or sinister 
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controlling central authority such as the state.132 So “the state” “itself” is 
ultimately an effect of practice. In Timothy Mitchell’s words: the state 
“should be examined not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, 
metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to 
exist.”133 
 
Further, of great consequence for a critical approach to the question of 
statehood is to recognize that signifying practices (such as for example 
speech or writing) about “the state” are in and of themselves enactments 
of the state, and not only representational locutions. To use John Austin’s 
well-known distinction, statements about the state are both performative 
and constative locutions.134 The critical question that one may want to ask 
is precisely how it becomes possible for those speaking of and in the name 
of the state to get away with using the state in a constative mode⎯to 
ontologize it⎯as if one were simply referring to an entity beyond and 
outside of language, as if the referent was not being (re)produced and 
conjured up in the moment of its naming. In short, how does the state get 
away with its claim to statehood, i.e. the claim to “being” a state? One of 
                                                   
132 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
 
 
133 Mitchell, “The limits of the state: Beyond statist approaches and their critics,” 94. 
 
 
134 John Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
See also Jacques Derrida, “Declarations of Independence,” in Negotiations: Interventions 
and Interviews 1971-2001, ed. and trans. by Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford University 
Press: Stanford, 2002): 46-54. 
 
 
  68 
Foucault’s great contributions in this regard lies in his meticulous 
demonstration that those officially authorized to speak in the name of the 
state are not the major doers of statecraft. Since the state representatives 
are themselves not major doers of statecraft, in order to succeed, statecraft 
must have a self-erasing quality to it, where the most important 
enactments of the state take place at the myriad of social practices “at the 
bottom” of society in everyday practice, at the same time as the 
constitutive function of those practices are forgotten and repressed as 
such. Before moving on, let me elaborate a little bit further on this 
understanding of statecraft in relation to conventional understandings of 
the state, drawing on Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy, and some works by Foucault.  
 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, possibly still the most fully 
elaborated general critical social theory on offer,135 Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe conceptualize the field of social interaction as a discursive 
space.136 One should not confuse the preceding claim with an ontological 
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statement about the ultimate nature of reality ⎯about “reality” as opposed 
to “appearance.” Rather, if one were to engage in “ontology talk,” Laclau 
and Mouffe’s position is that there can be nothing beyond 
discourse⎯discourse does not re-present, i.e. stand in for something 
“beneath,” “beyond,” or “outside” of itself. Most importantly perhaps, their 
quasi-ontological concept⎯perhaps Gasché’s notion of infrastructure137 
identified in Derrida’s writings is a more appropriate designation than 
“concept”⎯ of discourse enables a considerable extension of the field of 
legitimate and important study, i.e. “the field of objectivity.”138 If we for 
example consider an analysis of social relations on the basis of natural 
science, “it limits both the objects that it is possible to construct within a 
discourse and the relations that can be established between them.”139 It 
would for instance exclude metaphor as real. However, by re-
conceptualizing the social as a discursive space, a metaphor can in itself 
contribute to the constitution of social forces. So, synonomy, metonomy 
and metaphor are not forms of epiphenomenal thought: instead, they are 
part of the ground itself in which the social is constituted.140 
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Further, their Gramscian-inspired notion of hegemony gives their 
theoretical enterprise a distinctly critical edge. As is well-known, Gramsci 
argued that in order for a dominant class to maintain its rule, it must 
somehow succeed in presenting its own cultural, social, and moral values 
as common sense⎯those values must become hegemonic. Hegemony, 
then, is about instilling the values upholding the prevailing order in the 
society at large. Importantly, as Ralph Miliband has observed, hegemony, 
is for Gramsci, also about persuading the subordinate classes that there is 
no genuine alternative to the present order; hence, hegemony comes to 
depend on resignation as much as consent.141 Hegemony, in Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discursive rendition, is the process of associating elements and 
trying to impose a dominant meaning on social practices that sets the 
limits for possible articulations within a certain structure, thereby drawing 
attention to what is excluded and repressed in a particular hegemonic 
articulation, and simultaneously opening up for imagining alternatives to 
the present social, economic, and political order. 
 
One might well wish to complement Laclau and Mouffe’s analysis of the 
social with the category of hegemony at its core, with a Foucauldian notion 
of power. Foucault’s writings on the workings of power give us several 
hints about the workings of and where to study the effectiveness of 
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hegemonic articulations. Just like Laclau and Mouffe, Foucault does 
certainly not present anything close to a neatly packaged theory of 
statecraft; rather, in many of his writings, he explicitly cautions against a 
narrow focus on “the state” in social analysis. Foucault’s famous remark 
that one must “cut off the king’s head” may be a useful entry point here. 
Foucault argues that one must get rid off the crippling notion of 
sovereignty, in order to start to understand the workings of power in 
society. As he puts it in The History of Sexuality “despite the differences in 
epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under 
the spell of monarchy.”142 Foucault here wants to challenge the idea of 
sovereignty as a model for how power works, a notion that grounds much 
contemporary social and political analysis, i.e. that is it possible to trace a 
single location and origin of power that expresses itself through a set of 
constraining laws⎯which is the very model of social contractarian (liberal) 
political theory à la Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Rawls. Indeed, the perhaps 
most fundamental question of liberal political theory is the legitimacy of 
the sovereign’s power,143 which became pressing due to the simultaneous 
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emergence of the sovereign state and the sovereign individual, which 
somehow had to be reconciled.144  
 
At least in part, this should be understood as an argument about a 
historical transformation of sovereignty; as Joseph Rouse puts it: 
“Although many of the political forms and practices of sovereign power 
remained in place, they were gradually taken over and ultimately 
sustained on the basis of power relations that functioned at a different 
location and scale.”145 This position, however, should not be taken to imply 
that, traditional⎯or any, centers of political powers have become 
unimportant. Rather, it undermines the validity of social and political 
analysis that only examine would-be centers, on the model of the working 
of top-down sovereignty, and it cautions against ascribing would-be 
centers too much influence in perpetuating themselves⎯since again; 
“official agents” of the states are not the major doers of statecraft. Perhaps 
most importantly, an analysis solely modeled on the traditional 
understanding of sovereignty misses out much of the workings of power in 
modern society, “whose operation is not ensured by right but by 
technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by 
control, methods that are employed on all levels and in forms that go 
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beyond the state and its apparatuses.”146 Instead of starting from the 
notion of power as being exercised from the sovereign usually by means of 
a set of constraining laws, (top-down), we might ask how power has been 
and is exercised in, and is constitutive of, everyday life.  
 
Thus, and what is now well-knows, Foucault challenged what he took to be 
the modern myth of power; namely power as a repressive force emanating 
from a single source of origin.147 On this understanding, power does not 
emanate from a sovereign source such as “the state,” but is dispersed 
throughout society: “Power’s condition of possibility… must not be sought 
in the primary existence of a central point… it is the moving substrate of 
force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender 
states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable.”148 As Rause 
explicates: “Power is not possessed by a dominant agent, nor located in 
that agent’s relations to those dominated, but is instead distributed 
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throughout complex social networks.”149 Further, power for Foucault has 
two facets; it encourages, enables, and allows certain practices, while 
constraining and disabling others.150 Power is often more effectively 
exercised by creating rather than repressing modes of objectivity, 
subjectivity, and conduct. The productive facet of power is for instance 
well exemplified in Discipline and Power, where Foucault traces the 
emergence of networks of power in relation to techniques of control, 
surveillance, and discipline.151 The individual that emerges is obedient and 
self-monitoring and becomes “capable of bearing a kind of regulated 
freedom;”152 hence, power creates just as much as it destroys. When 
participating in everyday practices and language, power works on us by 
constituting our sense of self.153  
 
Instead of asking the liberal question of the sources of power⎯who 
possesses power?⎯the genealogical question that Foucault invites us to 
pose is rather how and where particular forms of power arise.154 This 
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injunction is often understood as Foucault advocating a “bottom-up” 
approach to the analysis of power, claiming that the study of power ought 
to begin from below; one should study power where it is exercised over, 
and produces certain types of, subjects rather than where it is legitimated 
at a center.155 To a certain extent, this seems to be a valid interpretation. 
However, a more nuanced reading of Foucault would probably hold that a 
pure “bottom-up” approach to power is insufficient, since the sites of 
legitimation at the top feeds back and reinforces, although never 
completely controls, power relations at the bottom. There is always 
interaction between top and bottom, and Foucault should not be read as 
advocating a simple “ontology of the bottom,”156 pushing itself upwards. 
Rather, social practices in everyday life must, in order to become 
dominant within a society, be appropriated and put to work for a certain 
center; they must, in Foucault’s words, provisionally be given a “terminal 
form.”157 There is then a distinction to be drawn between domination and 
power, where domination is a state of affairs in which a certain center has 
                                                                                                                                           
 
 
155 A “bottom-up” understanding of Foucault’s analytics of power is to be found in Thiele, 
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by a blend of skillful politics and historical contingency been successful at 
instituting practices that work in its favor.158 
 
Hence, it should be clear that for Foucault, the reduction of the state to a 
rational, calculating subject à la orthodox Marxism for instance, obscures 
the workings of power.159 The state should therefore not be studied as a 
politico-judicial entity, calculating how it may best be able to exercise 
power in society; and neither, for instance, as epiphenomenal to relations 
of production (i.e. to some “deeper” reality). Rather, Foucault directs our 
attention to questions such as how a plurality of institutions and practices 
come to appear as “a state.” And, how does the state get away with the 
claim to being a state? Although the state for Foucault does not have one 
grand over-arching function (such as to make sure that capitalism prevails 
for instance) to which we can refer back its actions, it may help to 
institutionalize certain forms of rationalities that constitute it. Perhaps it is 
fair to say that Foucault, similarly to Laclau and Mouffe, is interested in 
the social rather than the state. Social order comes about as a result of the 
complex interplay between various social forces rather than as the product 
of some sinister central authority such as the state. A first step in putting 
forward a critical framework for thinking about European integration in 
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relation to “the state,” is thus to move away the ontologizing tradition of 
conceptualizing “the state” (which in and of itself is a form of statecraft), 
and instead speak of statecraft. 
 
 
“The state” as desire: identification, bordering, ordering 
 
When departing from the ontologizing tradition of thinking about “the 
state” as infused with a certain is-ness, one may instead put forward an 
understanding of “the state” as nothing but an effect of desire-driven 
practices, which we shall collectively refer to as practices of statecraft. As 
Roxanne Doty writes: “The ‘state’ is nothing but a desire that is manifested 
in practices of statecraft, practices that can originate in government 
bureaucracies and institutions, churches, schools, corporations, theaters, 
novels, art museums, our backyards, our front yards, our kitchens, and 
living rooms and bedrooms.”160 A minimalist understanding of statecraft 
could be understood as simultaneous practices of identification, bordering, 
and ordering.161 “The state” then, I propose, can be conceptualized as an 
                                                   
160 Doty, Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies, 12. 
 
 
161 I am here loosely drawing on the framework proposed by the so-called Las Cruces 
Group, namely a focus on identities, orders, and borders. In his preface to their edited 
volume, Yosef Lapid argues that “the dynamic nexus constituted by interrelated processes 
of bordering, ordering, and collective identity building open a uniquely well-situated 
analytical window to observe issues of mobility, fluidity, and change in contemporary 
world politics.” Yosef Lapid, “Identities, Borders, Orders: Nudging International 
Relations Theory in a New Direction,” in Identities, Borders, Orders-Rethinking 
International Relations Theory, eds. Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 2. And indeed, it does not seem to be 
an exaggeration to claim that much thought outside the narrow confines of mainstream 
Anglo-American International Relations ever since the 1980s has been concerned with 
questions of identity, orders, and borders in their widest sense. I will make use of those 
basic categories in my attempt to think through the crafting of the European Union and 
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effect of a plethora of practices of identification/bordering (i.e. 
statecraft), animated by a desire for order, stability, and foundation, 
constitutive of a wide variety of subject positions, but never traceable 
back to a single origin.  
 
Let me by way of elaborating present an understanding of the relation 
between identification and bordering, which simultaneously produce the 
ontologizing effect of “a state.” As Yosef Lapid points out, in the social 
sciences the category of identity was for a long time conceptualized as 
analytically prior to that of a border.162 That is to say, borders or 
boundaries were seen to more or less naturally emerge to enclose an 
identity, understood as a self-identical “thing” or even essence. Borders, 
then, had nothing to do with the actual substance or content of an identity. 
This understanding, however, has for decades been challenged in a 
number of disciplines; Fredrik Barth in Anthropology, and Andrew Abbott 
in Sociology to name but a few, and indeed more generally in much of the 
critically oriented literatures in the social sciences and humanities. On this 
understanding, practices of identification and bordering always go hand in 
                                                                                                                                           
its relation to modern statecraft. However, it should from the outset be emphasized that 
the more critical advances in IR theory have been more inclined to speak of practices of 
identification, bordering, and ordering, when theorizing world politics, emphasizing the 
performative and incomplete character of social life, refusing to treat identity, order, or 
border as traditional “concepts.” 
 
 
162 Lapid, “Identities, Borders, Orders: Nudging International Relations Theory in a New 
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hand. Practices of identification are simultaneously practices of bordering 
so that identification and bordering are in fact two different sides of the 
same coin. To make a claim to identification is in fact always a boundary-
drawing practice, since an identity purports to “be” something, which 
entails its alleged separateness from other “beings.”  
 
In the critical literatures, an identity or entity is nothing but an on-going 
accomplishment of practice. Consider for example Judith Butler’s work on 
gender as pure performativity; there is no such thing as a masculine or 
feminine essence, only the on-going performance of socially constructed 
notions of masculinity/femininity.163 A particular gender then, is nothing 
but an effect of on-going practices of gendering. It then becomes of great 
significance to understand the ways in which such practices work, and how 
they are embedded within material relations of power. In addition, 
axiomatic for a critical understanding of identity is the refusal to think of 
identities as identical to themselves.164 As Derrida writes, “what is proper 
to a culture is to not be identical to itself. Not to not have an identity, but 
not to be able to identify itself, to be able to say ‘me’ or ‘we;’ to be able to 
take the form of a subject only in the non-identity to itself or, if you prefer, 
                                                   
163 Butler, Gender Trouble. 
 
 
164 On this point see also Jens Bartelson,”Second Natures: Is the State Identical with 
Itself?” European Journal of International Relations 4, no. 3 (1998). 
 
 
  80 
only in the difference with itself.”165 An identity-claim is thus from the very 
beginning inevitably opened to its negation. The borders inscribing an 
identity then are, as Michael Dillon puts it, “prone to violent foreclosure 
which excites its own resistance.”166 
 
What about practices of ordering then? Arguably, what animates practices 
of identification/bordering is a desire for order, stability, and foundation. 
As Doty writes: “The state is a desire to overcome ambivalence and 
undecidability, to make the numerous and diverse points of order, e.g., 
geographic, ethnic, moral, economic, and so on resonate to affect a 
coherent whole.”167 Stephen Toulmin, for example, has written about such 
desire for foundations as historically emerging in response to the violent 
religious wars ravaging the European continent in the 16th and 17th 
centuries and clearly epitomized by the philosophies of Descartes and 
Hobbes. In Toulmin’s understanding, western modernity is imbued with a 
“Quest for Certainty,” as a response to the very turbulent era in European 
political life, philosophically reflected in an obsession with 
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epistemology.168 However, one may also understand this “quest” or desire 
as inherent in the use of language itself. We all desire to make the world 
we encounter representable, and thereby intelligible, since that is a 
condition of possibility for living, acting and orienting ourselves in the 
world. There is certainly, however, a distinction to be drawn between 
acknowledging this inevitable violence inherent in representation, and to 
unreflectively partake in the imperative of “offer yourself up to 
representation, i.e. speak my language, use my logic, and abide by my law, 
or you shall not be allowed a voice,”⎯an imperative criticized by Derrida 
as at the core of the logocentric tradition. 
 
One way of understanding how statecraft works as a desire driven practice 
for b/ordering space, is to take up Derrida’s suggestion of thinking of 
social life in terms of hauntology rather than ontology; as Colin Davis puts 
it: “replacing the priority of being and presence with the figure of the ghost 
as that which is neither present nor absent, neither dead nor alive.”169 
Further, “Derrida’s spectre is a deconstructive figure hovering between life 
and death, presence and absence, and making established certainties 
                                                   
168 See Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1990). See also Michael C. Williams, “Identity and the politics 
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vacillate. It does not belong to the order of knowledge.”170 Rather, “the 
Ghost pushes at the boundaries of language and thought.”171 What 
occupies the function of the specter in the desire for the state is arguably 
that which in the social contract tradition is referred to as “the state of 
nature,” i.e. the radical other to authority, government, and rule. In 
Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes makes this very clear.172 The state of nature is 
rather ambiguously presented as a historical condition that “we” living 
within the state have now transcended, and simultaneously as a condition 
lurking behind whenever and wherever the assertion of state authority is 
failing. The state of nature can never be completely externalized, but traces 
of it must always remain on the “inside,” which remind us about the 
omnipresent possibility of its return. As the constitutive outside to the 
state, the state of nature is thus prior to, enabling of, and always risks 
exceeding the state.173 And the fear of its return is precisely what animates 
the desire for the state, calling on us to perform the rituals of statecraft. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the state of nature can only be defined precisely 
by not being clearly delimited and known. We can glimpse certain traces of 
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it, but part of its frightening character is that we will not know what it is 
until we are there.174 The full horrors of the state of nature cannot be 
wholly spelled out in advance, and precisely therein lies its true 
dreadfulness⎯it seeks to re-present unspeakable or un-representable 
horror, hence never fully succeeding in doing so.175 
 
 
We may thus summarize and synthetize the preceding discussion in the 
following way. Statecraft, critically understood, involves the imposition of 
an inside/outside boundary of differentiation constituting an effective 
outside (the foreign, the different, the alien) that can be deployed in the 
negative affirmation of an identity at the same time as effecting a certain 
forgetfulness as to the arbitrariness of that very practice. “The state” then, 
emerges as an effect of an ensemble of practices of 
identification/bordering. Moreover, recalling the impossibility of self-
identity, the designation of the figure of the other is indeed arbitrary, since 
whoever/whatever is cast as the outsider must always already reside on 
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the inside.176 However, in the performative constitution of the state there 
also has to be a certain sense of its own impossibility, because only that 
sense of incompleteness can be the basis for generating the desire that is 
called into play to repeat the whole logic.177 As Richard Ashley writes, the 
state “is nothing more and nothing less than an arbitrary political 
representation always in the process of being inscribed within history, 
through practice, and in the face of all manner of resistant interpretations 
that must be excluded if the representation is to be counted as self-evident 
reality.”178 Statecraft, therefore, as Hobbes’s inadvertently clarified in 
Leviathan, can never be a simple completed fact. In fact, statecraft can 
never totally succeed in the sense of making the state appear as a finished, 
sutured, and finalized product. The absolute success of the state would 
coincide with its own demise. Finally, animating the re-enactment of the 
state is a powerful, negative desire rooted in the fear of the return of the 
state of nature, and the concurrent productive desire for order and 
security.179 
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Between the universal and the particular: On the normative structure of 
Westphalia 
So what then if the crafting of the European Union resembles the crafting 
of the modern Western state, which “is” nothing but a ceaseless desire for 
ordering, bordering and identification? What is really at stake in this 
dissertation? To provide an answer to that question, one may start by 
considering what Lothar Brock and Mathias Albert have referred to as the 
normative structure of Westphalia, which is “what keeps Westphalia 
together.”180 The modern Westphalian state “provides a pragmatic 
solution to normative paradoxes that are difficult to reconcile in modern 
thinking and practice.”181 And “its discursive field is demarcated by the 
positions of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism.”182 The modern 
European state could be understood as the institutionalization of a 
constant mediation between the particular (communitarianism) and the 
universal (cosmopolitanism). The “normative cohesion” of the 
Westphalian system of states, as Albert and Brock call it, was precariously 
achieved by the modern state, which precisely provided a solution to the 
paradox of how to reconcile the universal with the particular: 
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“[Modernization] inscribed the fundamental tension into the modern 
normative world order: the tension between Kantian universalism on the 
one hand, and the de facto normative integration of the Westphalian order 
via the nexus of orders, borders, and identities on the other. Though 
ethical norms are about universality, this universality is never achievable 
universally. If this is the case, why then not confine this universality to 
state boundaries and create a particularistic universe inside territorial 
markers?”183  
 
 
On this understanding, modern Europe has always been a history about 
the particularity of the universal and that universality compacted into the 
particular.184 This realization in fact takes us back to the paradoxality of 
the modern Western state itself. This paradox can briefly be stated as 
follows: With the peace of Westphalia emerges the modern state which is 
an agreement that, ironically, a particular sovereign has the right to be the 
head of his universal religion and associated system of metaphysics within 
the particularity of his state, if in return, the sovereign—contradicting the 
very notion of the universality of one’s own state—recognizes that beyond 
his own space are spaces in which the sovereign’s universal pretentions 
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must make a halt. So, what emerges then is a mutual recognition that 
several sovereigns are caught up in the same paradoxical situation. The 
Westphalian system of states then—which rests on a specific form of 
organizing space into fixed and mutually exclusive containers185—might 
thus be described as a collection of particularities that are mutually 
recognized as entitled to the universal within their borders. Arguably, if 
anything could be deemed as common to the European experience, it 
would be this very contradiction itself. 
 
One may therefore suggest that ”the state” of the Westphalian states 
system depends on two fundamental gestures each pushing in opposing 
directions: a universalizing and a particularizing gesture, i.e. the poles of 
cosmopolitanism and communitarianism respectively.186 Let me elaborate 
upon those basic discursive gestures using the previously introduced 
heuristic devices of bordering, ordering, and identification. The first major 
discursive gesture is one of universalizing. As Simon Critchley has pointed 
out, western philosophy is often understood as beginning precisely at the 
moment when Socrates starts the tradition of asking not what justice 
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of Marx and Heidegger. 
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means only for Athenians but what justice means for all, in general, as a 
universal, abstract concept. Western philosophy itself then, is born out of 
an attempt to critique tradition from some vantage point beyond that 
particular tradition.187 The gesture of universalizing is often understood to 
be at the very core of monotheistic universalism such as Christian 
salvation;188 Hellenic philosophy such as Platonic forms; and the 
Enlightenment project such as Kant’s disembodied understanding of 
reason, and is reflected in a desire towards the general, the abstract, and 
the universal; unwilling to accept temporal and spatial boundedness on 
ontological, epistemological, or indeed ethical grounds.  
 
Universalizing gestures tend towards the uprooting of local claims to 
identification in favor of universal ones. While a universalizing ethos is 
potentially radically inclusive, the potential violence here lies in an ethos 
that altogether refuses to accept difference; an ethos that believes that it 
can read the whole world on its own terms ⎯an ethos that refuses other 
languages, logics, and laws than its own. The ethos of the universalizing 
gesture is one of de-bordering; in its more benevolent guises it takes 
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expression in discourses of human rights,189 and certain cosmopolitan 
dispositions. In its more sinister guises, it underpins discourses of 
imperialism and colonialism. Finally, in terms of ordering, universalizing 
gestures would characteristically hold that there is an underlying harmony 
to the universe, and thus, such gestures do not commit unjustifiable or 
arbitrary violences towards competing orders, since universalizing 
gestures understand themselves as surface expressions of a deeper 
underlying essentially harmonious universe.190  
 
The second basic axis around which the modern state is crafted is one of 
particularization. On such narrations, life is by necessity rooted in 
particular places, and embedded within historically and geographically 
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particular systems of intelligibility ⎯”cultures,” “structures of meaning,” 
“life forms,” or “language games.” The individual is conceptualized as a 
communal being, whose consciousness is by necessity firmly embedded in 
such a local system of intelligibility. Several critics of modernity and the 
Enlightenment project of various forms share a basic suspicion to claims 
to universality. A paradigmatic western philosopher of particularism is no 
doubt Martin Heidegger. Heidegger’s critique of the ethos of modernity 
lies in the modern Dasein’s vain insistence to make the whole world 
transparent, i.e. to fully disclose itself.191 For Heidegger, this is first of all 
ontologically impossible, since any act of disclosure is also an act of 
concealing⎯a thing can never be/come fully transparent. However, this 
insistence predisposes the modern Dasein to a violent ethos, which is 
always over-reaching and perpetually frustrated, and never lets difference 
simply be. Another paradigmatic, but less known, critique of 
universalization is to be found in Vine Deloria’s critique of (rather 
Platonically understood) Christianity, as a religion that refuses to accept 
that religious practice stems from somewhere, i.e. has a connection with 
the land and environment where it originated and grew from.192 Deloria 
characterizes the main problem with western thought as a relentless drive 
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towards the abstract, desiring to impose figures of thought that are 
peculiar to its origins upon alien places.  
 
However, the ethos of particularization is not without its own dangers. An 
ethos of particularization insists on identification/bordering. The modern 
state effectively attaches this ethos of particularization to a particular 
territory. As John Ruggie puts it: “the distinctive feature of the modern 
system of rule is that it has differentiated its subject collectivity into 
territorially defined, fixed, and mutually exclusive enclaves of legitimate 
dominion.”193 Or as John Agnew puts it: “a state is territorial much like life 
on earth is terrestrial.”194 To the extent that “the state” is seen as a 
“container” of a particular system of intelligibility, it may justifiably expel 
difference, as properly not belonging within its orbit. Human 
responsibility is thus territorialized and particularized, and only under 
certain circumstances should hospitality be extended to the foreigner.195 In 
spite of all kinds of stories about the rightfulness and legitimacy of 
borders, such stories do little to conceal that effective bordering rests upon 
nothing but brute violence.196 This ethos is at its most lethal when 
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territorial borders stop people from gaining refugee. The narrative 
structure defending this ethos is today prominently found in identity 
politics discourse, which proclaims that a particular group is different 
from other groups, and as such, stands in need of protection from 
“foreign” ways of life.197  
 
Basic dispositions Universalization Particularization 
Place Placeless cosmopolis Rooted community 
(“space”) 
Time Timeless Historical 
Reason Disembodied Situated 
Ethos Subsume, interiorize, 
assimilate difference.  
Expel difference. “We” 
is bordered.  
Responsibility Borderless Localized 
Paradigmatic 
fulfillers of  ‘author 
function’ 
Plato, Marx Heidegger 
 
Figure 1: Basic dispositions of the normative structure of Westphalia. 
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To sum up this discussion, the crafting of the modern state is caught up in 
a pendular movement between particularizing and universalizing itself. 
And the two basic gestures of universalization and particularization, 
around which the modern state is crafted, carries its own distinct ethical 
risks. To the extent then, that the crafting of the European Union would 
“go beyond” the crafting of the modern state, it would have to decisively 
break with this normative order of Westphalia. I will in the chapters that 
follow, return to the basic themes introduced in this first chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
IN SEARCH OF A FOUNDATION FOR EUROPE: EU’S FAILED 
CONSTITUTION 
Just the very name: Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.198 
Perhaps needless to point out, but in common legal vocabulary, a treaty is 
not the same thing as a constitution. Whereas a treaty is a pronouncement 
and affirmation of multiplicity and diversity, a constitution is one of unity. 
There was indeed some deliberate ambiguity as to whether one were to 
understand the European Union’s Constitutional Treaty as a treaty, and to 
read the new text as previous EU treaties have been understood; i.e. as 
agreements between sovereign states that are, at least in a legal sense, 
equal to one another and pool some of their powers for a common 
purpose; or, if one were to emphasize the constitutional aspects of the 
document.199 Some governments tended to present the Constitutional 
Treaty to its domestic audiences as a “treaty” and others as a 
“constitution,” often depending on the popularity of European integration 
with their respective constituencies. On a charitable reading, one might 
understand the formula “Constitutional Treaty” as a confirmation of EU’s 
slogan of Unity in Diversity, which the Constitutional Treaty incidentally 
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establishes as EU’s official motto. A less charitable reading could hold that 
the wording represented yet another example of political compromise 
resulting in a half-measure, which from the outset stymied the European 
Union’s “Madisonian moment.”200  
 
In this chapter, I examine the constitutional aspects of the EU’s 
Constitutional Treaty,201 and offer a deconstructive reading of the text that 
was supposed to securely establish “Europe.” The Constitutional Treaty, 
despite its failure of being ratified, is arguably the EU’s most authoritative 
attempt to give the signifier of Europe a determinate content, and place 
Europe on a stable foundation. Therefore, I have chosen to engage the 
Constitutional Treaty rather than EU’s most recent treaty revision, the 
Treaty of Lisbon. The Constitutional Treaty could thus be seen as a 
hegemonizing articulation of community building, setting out the 
dominant understanding of EU’s self. 
 
The overall question to which I seek to provide an answer is how the 
Constitution sought to establish the European polity. In order to do so, I 
will read the Constitution in light of the politico-theoretical problem of 
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how to bestow legitimacy and authority on the foundation of a political 
community in an era which, among other things, has been called not only 
“disenchanted modernity” (Weber), but “high modernity” (Giddens), 
“liquid modernity” (Bauman), and even “postmodernity” (Lyotard); an era 
characterized by, if not an outright rejection of, at least a profound 
skepticism to various absolutes that functioned to secure the foundation of 
pre-modern polities. In short, how did the drafters of the Constitutional 
Treaty seek to securely found “Europe?” I will probe the attempted 
foundation of Europe principally with the aid of a short piece by Jacques 
Derrida on the U.S. Declaration of Independence, and argue that an appeal 
to universality lies at the heart of the strategy employed by the drafters of 
Europe’s Constitutional treaty. It is, however, a universality derived from a 
past that simultaneously contains the sources of all the conflicts that have 
haunted Europe, and their apparent resolution. Paradoxically, the very 
source that is intended to bestow stability and permanence on the 
European moment of foundation also contains what has always prevented 
Europe from coming together, that which has always torn Europe apart. 
This appeal to universality further reveals that Euro-crafting still operates 
within the normative structure of Westphalia, which will cast initial doubt 
on the claim that Euro-crafting is qualitatively different from statecraft. 
 
I will start with a brief exposition of the origins of the Constitution and the 
debate that preceded its coming into being. When listening to the debate, 
one hears that the constitutional project was driven by a desire to place the 
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project of European integration on a secure foundation, a foundation that 
would withstand the vagaries of capricious populations, especially the 
populations of the soon-to-become members at that time. In the second 
part, I elaborate on the constitutive functions of a constitution, which is 
followed by an elucidation of the ultimate source(s) of authority in the 
European Constitution.  
 
 
 
Fischer’s desire 
 
During the negotiations of the Nice Treaty in 2000, the then German 
foreign minister Joschka Fischer opened the debate on the future of 
Europe with a speech, to which I will shortly return, calling for a European 
Federation based on a constituent treaty.202 Fischer’s speech sparked off a 
debate that eventually led to the inclusion of a proviso into the Nice Treaty 
calling for further debate and clarification on the future development of 
the EU. The question of whether and why the EU really needed a 
constitution swiftly moved to the question of what should be in it, and at 
the European Council summit at Laeken in 2001, the Convention on the 
Future of Europe was launched, a body responsible for the drafting of a 
constitutional treaty. The convention consisted of member state 
representatives, members of national parliaments, members of the 
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European Parliament, and members of the European Commission, and 
was headed by former French president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. The 
elderly and aristocratic d’Estaing, certainly not downplaying the task with 
which he had been entrusted, dubbed the Convention “the European 
Philadelphia.” In October 2004 representatives of the member states 
signed the text.203   
 
Lofty comparisons—both favorable (most often before it was rejected by 
the French and the Dutch populations) and unfavorable (most often after 
it was rejected by the French and the Dutch populations)—with the 
Philadelphia Convention and the adoption of the U.S. Constitution in 1787 
abound. To its critics, the Constitutional treaty was an attempt to force the 
elite-driven and increasingly rapid pace of European integration onto ever 
more alienated publics. To critics on the left, more specifically, it 
constituted an attempt at entrenchment on a continent-wide scale of a 
democratically and socially impoverished model of governance committed 
primarily to neo-liberal economic tenets. To critics on the right, on the 
other hand, the Constitutional treaty was thought to create an 
interventionist socialist European super state, committed to eroding the 
independence of their nation states. For its advocates, however, the 
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Constitutional treaty represented the moment where a truly united 
European political community would be established and recognized as 
such. 
 
How did this alleged “Madisonian moment” in European integration come 
about, following more than fifty years of gradualist and incremental 
integration, a moment very far from what the, historically speaking, most 
influential theory of European integration, neofunctionalism, both 
predicted and prescribed?204 The most frequently raised explanation in the 
scholarly literature has to do with the objective of enhancing EU’s popular 
legitimacy.205 Ever since the Maastricht treaty from 1992 Euro skepticism 
had been on its rise across virtually all of its member states. 
Unprecedented levels of popular opposition to the European project could 
be witnessed, even in countries whose populations traditionally had been 
highly supportive of European integration. It seemed as if whenever an 
opportunity for direct public input through referendum arose, as in the 
Danish rejection of the Maastricht treaty, the very narrow approval of it in 
France, and the rejection of the Nice Treaty in Ireland, the European 
publics did not share the Euro-enthusiasm of their political, social, and 
                                                   
204 The most influential formulation of neofunctionalism is to be found in Ernst B. Haas, 
The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). I deal with 
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205 See for example de Burca, “The Drafting of a Constitution for the European Union.” 
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economic elites. A Constitution, then, was thought to somehow remedy the 
increasingly apparent, and for the Union’s advocates, exceedingly 
troublesome lack of popular legitimacy. At the same time, the EU was 
about to be considerably enlarged, to encompass an additional twelve 
countries mostly from eastern and central Europe.  
 
Let us take a closer look at the speech by Fischer, which was instrumental 
in bringing about the process that eventually led to the drafting of the 
Constitution.206 Fischer situates Europe at a historical juncture just after 
the Cold War and at “the beginning of globalisation” and warns that the 
Union is increasingly seen “as a bureaucratic affair run by a faceless, 
soulless Eurocracy in Brussels.” Fischer urges forward, “onwards” to “the 
completion of European integration” and warns that a step “backwards” 
would demand a “fatal price.” But why a constitution? It is for Fischer a 
matter of rescuing the EU from the perception of being opaque and 
incomprehensible to the European publics. The Union must be 
reinvigorated in the eyes of the European publics.  
 
Quite possibly worried that all countries may not agree to a comprehensive 
enough constitution, and that after the eastwards enlargement, the Union 
will be more heterogeneous, making “further differentiation … inevitable,” 
Fischer proposes that the center of Europe must be reinforced: the Franco-
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German locomotive must be reinvigorated, and must be allowed to push 
ahead of the more “peripheral” (in both a geographical and cultural sense) 
members. The true guardians of Europe’s holy grail, or as Fischer puts it, 
those countries “staunchly committed to the European ideal” must assume 
their responsibilities. This core, Fischer reassures, must remain open to all 
member states, on the implicit condition of course, that they recognize this 
(one and true) European ideal.  
 
Fiat Europa! 
 
How could a dry document written in characteristically dull Euro-speak be 
the answer to Fischer’s desire and what the scholarly community calls the 
EU’s “endemic legitimacy crisis?” For conservative commentators, a 
Constitution was certainly not the answer—regardless of the question. One 
of the most frequent conservative objections to the creation of a full-blown 
European polity became known as the “no-demos thesis.”207 In one of its 
most circulated versions, Larry Siedentop argued that the preconditions 
for a genuine democracy at the European level were missing.208 The kinds 
of things that de Tocqueville noticed in his celebrated study of American 
democracy were not to be found in Europe: there is no common political 
                                                   
207 Michiel Brand, “Formalising European Constitutionalism: Potential Added Value or 
‘Death by Constitution?’” in The Constitution for Europe and an Enlarging Union: Unity 
in Diversity? eds. Kirstyn Inglis and Andrea Ott (Europa Law Publishing: Groningen, 
2005), 5. 
 
 
208 Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Press, 
2000). For another version of the “no demos thesis,” see Dieter Grimm, “Does Europe 
need a Constitution?” European Law Journal 1, no. 3 (1995).  
 
 
  102 
tradition, no common language, no particular identification with other 
communities, and no mutual trust. To put it succinctly, for Siedentop, 
Europe lacked a demos, which democracy presupposes. Some voices even 
held that the nation state represented the final equilibrium in identity 
formation, being the product of a unique historical trajectory that is simply 
not possible to reproduce at human will. In contemporary Europe, this 
argument continued, even though national identity is arguably a declining 
element in the individual’s identity, nation states continue to confer an 
important sense of identity onto individuals. However, nation states have 
existed for such a long time that they are still able to attract loyalty long 
after the conditions that that produced the original grant of loyalty have 
disappeared.209 Therefore, an attempt to create a supranational 
community, expected to function as a major locus of individual identity, is 
simply not feasible.  
 
To some however, the “no demos thesis” seemed largely to miss the point. 
Jürgen Habermas argued that the no demos argument confused a 
“community of citizens” with a “community of fate” shaped by common 
history, language, and descent. This confusion, according to Habermas, 
“fails to capture the voluntaristic character of a civic nation, the collective 
identity of which exits neither independent of nor prior to the democratic 
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process from which it springs.” 210 Modern democracy and the nation-state 
developed in parallel, but the latter was not prior to the former. A 
constitution, Habermas held, would serve as a catalyst in the development 
of a European public sphere, a European civil society, and a European 
political culture. Tout court, the no demos argument had the casual arrow 
wrong. Instead, Habermas emphasized the constitutive character of a 
constitution: a constitution had something to do with taking hold of the 
European peoples’ “consciousness”211 In a similar vein to Habermas, 
Joseph Weiler, a leading legal scholar and long-standing commentator on 
the European Union argued: “One does not and cannot wait until the 
bonds of loyalty, of constitutional demos, of polity are in place as a 
precondition for a constitutional settlement. The constitutional settlement 
is a voluntary invitation, self-conscious and autonomous to create, over 
time, such a polity, such a demos and such a loyalty.”212 
 
Hence, for both Habermas and Weiler, a constitution was perceived as 
doing much more than simply structuring the respective powers of 
government and the relationships between public authority and 
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individuals, or between the state and other agents, and simply spelling out 
pre-existing norms, values, and principles of such a community. The most 
important role of a constitution was not to passively encapsulate 
fundamental values of the polity, as a reflection of the “collective identity” 
as a people, as a nation, as a Community, as a Union, as a “repository of 
values,”213 but to actively inscribe these values as constituent of the 
political community that was being brought into existence, thereby 
constituting the European people itself. On this understanding, the 
decision to include a bill of rights into EU’s Constitution was a highly 
symbolic move. Furthermore, both Habermas and Weiler seemed to agree 
that, somewhat paradoxically, a constitution was both defining or 
constituting and presupposing a political community, whose members 
were to be bound by that constitution. Philip Allot captured this 
constitutive moment as an “ecthetic moment,” ecthesis being the part in a 
Euclidean proof of a triangle which simply says: let ABC be a triangle!214 It 
is this moment of the proof that particularizes the universal (i.e. the ideal 
triangle) and universalizes the particular (i.e. any actual triangle). For 
Allott, the Constitution would be the ecthetic moment of Europe: “Let 
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Europe be unity!”215 Let us, with the help of Derrida, examine this 
“ecthetic moment” further. 
 
Derrida approaches the “ecthetic moment” of a community-founding text 
through an examination of the signatures of the U.S. Declaration of 
Independence.216 He starts by asking who signs the document that founds 
an institution and notices that such an act of signing does not describe, but 
“performs” and “accomplishes” something.217 The declaration founding a 
state necessitates that the signer “engage him- or herself” and this 
signature “maintains a link with the instituting act”. So, although any 
institution thus founded becomes independent from the individuals who 
founded it in an empirical sense, i.e. political elites come and go, “it turns 
out that the founding act of an institution–the act as archive as well as 
performance–must maintain within itself the signature.”218  
 
Whose signature(s) are we talking about? Just like Jefferson, Giscard 
d’Estaing writes but does not sign. Giscard D’Estaing was appointed by the 
European Council and thus writes on behalf of the Council. And just like 
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Jefferson, Giscard d’Estaing was not responsible for writing in the 
productive meaning of the term, only for drawing up, as a secretary draws 
up a draft document. D’Estaing then submitted the draft to another set of 
representatives, namely representatives for the European peoples. Are 
they the ultimate signers then? Analogously, as Derrida notes, “they sign 
for themselves but also “for” others. By right, the signer is the people.”219 
So what happens in the act of signing? “The ‘we’ of the Declaration speaks 
‘in the name of the people’. But these people do not exist. They do not exist 
as an entity, the entity does not exist before this declaration, not as such. If 
it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, as possible signer, 
this can hold only in the act of the signature. The signature invents the 
signer.”220  
 
Unlike the U.S. Declaration of Independence, various national peoples in 
Europe already exist. However, those national peoples are constituted as 
European peoples in the very moment of signing. The signer, the various 
European peoples did not exist before the signing of the constitution as 
such, hence “the signer can only authorize him- or herself to sign once he 
or she has come to an end–if one can say this of his or her own signature 
in a sort of fabulous retroactivity.”221 However, since the not-yet-existing 
                                                   
219 Ibid., 49. (Emphasis in the original). 
 
 
220 Ibid. (Emphasis in the original). 
 
 
221 Ibid.,50. 
  107 
people was able to give the right to sign its constituting, its coming to 
being, it must always already have possessed such a right. At this point, 
Derrida refers to John Austin’s distinction; the signing of a constitution 
requires both a performative and a constative moment.222 It is the 
constative element, i.e. the element that presents itself as a constative 
utterance, which invokes that what guarantees the performative element. 
Contained in the constative element, something else, “another 
subjectivity,” is lurking behind the scenes, “in order to guarantee it, this 
production of signature.”223 Who, then, is this mysterious 
countersignature? 
 
The question of the nature of this countersignature takes us to a central 
problem in modern political theory: how to found a political community 
when traditional sources of authority no longer compel? Or to put it 
differently, in a postfoundationalist era, how can lasting foundations be 
established? Sophia Näsström states the paradox of community 
foundation succinctly: “While the people constitutes the only legitimate 
source of political authority, it cannot lend itself the legitimacy it needs to 
qualify as such … In order to constitute the legitimate source of political 
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authority, it would have to be prior to itself.”224 Hannah Arendt thought 
that the U.S. Declaration of Independence was genuinely path breaking for 
not primarily making recourse to an absolute, above and beyond the 
people itself.225 For Arendt, appealing to an absolute is not only 
intellectually dishonest, it is fundamentally disempowering since such an 
absolute is “a truth that needs no agreement since, because of its self-
evidence, it compels without argumentative demonstration or political 
persuasion … they [absolutes] are in a sense no less compelling than 
‘despotic power.’”226 Absolutes, in Arendt’s view, limit human possibilities, 
innovation, and freedom, and coerce people into blind submission. 
 
The wording in the U.S. Declaration of Independence that “we hold these 
truths to be self-evident” is partly performative, (we hold) and partly 
constative (the invocation of self-evident truths). According to Honig, 
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Arendt downplays the constative part of the phrase and celebrates the “we 
hold” as truly revolutionary. For Arendt, the source of authority of the 
Declaration of Independence, lies in the very act of foundation itself, and 
the appeal to “self-evident truths” is actually redundant.227 For Derrida, on 
the other hand, the appeal to ”self-evident truths” in the Declaration of 
Independence was not a slip of the tongue but an assertion of the source of 
authority behind those self-evident truths, namely the laws of nature and 
ultimately God, standing as the countersignature to the people, as the 
guarantor of the people; of the righteousness of the people. At the last 
instance of an act of foundation, according to Derrida, there is a gap that 
must be anchored in something. No act of foundation can anchor itself 
without recourse to something external to the act itself. This line of 
reasoning is analogous to Derrida’s critique of structuralism. In every 
structure there is a blind spot, that makes the structure work, but which 
cannot be legitimated by the structure itself, hence, necessarily occupying 
a precarious location simultaneously inside and outside this structure.228 
 
The first article of the European Constitution begins with a performative 
declaration: “Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to 
build a common future, this Constitution establishes the European Union, 
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on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they 
have in common.”229 Hence, the European Union is brought into 
existence. Throughout the Constitution, the importance of values is 
emphasized.  The Union is founded ”on the values of respect for human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.”230 
Further, its aim “is to promote peace, its values and the well-being” of the 
European peoples.231 It is these values that determine whether a country 
may become a member or not (although it must also fulfill the condition of 
“being European”): ”The Union shall be open to all European States which 
respect its values and are committed to promoting them together.”232 And, 
the Union’s external relations ”shall be guided by the principles which 
have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement.”233 
 
The search for a beginning, an absolute, which could function as a 
foundation for the Europe that is being constituted is intimately linked 
with the values that are stressed throughout the Constitution. 
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Interestingly, one of the most heated debates regarding the Constitution 
concerned whether the preamble should include an explicit reference to 
Christianity or not.234 The secularist countries prevailed, but instead of an 
appeal to religion, we find something that is structurally similar, namely 
an appeal to the universality of the values upon which Europe would be 
founded. Such an appeal is found in the preamble to the Constitution: 
“DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and humanist 
inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of 
the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, 
democracy, equality and the rule of law.” A similar appeal is to be found in 
the preamble to the bill of rights that the Constitution incorporates in its 
second article: “Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is 
founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, 
equality and solidarity.” 
 
The appeal to the universality of its values, presented as a constative 
utterance provides the countersignature to the constitution of the 
European Union. Arguably, those values secure the founding of the Union. 
As Näsström aptly notices, the function of appealing to a universal in 
whatever guise it may take, has always been to transcend and arrest the 
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contingences of time.235 Thus, the universal values are understood to 
bestow timelessness and permanence on the European Union. Let us 
further explore the nature of the values in the Constitutional treaty. In its 
entirety, the preamble reads: 
 
 
DRAWING INSPIRATION from the cultural, religious and 
humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed 
the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of 
the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule 
of law, BELIEVING that Europe, reunited after bitter 
experiences, intends to continue along the path of civilisation, 
progress and prosperity, for the good of all its inhabitants, 
including the weakest and most deprived; that it wishes to 
remain a continent open to culture, learning and social 
progress; and that it wishes to deepen the democratic and 
transparent nature of its public life, and to strive for peace, 
justice and solidarity throughout the world, CONVINCED 
that, while remaining proud of their own national identities 
and history, the peoples of Europe are determined to 
transcend their former divisions and, united ever more 
closely, to forge a common destiny, CONVINCED that, thus 
‘United in diversity’, Europe offers them the best chance of 
pursuing, with due regard for the rights of each individual and 
in awareness of their responsibilities towards future 
generations and the Earth, the great venture which makes of it 
a special area of human hope. 
 
 
Europe’s “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance’” is here posited as 
the ultimate source of the values that Europe is to be founded upon—
serving as a foundation both to overcome Europe’s “ancient divisions” and 
“to forge a common destiny.” There is a peculiar dialectic at work between 
“Europe” and “its peoples” in this process: “the peoples of Europe are 
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determined to transcend their former divisions.” What is of more 
consequence, however, and as J. Peter Burgess notices, the universality 
that is appealed to is unstable: Europe’s “cultural, religious and humanist” 
past is the source of the universal values that Europe rests upon and are 
supposed to guide “us” in overcoming Europe’s divisions.236 At the same 
time, however, Europe’s past is precisely one of division and conflict, 
which must be transcended, in order to make Europe safe for its universal 
values, which paradoxically were present already in the past, so that 
Europe can unite. Ultimately and rather peculiarly then, it turns out that 
the major condition of possibility of Europe-as-a-unified-whole, namely 
Europe’s past resting on a set of universal values, coincide with its major 
condition of impossibility since this source simultaneously contains all 
that which has always torn Europe apart.  
 
What is common to all the three sources of inspiration for Europe’s 
constitutional project, culture, religion, and humanism, is that within 
them, one finds powerful drives towards unity and identity that have 
historically been tearing Europe apart. The drafters may argue that 
European integration is designed and pursued in order to overcome the 
drive to fragmentation and difference, starting from the premise that it 
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was Europe’s diversity that ultimately caused war. However, another 
reading is that it was rather the drive towards unity and identity, examples 
of which we find under the labels of “culture” (think of the many 
nationalisms in Europe), “religion” (think of Europe’s religious wars), and 
“humanism” (think with Adorno and Horkheimer of the totalitarian 
dimensions of the Enlightenment project), which caused conflict within 
Europe. On this reading, conflict has ensued as a result of various 
particularisms presenting themselves as universalisms, claims that have 
always been resisted, and that eventually resulted in two total wars in the 
twentieth century. The risk of European integration, then, is that it merely 
replicates all the previous (bloody and violent) attempts to European 
identity: attempts to get rid of the differences within Europe, in the name 
of achieving European unity. Historically, and to put it in terms of the 
depressingly familiar language of realpolitik, pushes towards European 
integration have often followed violent trajectories of imperialism. Hence, 
within the turgid narratives of a shared European culture lies the dynamic 
that has produced much violence in Europe.  
 
The desire for identity in the Constitution perhaps most explicitly reveals 
itself in the reference to a European reunification made in the preamble. 
European integration and ultimately European unity will presumably take 
Europe back to a mythical state that predates all conflict that tore it apart. 
The ultimate promise of European integration, then, is a return to its 
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origin as complete, full and self-identical—Europe is re-collected, and 
Europe will finally (again) be Europe. And following Derrida, this mirrors 
the second step in what one may call the distinctive double-gesture of 
Western metaphysics, namely “the enterprise of returning ‘strategically,’ 
ideally, to an origin or to a ‘priority’ held to be simple, intact, normal, pure, 
standard, self-identical, in order then to think in terms of derivation, 
complication, deterioration, accident, etc.”237 In the context of European 
community building, a major implication of the desire for identity and re-
collection lies in how difference is treated. That which may threaten the re-
collection of Europe should either be excluded (rendered as non-
European) or interiorized; that is, subsumed and cleansed of what could 
not effectively pass as European. This is a powerful quasi-Hegelian motif, 
where European History strives to reduce otherness to sameness. 
 
EUlogy  
 
We have in this chapter seen how the Constitutional Treaty attempts to 
establish Europe as a community of values by linking it to a transcendental 
signified in the shape of a set of universal values. And, already within the 
constitution, we notice the problematic nature of those values. Most 
importantly perhaps, and what I will come back to in the next chapter, the 
Constitutional Treaty expresses one of the defining gestures of modern 
statecraft: the universal is being compacted into a particular. Although 
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Europe is defined by reference to a particular set of values, as proper to 
Europe, those values are said to be universal. However, the constitution of 
Europe is of course not a one shot event. Figuratively, a Constitution must 
be resigned every day to perpetually reinvent its signers, so that people 
start thinking of it as normal, commonsensical and therefore inevitable. 
Indeed, as Zygmunt Bauman puts it, “having no other ground except the 
submissiveness of the converted, the presence of communities must be 
renewed daily.”238 In the next chapter, I turn to the policy area that has 
arguably most to do with community building and subject formation, 
namely foreign policy, to examine how this community of values is 
enacted. By reading a large amount of speeches spanning about a decade, I 
wish to convey a sense of this performative nature of statecraft. 
 
Before doing so however, let me offer an interpretation of the failure of the 
Constitutional Treaty. In 2005, 54% of the French and 64% of the Dutch 
populations said No to the Yes-to-Europe. European elites were quick to 
blame the defeat of the Constitution in France and the Netherlands on the 
joint efforts of the “backwards” forces of “the far right” and “the far left.” 
While I by no means wish to downplay the extent to which xenophobic 
sentiments may have played their ugly part in both the French and the 
Dutch referenda, the rhetorical strategy of scapegoating “extremism” was 
blatantly self-serving. Jean Baudrillard suggested a different 
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interpretation of this No to “the Unquestionable Yes”, namely as a protest 
to the onslaught on the principle of representation, “after which Europe’s 
people will find themselves irrevocably consigned to the role of extras, 
requested to supply a rubber stamp from time to time.”239 This No, then, 
could be interpreted as challenging the hegemonic narrative of Europe, 
which presents itself as the only alternative, as historical necessity.  
 
To this, let me hint at a related interpretation: the No could be taken as a 
demonstration of resistance to the dialectical narrative of European-as-
coming-together, a dialectic that seeks to relegate all difference that 
cannot be subsumed under the official banner of European values, 
principles and virtues; that cannot effectively pass as European, to 
banishment. The No was not “a work of the negative”240 but the 
affirmation of contradiction–opposition that cannot be resolved. Thus 
understood, it is a No that smacks of a lustful spirit of revolution against 
the totalizing narrative of Historical necessity. The No could be 
understood as an act of recognition to non-Europe(s), non-Europe(s) that 
“we Europeans” should not anxiously have to impose closure on and expel 
from our European selves. The No could further be interpreted as 
resistance to the invocation of a set of universals to arrest politics, to de-
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democratize. In the resistance to being named as One, to being reduced to 
having One Economy as the European Economy, and One Interest as the 
European Interest, lies perhaps what unites the majorities of the 
populations in France and the Netherlands. 
 
On a final note, as shown in the beginning of this chapter, in the 
mainstream scholarly discourse, the need for a Constitution was often 
thought to be necessary to enhance the Union’s legitimacy. One should 
notice that legitimacy does not necessarily have anything to do with 
democracy. In many, at least European, national settings, the institutions 
seen as most legitimate in the public eye are often the ones least 
democratic, such as central banks and the military.241 Further, the 
democratic paradox teaches us that democracy, the people itself, cannot 
act as a sole source of legitimacy for a constitution, since the constitution 
in its very act of institution gives birth to the people, and for it to do so, 
needs to appeal to an absolute, external source to the act of foundation 
itself. Would the question of whether the EU benefits from a constitution 
be framed in terms of democratizing the EU, rather than enhancing its 
legitimacy, a constitution would therefore not necessarily seem to be the 
                                                   
241 Andrew Moravcsik makes this point and notices that the most democratic institutions 
at the national level are often the least popular ones. From this he, somewhat 
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no. 4 (2002). 
 
 
  119 
best option. In fact, in the act of constitutionalisation, some values are 
taken out and placed beyond and above politics; they are in effect 
depoliticized and placed beyond the reach of democracy. The process of 
constitutionalisation is thus directly opposed to a process of 
democratization, the latter being concerned with the extension of 
democratic politics into more areas of global and local life. The defeat of 
the Constitution may therefore ultimately in some sense be interpreted as 
a victory for democracy—a democracy not as an end-state, but democracy 
as a never-to-be finished process, as a democracy yet to come.  
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Chapter 4 
SOLANA’S STRUGGLE: UNIVERSALITY, PARTICULARITY, AND 
EXEMPLARITY IN THE CRAFTING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Ever since the inception of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 
1970, predecessor to the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) established in 1993, the way in which the European Union 
conducts international relations has been subject to much academic, as 
well as more popular, controversy. From François Duchêne’s and Hedley 
Bull’s ponderings over the virtues and vices of the EU as a “civilian power” 
in the 1970s to the more recent debate on the EU as a “normative power,” 
many commentators have argued that the EU’s approach to international 
politics is sui generis and qualitatively different from that of the modern 
state.242 It should from the outset be clarified that I will in this chapter not 
deal with the question of whether there is a greater emphasis on human 
rights and international law in EU’s foreign policy discourse as compared 
to most states, which is sometimes claimed in the “normative power 
Europe” discourse. Rather, my chapter concerns what I take to be a more 
fundamental issue for questions of violence and ethics, namely how the 
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“Europe” in the European Union is being enacted in relation to difference, 
and what that might tell us when it comes to the question of the EU’s 
alleged difference from the modern state. 
 
In this chapter, I examine the crafting of the European Union through a 
reading of the collected speeches made by the first and former High 
Representative of the EU’s CFSP, Javier Solana. Arguably, more than 
anyone else in the last decade, Solana has spoken on behalf of “Europe” in 
regard to how the Union relates to its “outside.”243 Solana is a highly 
uncontroversial figure, whose speeches attracted very little criticism. His 
speeches thus to a large extent articulated what the mainstream political 
parties and countries in the EU found and still find commonsensical. 
Solana’s speeches provide a useful entry point into the discursive network 
that crafts the European Union.244 I do not claim that his speeches are 
representative of Europe’s struggle to articulate an ethos in the sense of 
standing in the name of another set of speeches as if perfectly 
substitutable, only that Solana for a considerable amount of time has been 
standing in a privileged position of power within a complex network of 
discourses. As High Representative of the CFSP, Solana has been 
                                                   
243 It should be pointed out that Solana is a highly uncontroversial figure, whose speeches 
attracted very little criticism. Solana’s speeches thus to a large extent articulated what the 
mainstream political parties and countries in the EU found and still find 
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structurally expected to “fill in” the subject position of an important 
structuring node that linked many discourses into a somewhat coherent 
semantic network. Given the impact of Solana’s speeches, as well as the 
prestige and authority vested in his office, one could quite plausibly 
ascribe a certain amount of discursive “agency” to Solana in articulating 
and enacting “Europe;” “agency” not understood as sovereign autonomy, 
but “agency” in the process of weaving together existing sometimes 
supportive, sometimes contradictory narratives about “Europe” already in 
circulation.245  
 
I argue that one may in EU’s foreign policy discourse identify two major 
discursive gestures, each with its own distinct risks, between which the 
crafting of Europe continuously oscillates. The first gesture is one of 
particularizing Europe. I understand this as practices of attempting to 
impose clear boundaries of differentiation around Europe. The Europe 
enacted is here understood as planting a new flag, claiming a piece of land, 
imposing its law upon this territory, and conjuring up its own distinctive 
identity; in other words, adding a new center of sovereignty from which 
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political and social life may be arranged. The second gesture is one of 
universalizing Europe. Here, the particularizing gestures are resisted and 
Europe is understood as identical to the rest of the world. Or, at least, 
“beneath” layers of whatever passes as culture, tradition, and history, there 
is no essential difference between Europe and her others. In this chapter, I 
suggest that Europe is crafted in a pendular oscillation between its 
paradoxical claim to being both particular and yet also universal. It is 
furthermore the suggestion of the chapter that this oscillation reveals that 
Europe is crafted in a way akin to that of the modern state: in a constant 
movement and mediation between the universal and the particular. 
Hence, I contend, the crafting of Europe involves similar risks to those of 
the modern state; i.e. either to expel or interiorize difference. It would thus 
be highly premature to speak of Europe not only as qualitatively different 
from that of the modern state, but also in a more fundamental sense, as 
the more apologetic strands of the literature on the EU tend to do, of 
Europe as an inherently “gentler” form of international actor.246  
 
My reading thus takes issue with those who hold that the EU has somehow 
transcended the logic of differentiation of the nation state with no outside 
being produced, a position articulated by Michael Hardt and Antonio 
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Negri,247 and which is hinted at, but most often not clearly spelled out in 
some of the celebratory pieces on European foreign relations, which hold 
that the EU is emerging as a “new” kind of actor.248 My reading also runs 
counter to those who see the European Union as rather unproblematically 
and unreflectively embracing an identitarian logic of particularity.249 
Rather, the logic of particularity, identity, and community is perpetually 
challenged, questioned, and problematized. Those contradictions, I will 
argue should be read as testifying to the fundamentally irresolvable 
tension between particularity/universality, which can be negotiated 
differently but not transcended. And the prevalence of the 
particularity/universality binary demonstrates that the crafting of the 
European Union has far from transcended the crafting of the modern 
state.  
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The chapter unfolds as follows. After briefly locating my problem area 
within the broader literature of critical IR pertaining to the role of foreign 
policy and identity, I go on to review some of the existing scholarship on 
the self/other relation in the case of the EU. I then argue that the EU is not 
primarily, or perhaps at all, differentiating itself from some concrete, 
identifiable entity outside its boundaries. Rather, the outside being 
produced emerges in response to the ontological question of Europe: i.e. 
what is Europe, and what are “our” uniquely European values? Europe is 
primarily being constituted as a community of values, with a perpetually 
challenged and often destabilized set of borders. Second, as seen in 
Solana’s remarks above, I show how those values oscillate between being 
represented as universal, i.e. common to all, and particular to Europe.  I 
suggest that this ambiguity should be seen as testifying to the impossibility 
of combining an attempt at instantiating a community, for which a logic of 
identity never can be renounced, with a wish to move beyond the 
exclusionary gestures inherent in such a logic, and imagine a more 
inclusive and difference-embracing form of political community.  
 
In attempting to constitute Europe as an inclusive community, I argue that 
there is an important risk involved. What could well be understood as a 
gesture of attempted inclusion, i.e. the positing of universality of European 
values, risks turning Europe into the exemplary community, as the 
privileged bearer of those universal values. The allegedly universal values 
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are often re-inscribed in the territory of Europe, in the form of Europe as 
the exemplary community. This strategy, as I will argue below, could most 
fruitfully be seen as an attempt to resolve, or at least manage, the 
contradiction between universality and particularity of Europe’s values 
through the introduction of time. Such a strategy is highly problematic 
since by recognizing no boundaries to Europe, it enacts an imperialist 
ethos. Ultimately, the oscillation between particularity and universality in 
the crafting of the European Union reveals that statecraft has far from 
been overcome.  
 
 
 
Foreign Policy and the question of Europe 
 
An investigation into how the European subject is crafted, a set of 
performances which this dissertation refers to as practices of crafting 
Europe, could be undertaken through the study of foreign policy 
discourse. Within International Relations (IR), a number of works employ 
an understanding of foreign policy as essentially concerned with subject 
formation. In these works, practices of foreign policy take on the meaning 
of performative and thereby productive of political community, and are 
not understood as “the external deployment of instrumental reason on 
behalf of an unproblematic internal identity situated in an anarchic realm 
of necessity,”250 as David Campbell has put it, contrasting a performative 
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understanding of foreign policy to a traditional one. In other words, in 
contrast to much traditional IR, the international states system is not 
understood as consisting of individuated states that are ontologically prior 
to a system with entities where identity is firmly grounded prior to foreign 
policy practices. Instead, a performative approach understands foreign 
policy as “a specific sort of boundary-producing political performance,”251 
and emphasizes how foreign policy establishes the boundaries that 
perform the subjects of global life, making certain subjects, objects, and 
modes of conduct “foreign.”252 This understanding of foreign policy, as 
performative and productive of community, underlies the literature of 
self/other differentiation in IR, and provides the basic justification as to 
why this dissertation deals with foreign policy discourse.  
 
The first wave of IR scholarship on self/other differentiation tended to 
focus on the ways in which difference was converted into otherness in 
order to perform a dominant narration of a national self.253 William 
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252 This understanding of foreign policy, though already proposed in 1987 by Ashley, 
“Foreign Policy as Political Performance,” is perhaps most comprehensively developed in 
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253 In mainstream IR, Alexander Wendt’s writings on collective identity formation have 
been influential. Though Wendt’s work has many merits, it is less useful for 
understanding the link between foreign policy practices and the performance of a 
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on symbolic interactionism, portrays intersubjectivity as an outcome of fully formed and 
prior existing forms of subjectivity (i.e. “national identities”), effectively foreclosing a 
constitutive understanding of foreign policy, and shall therefore not be dealt with here.  
  128 
Connolly’s assertion in his Identity/Difference that “Identity requires 
difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order 
to secure its own self-certainty”254 was often, somewhat programmatically, 
taken as a starting-point, particularly in the more empirical treatments of 
the self/other nexus. And in what after more than fifteen years probably 
remains the most influential empirical work on foreign policy and the 
production of subjectivity, David Campbell portrayed U.S. foreign policy as 
a series of self-constituting and highly violent practices of othering, 
explicitly choosing not to focus on counter-discourses and instances of less 
violent dealings with difference, making U.S. foreign policy look a lot 
worse than would otherwise have been the case.255  
 
In the literature on Europe and the EU, some scholars have in modes of 
analyses similar to Campbell’s enterprise, tended to emphasize the 
similarities of how Europe, like the modern state, relates to difference, i.e. 
as a series of self-constituting practices of othering. Iver Neumann’s story 
about how “the East” has been used in European identity formation is 
essentially one of how difference has been converted into otherness 
throughout history and closes on a rather pessimistic note regarding EU’s 
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prospects of resisting othering-practices: “As far as I can see, political 
opposition on the level of nation-states, regions, and the EU has already 
begun to take the shape of rallying around essentialised communities that 
are presented as threatened and hence in need of being secured. 
Difference is already being turned into otherness.”256 Similarly, Maria 
Stern’s reading of the European Security Strategy highlights how “Europe” 
emerges through a series of inclusions and exclusions with a clearly 
demarcated inside and outside. Although Stern acknowledges that Europe 
is produced through many “interrelated and even competing logics,”257 her 
focus is evidently on how gendered and colonial logics establish the classic 
binaries between inside and outside, and concluding that violently drawn 
distinctions “between good and evil, humanity and barbarism, the 
underdeveloped and the developed, haunt the secure Europe and the 
better world promised in the strategy.”258 
 
Nevertheless, others have found Campbell’s one-sided focus on strategies 
of othering, somewhat lacking in nuance when applied to the European 
Union. Based on a reading of European security rhetoric, Ole Waever 
denied what he called against “the wish of various post-structuralists” that 
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the EU was othering its neighbors and that it was predominantly Europe’s 
bloody history that provided the other for the constitution of its self.259 
And whereas Lene Hansen wanted to introduce a discursive research 
design that allowed for degrees of otherness,260 Bahar Rumelili sought to 
identify scope conditions for when difference was most likely to be turned 
into otherness and argued that: “the discursive dependence of identity on 
difference does not necessarily entail a relationship of Othering between 
self and other. This contingency, while acknowledged in some 
sophisticated analysis, remains understated and underexplored in critical 
constructivist literature.”261  
 
Rumelili argued that one needs to separate the ontological question of the 
self/other relationship from its behavioral manifestations and posits what 
she believes to be three constitutive dimensions of self/other interactions–
nature of identity/difference, response of other, and social distance–which 
help to account for the different ways in which the EU relates to Central 
and Eastern Europe, Morocco, and Turkey respectively. Whereas Rumelili 
helpfully points to the importance of differentiating between ways of 
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relating to difference and infuses much nuance into the discussion about 
otherness in IR, a problem with her argument is that one particular aspect 
of practice, i.e. the decision of the EU to enlarge or not, becomes the 
determining criterion for whether difference is turned into otherness or 
not. In the final analysis, for Rumelili, “brute state behavior” rather than 
dominant discursive representations becomes the determinant of mode of 
differentiation. Such a criterion is problematic since what constitutes 
subjectivity is discourse, which could and ought not to be reduced to any 
one aspect of behavior that is interpreted to be decisive. For the textual 
understanding of the social world that this dissertation operates on, it is 
not possible to uphold a distinction between behavioral manifestation and 
discursive representation since behavior is always discursively mediated. 
 
Favoring a more textual trek, Thomas Diez has usefully proposed different 
forms of othering as ways in which the EU could potentially relate to 
difference, as expressed in the “EU normative power” discourse. First, the 
other could be represented as an existential threat (as the Copenhagen 
School focuses on in the analysis of securitization), second, as inferior, 
third as violating universal principles, and finally, simply as different 
(without any hierarchization).262 In a reply, Ian Manners proposes a fifth 
category with which the normative power Europe discourse may be 
examined, namely the self as other as borrowed from Julia Kristeva and 
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understood as “an abject-foreigner which is part of our conscious and 
unconscious selves.”263 Diez calls for further research on the academic 
discourse of normative power Europe and the modes of otherness which 
they imply, which certainly is needed. And just as important as critical 
attention to the scholarly discourse, is attention to how the EU policy 
makers themselves relate to difference, a task to which I turn in this 
chapter. 
 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have argued that the inside/outside 
dialectic is distinctively modern and we are now living in a “postmodern” 
era where it is becoming increasingly impossible to uphold a distinction 
between inside and outside.264 Hence, the logic of the constitutive outside 
no longer applies: “The binaries that defined modern conflict have become 
blurred. The Other that might delimit a modern sovereign Self has become 
fractured and indistinct, and there is no longer an outside that can bound 
the place of sovereignty.”265 In Multitude, they point to the European 
Union as exhibiting this “postmodern” non-mode of differentiation, in 
which there is no longer an outside serving as constitutive of the EU’s 
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“postmodern” self.266 In the spatial sense, Hardt and Negri seem 
correct;267 the constitutive outside is no longer contained in another state 
or another stable entity, which is very clear when considering Solana’s 
description of the threats facing Europe: “The greatest challenges which 
face us today know no borders, no frontiers: I am speaking of terrorism, 
organised crime, money laundering, drug-trafficking. These activities 
weaken our economies, destabilise our infrastructures, undermine 
democracy and damage our peoples. Their internationalism is what allows 
them to flourish. Like a rampant disease, they are difficult to isolate, and it 
is extremely difficult for any single nation to combat them successfully.”268 
 
As Hardt and Negri claim, a spatial outside may no longer bound the 
sovereignty of Europe. As Solana claims, “We have moved beyond clearly 
demarcated front-lines, with armies facing each other. Instead people are 
at risk everywhere, including in our own city centres. Of course this is a 
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world of great opportunities for increased freedom and prosperity. But it is 
also one of unpredictable perils.”269 
 
 
But Derrida never limited the outside/inside distinction to a spatial divide 
in the Cartesian sense. Only in a spatial sense, could one argue that Europe 
has moved away from the double gesture of Western metaphysics. The 
ontological question, however, of what Europe is, continues to haunt 
Solana–and that is a ghost that cannot be exorcised: “We no longer face 
the threat of massive conventional and non-conventional attack. There are 
new challenges. They may not threaten our existence. But they threaten 
our way of life, our values.”270  
 
 
The conflicts of the contemporary world often do not have consequences 
for the geopolitical landscape, but what Solana finds “worrying about 
them” is that they “often signal a return to barbarity,”271 and hence, pose a 
threat to our values, what we are. Ultimately, as we shall see below, 
despite Solana’s wish for articulating a new sort of political community: 
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“We are no longer a partnership against something, but a partnership for 
something,”272 Solana still has to end up affirming the exclusionary logic of 
identity with its inevitable violence. Solana’s struggle to articulate a more 
inclusive form of political community reveals the impossibility of doing 
away with the constitutive outside. 
 
 
Europe as a community of values 
Javier Solana, like the Constitutional Treaty, consistently insists that 
Europe is “above all a community built on a set of principles and a set of 
values.”273 For the first time in history, claims Solana, is it possible for 
Europeans to consolidate a lasting peace on the European continent not 
on the basis of a balance of power but “on the voluntary acceptance of and 
commitment to a set of values that inspires our civilization.”274 As a 
consequence of this community founded on common values, the EU’s 
foreign policy is most fundamentally about “the defence and promotion of 
the values which are at the heart of European history and civilization,”275 
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and ought to reflect “the values and principles which have forged our 
identity as European.”276 Hence, Solana insists that European foreign 
policy must not limit itself to a defense of Europe’s economic interests, but 
that a “comprehensive foreign policy is a statement of values as well as 
interests, an expression of identity, and a decision to promote them 
abroad.”277 The legitimacy of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) in the eyes of its citizens partially relies on its defence, 
maintenance, and promotion of European values: “values are our crucial 
link with the people of the street, who want to understand why we take this 
or that decision, and whose support we need at all times.”278 
 
Importantly, and analogous to the Europe inscribed in the Constitution, 
there has to be values that are at the heart, that is, at the transhistorical 
center of Europe, exclusively European, and upon which the European 
community can be securely founded and fended off from the rest of the 
world. Europe is being particularized and we here see the traditional logic 
of differentiation at work, which just like the Constitutional Treaty 
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differentiates Europe by means of appealing to a set of values. If European 
values were simply universal values, they would not be able to effectively 
ground a peculiarly European mode of subjectivity, i.e., we would quite 
simply not be able to distinguish Europe from non-Europe. A problem 
with the emphasis on the particularity of values is that it risks turning the 
EU into an imperial power, attempting to impose its unique and particular 
values on others. When the particularity of those values is emphasized the 
resulting foreign policy could from a viewpoint from outside of Europe at 
times appear as rather menacing as in Solana’s remark that “Europeans 
want their values…promoted around the world,”279 and as in his insistence 
that the development of EU’s security and defense policy (ESDP) “is 
crucial if Europe is to…maintain those values on which it is based.”280 In 
other words, according to Solana, Europeans want their particular values 
not only to be defended at home but also advanced abroad, and need a 
common security and defense policy, i.e. a military component in the form 
of the ESDP, to do so.  
 
Solana goes to some length in his attempt to spell out the values on which 
Europe is allegedly founded and a tension between the universality and 
particularity of European values runs as a red thread throughout. The 
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values defining Europe are sometimes presented as uniquely European, as 
when these values are portrayed as a source of respect for Europe from 
other countries: Europe is respected for its values.281 Speaking under the 
subheading of “back to Europe’s essence,” which Solana advocates as a 
way out of the crisis after the failure to ratify the proposed European 
constitution, he claims that: “I believe that our continent does have a 
particular identity. True, discussions on European identity often 
degenerate into platitudes and guff. Europe’s identity is hard to pin down. 
And of course we share many values with others, notably in North 
America. Even so, I believe there is a European identity.”282 
 
It is worthwhile to notice that this speech, where the particularity of 
European identity is stressed, is delivered in a time of perceived crisis of 
the European project of community building. Solana appeals to the 
particularity of European values to stress the commonalities of Europe, 
and explicitly advocates a return to the “essence of Europe” to remind 
Europeans about their common project of community building as 
“destiny.” Here, Solana very clearly engages in the double gesture of 
Western metaphysics, anxiously desiring a return to the origin of Europe—
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Europe’s essence, as a way out of the crisis of Europe, the corruption of 
Europe’s purity. This is of course problematic, since as we saw in the 
previous chapter, “European values” contain also that which has caused 
conflict and division within Europe. 
 
At other times, however, Solana simply equates European with universal 
values. Speaking in a Swedish town, Solana claims that: “The values rooted 
in our common texts are common to all. They are shared also with those 
who cannot be in Helsingborg–the victims of conflict whether in the 
Balkans, in the Middle East, on the Horn of Africa and in Central Africa. 
Our purpose is to enable these values to flourish and find expression 
where they already have deep roots.”283 Here, there is clearly no 
difference to be drawn between the values that Europe wants to promote 
and the values already in place in distant localities. These values already 
inhabit the whole world, and Europe’s task is to cultivate them for the rest 
of the planet’s peoples, to water their “deep roots” so that they may grow 
and flourish. The ambiguity about the status of the values that the EU is 
founded upon and the EU’s foreign policy therefore should reflect is 
sometimes found within the same speech. In one speech, Solana first 
asserts that the EU’s foreign policy should reflect “the values and 
principles which have forged our identity as Europeans” and then he 
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immediately goes on to claim, ”it is essential that Europe's foreign policy is 
based on those values and universal principles. A key element of this must 
be the promotion and protection of human rights anywhere in the 
world.”284 One finds a similar tension in what is probably Solana’s most 
sustained reflection on the status of the values that allegedly define 
Europe: 
 
I believe there is a core set of values, convictions and experiences 
that together form a composite European identity. And there are, by 
now, enough elements of a European model on how to organise our 
societies and interact with the wider world. We all feel it when we 
travel around the world. What are the elements? I would say 
compassion with those who suffer, peace and reconciliation through 
integration; a strong attachment to human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law; a spirit of compromise, plus a commitment to 
promote in a pragmatic way rule-based international system. But 
also a sense that history and culture are central to how the world 
works and therefore how we should engage with it.285 
 
 
However, immediately after having spelled out a rather substantive 
definition of European values as proper to Europe, and appealing to 
identity as a necessary pre-condition for community, i.e. particularizing 
Europe, Solana immediately goes on to recognize that: “Once again these 
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elements are not unique to Europe. And I don’t want us to define ourselves 
negatively, against ‘the other’. But we probably do feel more strongly about 
these values than others.”286 
 
Thus, when further examining the values upon which Europe is founded, 
one encounters a paradox. On the one hand, the particularity of the values 
of Europe are emphasized in an attempt to differentiate Europe from other 
communities, i.e. to bound Europe’s self. However, in order to legitimize 
European intervention abroad in defense of this community of values and, 
most plausibly, construct Europe as an inclusive community, the universal 
nature of those values is instead emphasized. Using the all-too-familiar 
language of realpolitik, would Solana not make this equation, he would 
run the risk of rapidly approaching the imperial pole—Europe as simply 
imposing its values on others. An appeal to universality is not without its 
own risks however. It conjures up Europe’s not very distant colonial past. 
One of the risks of the insistence of the universality of Europe’s values is 
brought to the fore when we consider the link between universality and 
exemplarity.  
 
Europe, exemplarity, and the (im)possibility of ethics 
The practice of the good example is about inscribing a particular in the 
name of the universal within a certain body. As Derrida explicates: the 
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value of universality is “always linked to the value of exemplarity that 
inscribes the universal in the proper body of singularity…whether this 
singularity be individual, social, national, state, federal, confederal.”287 
How does this play out? Derrida has devoted considerable attention to 
what has been called the problem of exemplarity.288 In Derrida´s writings, 
the notion of an example—traditionally understood as an instance of the 
universal—takes two meanings at the same time; in Michael Naas’s words 
“an undistinguished sample and a teleological model” between which the 
notion of an example oscillates.289 The first meaning is that of a sample; 
i.e. one undistinguished sample among many others, akin to the notion of 
a sample from a population in statistics. This understanding of an example 
presupposes the existence of a certain norm, which is present and 
universal in regard to all possible samples. The examples are simply 
mirror images of this pre-existing norm. On the second understanding of 
an example, however, the example always either exceeds or falls short of 
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some norm. Derrida provides a clear rendition of this aporia when 
commenting on Maurice Blanchot´s discussion of Marx: 
 
This other thinking of knowledge, if I can put it that way, does 
not exclude science.  But it overturns and overflows its 
received idea. Blanchot recognizes in this “the example of 
Marx.”  Why example?  We will ask even before knowing why 
“the example of Marx.”  Let us insist on this point.  An 
example always carries beyond itself: it thereby opens up a 
testamentary dimension.  The example is first of all for others, 
and beyond the self.  Sometimes, but not always, whoever 
gives the example is not equal to the example he gives, even if 
he does everything to follow it in advance, “to learn how to 
live,” as we were saying, imperfect example of the example he 
gives—which he gives by giving then what he has not and even 
what he is not.  For this reason, the example thus disjoined 
separates enough from itself or from whoever gives it so as to 
be no longer or not yet example for itself.290 
 
The example in this second sense is often understood as the essentially 
good example, carrying beyond itself and setting an example for others to 
follow, becoming the bearer of the uncertain and ambiguous norm that it 
is (merely) supposed to exemplify. So, the example in this second sense 
functions to stabilize and give content to a norm that is not already 
unambiguously in place. This logic of exemplarity is particularly visible in 
times of crises, when there is fundamental uncertainty about how to 
behave, only vague and ambiguous analogies to draw on.291 In the 
aftermath of 9/11, for example, the firemen who risked their lives to save 
people trapped in the burning remnants of the Twin Towers became the 
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exemplars of how a citizen ought to behave. The firemen exhibited 
exemplary behaviour, giving content to what good citizenship means while 
becoming bearers of a norm supposedly universal in regard to how all 
(good) citizens ought to behave, but a norm that was fundamentally 
uncertain and in need of at least provisional fixation. 
 
In the traditional philosophical discourse on the idea of Europe, one finds 
an oscillation between the two meanings of the example, as one 
community among others—a community that observes the law already in 
place—and as the essentially good example; Europe as the bearer of the 
law that it sometimes must depart from and violate in order to lay down. 
The traditional discourse on Europe found in thinkers as diverse as Hegel, 
Husserl, Heidegger and Valéry, has often subscribed to the idea of Europe 
as the good example: “the idea of an advanced point of exemplarity… [as] 
the idea of the European idea, its eidos, the idea of beginning and telos.”292 
This is the Europe that never ceases “to make advances on the other: to 
induce, seduce, produce, and conduce, to spread out, to cultivate, to love 
or to violate, to colonize, and to colonize itself.”293 
 
When reading Solana’s speeches, one finds a similar oscillation between 
Europe as one example of regional integration among others, and as the 
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good example, as providing the exemplary model of integration: “Over the 
last forty years, the European Union has become one of the most 
sophisticated and advanced examples of regional integration in the 
world.”294 At other times, the EU is simply presented as the best model, 
the exemplary of regional integration: “There is no better example of 
regional integration than the European Union. It has stood the test of 
time.”295 So whereas the model of regional integration that the EU 
instantiates, sometimes simply offers “a model…for peace through 
regional integration,”296 it is most frequently presented as more than one 
model among many models, but the only model, the exemplary model, 
that other regions ought to follow: “The European Union can be an 
example to the region of what can be achieved through co-operation and 
integration…We are better placed than anyone else to help, and we have a 
direct interest in doing so.”297 
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When speaking of Africa, Solana notices that it has “chosen a similar 
path”298 to that of Europe and notes “with satisfaction that the European 
Union has served as inspiration and a model.”299 And Europe’s 
exemplarity leads to “a need for Europe” in the world: 
 
Everywhere I hear foreign contacts tell me of their need for Europe. 
Yes, there is a need for Europe around the world! … Yes, the 
magnetic force of the European model is stronger than ever! Yes, 
Europe today is the main vector of peace and democracy right 
across the world. How many regions and countries admire the 
Franco-German reconciliation? This is no messianic posturing on 
my part but a statement of fact based on three objective realities: 
Europe is the most extensive and most developed model for 
political integration based on law and freedom. … The world needs 
Europe.300 
 
It is not enough to simply embody the good example, for others to look up 
to, admire and try to imitate according to the best of their abilities. In the 
early years of Solana’s incumbency, before the military component of the 
CFSP, the ESDP, had materialized, he repeatedly stressed that Europe’s 
exemplarity can no longer passively assert itself: “It is no longer enough 
for Europe to remain a force for peace through example. The Union is also 
a community built on a set of principles and values. … There is in 
                                                   
298 Javier Solana, ”Statement by Secretary General/High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy” (Africa-Europe Summit, Cairo, 3-4 April, 2000). 
 
 
299 Javier Solana, ”Public Meeting on the Situation in Africa” (New York, 29 January, 
2002). 
 
 
300 Javier Solana, ”Speech by Javier Solana at Institut d’Etudes Politiques” (Paris, 18 
April, 2005). 
 
 
  147 
particular increasing concern to support democracy and human rights in 
developing countries. I am convinced of the need for the European Union, 
together with those who share our values, to be forthright in defending 
these values and in upholding the basic principles on which Europe is 
founded.”301 
 
Here, one finds a peculiar link between exemplarity and responsibility. As 
Solana puts it, “It is my belief that because of our size and interests, 
because of our history and values, we have an obligation to take our share 
of responsibilities in this global age.”302 Europe is indeed even “being 
called upon” to assume its responsibilities,303 and not just in the sense that 
as Solana often refers to, there is an external “demand for Europe,”304 but 
because of the exemplarity of the values that Europe embodies. 
Responsibility for the world then becomes something that imposes itself 
upon Europe: it is not “only a matter of choice [but] … a question of 
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responsibility.”305 Interestingly, this is not so far from an important strand 
in U.S. foreign policy discourse, which as Ernest Lee Tuveson argued, 
holds that “history has put a special responsibility on the American people 
to spread the blessings, liberty, democracy, and equality to others 
throughout the earth, and to defeat, if necessary by force, the sinister 
powers of darkness.”306  
 
When read through the logic of exemplarity, eurocentrism with its 
monological mode of relating to the other comes to the fore. The risk here 
is that Europe as the good example has little to learn from the other, only 
assume its burden to act as the great Educator, with all its colonially 
charged traces. And, radiating its exemplarity from the city on the hill is no 
longer enough, it is not responsible behavior. European foreign policy 
ultimately becomes a vehicle through which Europe may assume its 
responsibilities imposed on it because of its exemplarity. This, and not the 
idea of universality as such, is eurocentrism properly speaking understood 
with Ernesto Laclau as the equating of the universality of certain values, 
norms, and principles with the institutions thought to embody those 
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values.307 The practice of exemplarity then re-inscribes those values within 
the European body. 
 
Importantly, the practice of exemplarity introduces a notion of time in an 
attempt to bridge the contradiction between universality and 
particularity.308 Time appears in the guise of “progress” or “development,” 
and operates by deploying the binaries of surface/depth and 
accident/essence. Progress or development is understood as the 
movement towards the obliteration of that which is cast merely as an 
accidental surface phenomenon and the simultaneous bringing to the 
surface of that which Europe already exemplifies. On this logic, other 
countries and continents may appear different from Europe, but are 
underneath those illusory appearances the same. Europe appears different 
and is an exemplar because it is the most advanced and developed locality 
in terms of this movement towards the surfacing of a deep essence 
common to all mankind. Thus, in Europe, values supersede and keep 
control of accidents. Outside of Europe, however, that gets reversed—
accidents supersede and keep those values repressed. What is yet to 
progress, are those cases in which historical accident and surface 
appearances give rise to superficially appearing differences, but only 
because that which is essential to all humans has not yet been brought to 
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the surface. Thus Europe and non-Europe are the same in essence. The 
difference lies in, that being more progressive, Europe has brought to the 
surface that human essence, and is now exemplifying it, whereas Europe’s 
others have not yet managed to do so. 
 
The significance of this narrative structure should be fairly obvious. The 
logic of exemplarity then becomes a potential basis for a dubious and 
eurocentric notion of responsibility, which coincides with the master 
narrative of colonial responsibility. Europe may on this logic in some 
instances act with force and violence towards various others precisely 
because of their failure to follow Europe’s example—which is after all 
alleged to be universal and really in line with their innermost but 
repressed wills. Europe’s leaders for their part though, could potentially 
be forgiven for that violence because were Europe’s others to develop, i.e. 
were their essence to come to the surface, they would have wanted this 
violence and perceived it as assistance in the emancipation of their deepest 
levels of selves. Thus are the risks of the practice of exemplarity, and this 
basic narrative structure is still there, albeit in a much more subtle form as 
compared to the heyday of colonialism. 
 
When reading Solana’s discourse on Europe through the logic of 
exemplarity, one can fully appreciate the consequences of that reluctance 
to impose boundaries to the extension of Europe’s values for the ethos that 
is being enacted. We shall in somewhat greater detail spell out the risks for 
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the ethos enacted of destabilizing Europe’s borders—the universalizing 
gesture. In the universalizing gesture, Europe’s boundaries are put into 
question, while the center is being preserved. Europe then becomes a 
center with no boundaries, and must refuse to recognize any boundaries, 
thus also putting into question other centers than that of Europe’s. The 
only way to establish identity without difference, i.e. a set of boundaries of 
differentiation, is by expecting that all temporary difference can be 
absorbed into the orbit of one’s own center. The imposition of boundaries 
around a center produces a constitutive outside that imposes limits to 
what can be drawn into the order of that center. The dangers of claiming 
identity without the recognition of difference (i.e. of establishing a center 
without delineating boundaries)—without recognizing a constitutive 
outside as such—lies precisely in the establishment of a center which will 
tend to absorb everything into an order structured by that center. 
Consequently, a center which does not recognize boundaries becomes the 
universal arranging mechanism around which everything else is seen to 
orbit such that everything in the world and all otherness is refused by 
becoming merely derivative and subservient to the central organizing 
function from which everything else is arranged.309 To clarify what is at 
stake here, one may briefly consider an impossible strategy, namely to 
recognize boundaries but refuse to establish a center. The imposition of 
boundaries without a center is impossible; the attempt to impose a border 
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between let us say Europe and Africa, necessarily requires a center to 
uphold the logic according to which the borders are established. The inside 
could simply not be differentiated from the outside in the absence of a 
center. To think of boundaries without a center would necessitate a break 
with the ancient division of logos and chaos. What then are the ethical 
implications of such a gesture? 
 
The attempt to impose a certain framework of understanding on 
everything that is outside to that framework is what Emmanuel Levinas 
refers to as totality.310 For Levinas, and as was introduced in the first 
chapter of the dissertation, this is the root of the violence of Western 
ontology. In the classical line of ontological thinkers, there is no 
experience that cannot be subsumed, reduced or made intelligible within 
one’s own language, logic, and law. When refusing to acknowledge 
boundaries that would produce a constitutive outside, Solana partly ends 
up within a totalizing discourse. In the case of Europe then, what could 
well be understood as a benevolent aspiration for inclusiveness turns into 
a pulsating heart that never stops beating in its desire for interiorizing 
difference. The risks for Europe’s ethos are thus that the other is denied an 
existence as operating according to another language, logic, and law but 
can only be made intelligible within the framework of one’s own, i.e. the 
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universal, center. Without the imposition of borders around one’s center, 
one effectively claims to be able to read the whole world in one’s own 
terms and a monological mode of relating to the other follows.  
 
It is thus possible to re-consider the claim of Europe as an ethical 
power.311 Recalling Levinas’s understanding of ethics, there can be no 
ethical relation without the recognition of alterity; i.e. without the 
recognition that there is something that escapes the knowing subject; 
something that cannot be reduced to sameness. Without the recognition of 
boundaries around the subject that is posited, there can be no recognition 
of alterity and hence no ethics is possible. Exclusionary boundaries, as we 
saw in the particularizing gesture, do violence but they have the ironic 
effect of avoiding other violences such as the inability of an ethos to 
recognize the limits of its homeland vis-à-vis the homelands of others.  
 
Between the universal and the particular: Euro-crafting as statecrafting 
Within the official discourse of Europe that I have examined, Europe is 
primarily and prior to any spatio-temporal inscription crafted 
axiologically. On the basis of the empirical material under examination, I 
have suggested that Europe is crafted and thereby differentiated foremost 
as a community of values. Within the aspiring discursive center of Europe, 
the constitutive outsides are no longer territorially inscribed and 
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“outsides” conceived of as bearers of “non-European values” may be found 
on the geographical inside just as well as outside of Europe. And yet, 
Europe is still depicted to be located somewhere on the map and not just 
anywhere across the globe; the signifier “Europe” is attached to a 
particular piece of territory. 
 
In Solana’s speeches one finds a continuous oscillation between 
particularizing and universalizing Europe. European values are 
simultaneously presented as unique, i.e. particular to Europe, and to be 
found everywhere, i.e. universal. The particularistic enactment of Europe 
conjures up a bounded place; this is the enactment of a bounded 
community with a particular identity. The risks of particularizing Europe 
are fairly obvious, since all identities need to continuously keep on 
excluding the different, the foreign, the alien and so on; all assertions of 
identity depend on the simultaneous creation of difference. There is no 
doubt that Solana tries hard to embrace a more inclusive type of political 
community, hence articulating widely spread sentiments on the European 
continent. In part, the universalization of the values that Europe allegedly 
rests upon could be seen as an attempt at that. And to the effect that 
Europe is enacted as a more inclusive and welcoming place it is certainly a 
laudable gesture, which challenges particularistic and exclusive strategies 
of nation building. Solana’s most frequently deployed strategy for doing so 
consists in the recognition of a center and the destabilization of the 
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boundaries of that center. Any claim to a center is a claim to making 
existence a function of the language, logic, and law of that center. Taken to 
its extreme, that language, law and logic become nothing more than a set 
of overextended metaphors, being associated with a will to power that 
refuses to recognize any boundaries whatsoever, in other words, a sort of 
forgetful poetics.312 Moreover we saw one of the risks of this gesture when 
the connection between universality and exemplarity was spelled out, 
where Europe is rendered as the good example, as the privileged bearer of 
those supposedly universal values. If those values were truly universal, one 
would not be able to trace them back to a particular locality;313 hence 
exemplarity is a way in which those values are re-inscribed in the 
territorial body of Europe. This is of course highly problematic, since such 
a claim acknowledges no limits to Europe’s “sphere of influence;” it buys 
into the conceptual framework of, to use an old term, pure imperialism. 
 
I have certainly not discovered some dark, murky secret by emphasizing 
the pendular movement between particularity and universality in the 
crafting of the European Union. In fact, as I proposed in the second 
chapter, the modern European state could be understood as the 
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institutionalization of this constant mediation between the particular and 
the universal. Ultimately then, on this reading the crafting of Europe 
between the particular and the universal closely resembles what is 
arguably a central feature of the crafting of the modern European state. 
When EU’s foreign policy discourse is examined, it thus seems fair to 
conclude that the conceptual apparatus of modern statecraft has been far 
from transcended. 
  157 
Chapter 5 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
STATISM: ON THE LIMITED IMAGINATION OF 
NEOFUNCTIONALISM 
 
A critique of European integration legitimation discourse should not 
neglect engaging neofunctionalism, which emerged, in the words of its 
most prominent theoretician Ernst B. Haas, “in order to give the study of 
European integration a theoretical basis.”314 Neofunctionalism has 
historically been, and in several ways remains, the most influential 
approach to theorizing about European integration. As Ben Rosamond 
points out in his extensive study of European integration theory, “for 
many, ‘integration theory’ and ‘neo-functionalism’ are virtually 
synonyms.”315 Indeed, it may not be an exaggeration to claim, as 
Rosamond does “we cannot think about the analysis of European 
integration without confronting neo-functionalism.”316 In this chapter, I 
am not concerned with the question that preoccupies most treatments of 
neofunctionalism in European integration studies: the explanatory, or 
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predictive power that neofunctionalism may hold in accounting for the 
historical trajectory of European integration conceived of as a set of 
sequential events. Rather, I am interested in the question of what 
“Europe” neo-functionalist discourse seeks to enact. To paraphrase Rob 
Walker’s approach to theories of International Relations, from such a 
perspective theories of European integration “are interesting less for the 
substantive explanations they offer about political conditions in the 
modern world than as expressions of the limits of contemporary political 
imagination.”317 I understand and will read neofunctionalism as an 
influential political discourse in the politically and ethically contested 
question of what “Europe” is, and what “European integration” ought to be 
about. More specifically, I will examine neofunctionalist discourse on the 
question of political community. 
 
There is little doubt that neofunctionalism in the 1960s and into the 1970s 
enjoyed the “status of an official ideology in Brussels.”318 However, it 
should from the outset be emphasized that neofunctionalism is not merely 
of interest for the intellectual historian rummaging around in the ever-
expanding graveyard of abandoned theoretical endeavors that are 
intermittently resurrected. On the contrary, neofunctionalism is very 
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much alive in contemporary European integration studies in at least two 
explicit and one implicit form. First, there are several influential voices in 
European integration studies that acknowledge a profound intellectual 
debt to neofunctionalism. In addition, neofunctionalism has in recent 
years enjoyed something of a renaissance. Several recent studies employ 
an explicit neofunctionalist theoretical framework for carrying out their 
analyses.319 Second, neofunctionalism sometimes figures in the form of an 
“other,” against which competing theories constitute themselves.320 Such 
is for example the case with Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal 
intergovernmentalism, which purports to explain European integration as 
driven by rational self-interested state actors.321 Finally and more 
implicitly, neofunctionalism often appears in a more spectral form, 
structuring the analyst’s treatment of a particular episode of European 
integration. Here, neofunctionalism—or any other theory for that matter—
is often not mentioned by name, but a neofunctionalist conceptual 
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backdrop still sets the parameters of intelligibility for the analysis 
undertaken. Thus, to an important extent, neofunctionalism still sets the 
horizon for what European integration has been, is, and should be, about. 
 
I will in this chapter highlight two readings of neofunctionalism, focusing 
on its understanding of political community and identity. The first reading 
could be referred to as the dominant logic of neo-functionalist discourse—
as a discourse which ends up invoking a highly traditionally statist 
understanding of political community. Despite its wish to go “beyond the 
state,”322 it fails to conceptualize European integration in categories that 
break with the modalities of modern statecraft. If we are to judge 
neofunctionalism by the stated ambition of its most renowned advocate 
Ernest B. Haas as an attempt to reflect upon “how human collectivities can 
move beyond the nation state,”323 then, it must be seen as deeply 
problematic. I show in some detail that neofunctionalism is in fact heavily 
statist, and relies on the understanding of the state found in the social 
contract tradition. Instead of challenging the peculiar political 
organization of the modern western state, neofunctionalism has helped 
and is helping to retrench it and turn it into the implicit or explicit model, 
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or “ideal-type,”324 in Weberian parlance, against which the European 
Union is perpetually evaluated. In the penultimate section of the paper, I 
show how contemporary political theorizing of European integration is 
beholden to a similar statist imagination. 
 
However, there is also a different reading of neofunctionalism that can be 
made. A discourse that is often read as depoliticizing social relations may 
in fact be read as politicizing the question of political community and 
identity. On this reading, neofunctionalism may be read as demonstrating 
the lack of foundations for the “Europe” it seeks to perform, thus opening 
up for a re-politicization of the question of the content of Europe. This 
reading points us away from the essentializing identity understandings of 
Europe that we found in the Constitutional Treaty and in EU’s foreign 
policy discourse. Instead, it points us towards imagining alternative ways 
of organizing social and political life on the European continent, which 
may have little at all to do with “community” as understood in the statist 
tradition. This is in fact the trajectory that Haas’s own thinking took, as he 
became increasingly frustrated with the neofunctionalism he had been 
championing and helped to establish. 
 
The chapter unfolds as follows. I begin by sketching the broad contours of 
neofunctionalist discourse, and locate it in its proper historical and 
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intellectual contexts. Second, I will carefully reconstruct the dominant 
neofunctionalist logic of political community and identity. I will emphasize 
Haas’s growing disillusionment with his earlier work, which eventually 
caused him to break with, or at least seriously question, his earlier 
neofunctionalism. In the third section, I argue that contemporary 
European integration theorists are beholden to a similar statist 
imagination as neofunctionalism. The concluding section briefly sums of 
the argument of the chapter. 
 
 
 
The contours of neofunctionalist discourse 
 
According to conventional narrations of European integration theory, 
neofunctionalism was born in 1958, when German émigré Ernst B. Haas 
published a lengthy tract on the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC).325 The ECSC, the earliest precursor to today’s European Union, 
had been set up to pool Franco-German coal and steel resources on the 
initiative of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in May 1951, 
following substantial pressure from the U.S. government.326 Haas sought 
to provide a theoretically informed account of the ECSC’s first six years of 
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existence, and would in a few subsequent shorter pieces consider the 
extent to which his findings were applicable to other settings beyond the 
European continent, in line with positivist social scientific ambitions to 
theoretical generalizability.327 Haas’s second major statement did not deal 
with the European experience of regional integration per se, but was an 
eclectic study of integration among states, drawing on functionalist theory 
and the International Labor Organization as a case study.328 In 1971, Haas 
wrote a lengthy and rather self-critical contemplation on how 
neofunctionalism had fared as a descriptive and predictive theory of 
European integration since the late 1950s,329 only to a few years later 
announce its “obsoleteness” in Western Europe—though only 
“obsolescent” in other parts of the world—in his last major piece on 
European integration.330 Haas would towards the end of his life revisit 
neofunctionalist tenets and write a short piece on its relation to the then 
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trendy Constructivism in International Relations theory.331 Other 
influential neofunctionalist statements include works by Leon Lindberg,332 
Leon Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold,333 and Philippe Schmitter.334 
 
It is common to recount the fortunes of neofunctionalism as being closely 
related to the ups and downs of the history of European integration: when 
integration in the coal and steel sectors went smoothly, and the common 
market seemed to be thriving in the early 1960s, neofunctionalism enjoyed 
its heyday.335 From the mid-1960s, when French President Charles de 
Gaulle highhandedly asserted the French national interest and humiliated 
federalist Walter Hallstein’s European Commission, the European 
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communities entered into a period of decline, which would last throughout 
the economically turbulent 1970s. Nationalism, which neofunctionalism 
had predicted was waning and eventually altogether disappear, seemed to 
hamper further European integration.336 In this period, the popularity of 
neofunctionalism rapidly declined. When European integration was “re-
launched” with the Single European Act in the mid-1980s, 
neofunctionalism would once again experience a revival in European 
integration studies.337 Most contemporary textbooks on the European 
Union include chapters on neofunctionalism, and there is today a 
widespread sentiment that neofunctionalism at least captured parts of the 
dynamics of European integration. 
 
What was neofunctionalism about then? Before I engage Haas’s oeuvre in 
greater detail, I will briefly draw up the contours of neofunctionalist 
discourse within the broader context of American social and political 
science. In a nutshell, and according to Haas, neofunctionalism is about 
transplanting the pluralist conception of the state to the supranational or 
“European” level.338 In the same way as pluralist theories of the state 
                                                   
336 Hoffmann, “Obstinate or Obsolete?” 
 
 
337 E.g. Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neofunctionalism: obstinate or obsolete?” 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 20, no. 1 (1991); Wayne Sandholtz and Alec 
Stone Sweet, eds. European integration and supranational governance (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998). 
 
 
338 Haas, “Does Constructivism Subsume Neo-functionalism?” 23. 
 
 
  166 
postulated that rational, utility-maximizing interest groups competed for 
power at the level of the state, neo-functionalists asserted that those very 
groups would—with some help from supranational institutions—start 
competing for influence and resources at the European level too. As Haas 
put it in retrospect: “Regional integration was expected to occur when 
societal actors, in calculating their interests, decided to rely on the 
supranational institutions rather than their own governments to realize 
their interests. These institutions, in turn, would enjoy increasing 
authority and legitimacy as they become the sources of policies meeting 
the demands of societal actors.”339  
 
The central dynamic of neofunctionalist theory is the notion of spillover. 
In Leon Lindberg’s definition, spillover refers to “a situation in which a 
given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the 
original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn 
create a further condition and a need for more action and so forth.”340 In 
other words, in order to fully realize the benefits from integration in one 
sector, related sectors would have to be integrated as well. And in modern 
industrialized societies, virtually all sectors were thought to be 
interdependent, thus creating a domino effect once integration in some 
important sectors got started. Interest groups, realizing that they had more 
                                                   
339 Ibid. 
 
 
340 Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration, 10. 
 
 
  167 
to gain from European level politics, would lobby their national 
governments to go along with further integration. Initially reluctant states 
would be dragged along and transfer more and more of their erstwhile 
sovereign powers to the European level. The powers of the member states 
were not to be confronted directly, but rather stripped away in a piecemeal 
fashion, starting in the less sensitive areas of “low politics” (essentially 
economics), and then proceed to issues of “high politics” (such as defense 
and foreign policy that were thought to be at the very core of state 
sovereignty). It is worth noticing that there was no temporal specificity 
about the neofunctionalist understanding of spillover. While its critics 
often assumed that neofunctionalism had been disconfirmed since 
spillover didn’t seem to occur within a limited time horizon, Haas and his 
associates never specified how long time it might take.341 
 
What is usually understood to set neofunctionalism apart from 
functionalism, in addition to the fact that functionalism is a theory of 
global political integration whereas neofunctionalism is a theory of 
regional integration, is that neofunctionalism stresses the agency of 
organized elites. Functionalism, as perhaps most influentially developed 
by David Mitrany, was a somewhat deterministic theory, which assumed 
that integration among states were more or less an inevitable byproduct of 
increased economic interdependence among states that industrialization 
                                                   
341 John G. Ruggie, Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane, and Philippe C. Schmitter, 
“Transformations in World Politics: The Intellectual Contributions of Ernst B. Haas,” 
Annual Review of Political Science 8, no. 1 (2005), 279. 
  168 
and modern technology brought about. As opposed to functionalism, for 
neofunctionalism “political integration comes about less through 
pressures from functional needs or technological change as such, and 
more through the interaction of political forces—interest groups, parties, 
governments, international agencies—which seek to exploit these 
pressures in pursuit of their own interests.”342 Whereas functionalists also 
believed in the idea of spillover as driving integration forward, neo-
functionalists perceived it less as driven by automaticity, but rather by 
organized interest groups, political leaders, and supranational agents.  
 
In terms of general trends within post-war American social science, 
neofunctionalism might be described as materialist, rationalist, utilitarian, 
and positivist. In spite of this being denied by Haas343 neofunctionalism is 
arguably materialist in the way it views interests: agents pursue their 
material interests through group politics. It is utilitarian and rationalist in 
that it postulates an autonomous agent—an interest group, supranational 
institution, or national leader—which makes rational ends-means 
calculations, in order to maximize its utility. Neofunctionalism also relies 
on an economistic understanding of the human subject, in which the 
individual is understood as a homo economicus, preoccupied above all else 
with material gains (rather than with emotional attachment to homeland 
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etc.). Haas’s work subscribes to the “end of ideology” thesis, in which there 
are no longer any serious political conflicts in society.344 Thus, 
neofunctionalism is essentially an anti-political theory, since Haas 
believed that the most fundamental political questions had already been 
solved. There was on such a view a general consensus on how society 
should be organized; so politics was no longer concerned with basic 
questions of the common good.345 Neofunctionalism is finally positivist. As 
characteristic of U.S. post-war positivist social science, neofunctionalists 
like Haas and Lindberg attempted nothing less than to discover the 
universal laws of integration.346  
 
Despite its search for law-like generalizations about integration, 
neofunctionalism took a hermeneutical approach to knowledge. 
Neofunctionalism sought to stay close to the perceptions of the actors 
themselves.347 No doubt, Haas’s hermeneutics came from his essentially 
Weberian understanding of social science: “Because human beings are 
reflective and reflexive, concepts in the social sciences must aid in 
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uncovering the meaning of specific actions and in demonstrating their 
significance within a particular social context, or risk becoming mere 
reifications.”348 A problem with that, however, is that neofunctionalism 
thereby disables any criticism of those actors, beyond the goals postulated 
by the actors themselves. Like Richard Ashley once wrote of classical 
realism, neofunctionalism “is ensnared in the ‘hermeneutic circularity’ of 
the tradition of practice it interprets.349 Neofunctionalism then could 
partly be seen as an ideology for those in favor of European integration as 
traditionally understood.  
 
Finally, what are the ideological components of neofunctionalism? It is at 
this point important to stress that neofunctionalism should be understood 
both as descriptive and prescriptive in orientation. Not only does 
neofunctionalism present itself as a detached observer’s theoretical 
interpretation of a particular historical trajectory; as an attempt to 
describe—in a social scientific vocabulary—how the so-called “founding 
fathers” of European integration was going about their vocation. It is also, 
potentially at odds with its aspiration to value-free social science, openly 
normative in orientation. It should from the outset be emphasized that 
Haas was a strong supporter of European integration. In part, this 
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undoubtedly had something to do with the fact that he and his family fled 
Nazi Germany in the late 1930s, and had thus experienced firsthand the 
tremendously destructive manifestations of the most extreme form of 
nationalism.350 Not only would European integration undermine the 
violent tendencies of the European nation state, thus preventing war from 
ever recurring again on the European continent, regional integration had 
the potential to do even more than that. When Haas was pondering the 
possibilities of exporting the model of European integration to other 
regions he claimed, “Such a development would be most satisfying. 
Presumably it would contribute to world peace by creating ever-expanding 
islands of practical cooperation, eventually spilling over into the 
controversy-laden fields which threaten us directly with thermonuclear 
destruction.”351 Neofunctionalist integration theory was thus a form of 
peace-research of global significance.352 As Heathcote put it, 
neofunctionalism “attempts no less than a solution to the problem of 
international violence, first in Europe, and then, so it is hoped, by 
emulation in other parts of world.”353 
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Neofunctionalism sought to mount an explicit challenge to the European 
nation state. Part of this was presented as a challenge to realism–the 
tradition in IR theory that tells a familiar story of the eternal recurrence of 
power politics between sovereign states. Whereas realism taught the 
essential sameness of power politics, Haas was interested in how and why 
change occurred in the international system.354 But even more essentially, 
the state, the neofunctionalists promised us, could be transcended in the 
form of regional organizations. The core challenge to realism, as 
Rosamond has argued, lies in the neofunctionalist understanding of a 
pluralist state. Haas “criticized the notion that complex modern societies 
are straight-forwardly and permanently attuned to security imperatives 
with its corollary that international politics must, therefore, be nothing 
more than (a national) interest-based Hobbesian anarchy.”355 The 
disaggregated understanding of the state that Haas subscribed to, is what 
ultimately made it possible to do away with it altogether and instead create 
a supranational community beyond the state; that is to acknowledge that 
citizens and governments were not to be lumped together. But what kind 
of political community would this be? And would it really be the challenge 
to statism that Haas, at least initially thought, and hoped for? In the next 
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section, I will undertake a close reading of Haas’s understanding of 
political community. 
 
Neofunctionalism and the question of political community 
 
To the extent that there is a founding work in European integration theory, 
Ernst B. Haas’s The Uniting of Europe could plausibly be singled out for 
such an accolade.356 As Ben Rosamond put is: “It is not hyperbole to 
suggest that The Uniting of Europe … represents the founding moment of 
the field of what we now routinely term ‘EU studies.’”357 Heavily cited 
since the publication of its first edition and obligatory reading for 
generations of scholars and students, The Uniting of Europe set the tone 
for theorizing about European integration for decades to come, and 
established the intellectual parameters for European integration studies. 
Haas’s neofunctionalism would become so influential that when his own 
students were interviewing officials in Brussels, they would often get 
responses that were couched in neofunctionalist terms.358 As one of them, 
influential neofunctionalist theorists in his own right, Philippe C. 
Schmitter, remarked: “Some of us have had the rather unnerving 
experience of hearing our special jargon spouted back at us by those whom 
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we are studying.”359 Haas’s neofunctionalism would thus conspicuously 
travel between academia and the policy-making world. In the decades to 
come, Haas and his neofunctionalist affiliates were to develop the most 
significant theoretical body on European integration hitherto. 
 
 
Haas’s stated purpose in The Uniting of Europe was to provide a 
theoretical, but empirically grounded, study of the first European 
community after the Second World War; the European Coal and Steel 
Community: “My aim is merely the dissection of the actual ‘integration 
process’ in order to derive propositions about its nature.”360 Haas sets 
forth the perhaps most well-known concept of neofunctionalism: the so-
called spillover dynamic as explained above, which accounts for the 
momentum of the integration process: “group pressure will spill over into 
the federal sphere and thereby add to the integrative impulse.”361 The 
Uniting of Europe seeks to examine the integration process that has taken 
place in Europe between 1950 and 1957, and derive theoretical 
generalizations from this process. 
 
                                                   
359 Schmitter, “A Revised Theory of Regional Integration,” 838. 
 
 
360 Haas, The Uniting of Europe, xii. 
 
 
361 Haas, Ibid., xiii. 
 
 
  175 
Central to Haas’s undertaking is the question of political community. 
Writes Haas: 
                   
New states may grow up as the result of the splintering of an 
existing political community-or an empire-as well as from the 
merger of hitherto distinct and independent entities. In both 
processes the evolution of ‘national consciousness’ is held to be the 
crucial factor. Loyalty to the established font of authority wanes as 
feeling of separate identity takes possession of the group 
clamouring for new forms of political organisation. … How and why 
does national loyalty tend to coincide with the territorial 
boundaries of the state? Is it inherent in political evolution that it 
must be so? Is it natural and inevitable that India, Ghana or 
Belgium are characterized by a sense of national identity which 
extends to their frontiers but not beyond? The process of 
development of a political community, therefore, is but little 
understood in terms of the analytical standards and criteria with 
which the social scientist today works.362  
 
The major task that neofunctionalism set for itself was precisely to 
theorize about the possibility of a “new” type of political community; 
indeed Haas wanted to examine the “development of a political structure 
and consciousness transcending that of existing nations.”363 Or as he put it 
a few years later: “We are interested in tracing progress toward a terminal 
condition called political community. Successful nation-states constitute 
such communities and subsequent amalgamations of several such states 
may also form communities.”364 In 1971, Haas reiterated that his main 
interest is in “observing the creation of possible new types of human 
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communities.“365 And towards the end of his life, reflecting on the 
achievements of neofunctionalism, Haas argued that his life had been 
devoted to the question of “how human collectivities can move beyond the 
nation state.”366 In view of the two devastating world wars that had 
ravaged the European continent within a time span of three decades, such 
an aim was certainly both understandable and laudable.  
 
Haas argues that political community is not the same thing as a state. 
Rather, a political community may take many different constitutional and 
institutional forms: “Any kind of federal arrangement, regardless of the 
degree of centralisation or decentralisation implicit in it, is compatible 
with our scheme so long as loyalties to central symbols overshadow 
attachment to local ones.”367 However, the standard or as Haas’s puts it 
“ideal type” employed to measure integration against, was in fact nothing 
but a thinly disguised statism: “the systematic study of the process of 
community formation through organisations of this type necessitates the 
explicit stating of an ideal type appropriate to the known institutional 
setting of western Europe. Here, the existing nation states are political 
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communities.”368 Whenever progress towards political community is 
assessed, then, the modern Western state is the yardstick. What then, is 
the most important component of political community in Haas’s 
understanding? It is not unchallenged sovereignty, nor exclusive territorial 
jurisdiction. At the core of Haas’s understanding of community is rather 
identity, or, as he calls it, loyalty. In fact, loyalty is the central component 
of Haas’s understanding of political community: “Political community … is 
a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to 
their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a 
specific period of time and in a definable geographical space. In this study, 
this condition will be the one toward which the process of ‘political 
integration’ is supposed to lead.”369 Haas makes a distinction between 
ideology as “doctrines peculiar to a group” and nationalism as “the values 
and claims acceptable to the great bulk of the population while also setting 
it apart from the values and claims of other political communities.”370 
Thus, “loyalty” is that which, as opposed to “ideology,” unites a group and 
establishes political community. 
 
The essential statist qualities of neofunctionalism is perhaps best brought 
out when one considers the crucial role of loyalty, or what we would be 
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more inclined to call “identity” in contemporary academic parlance. 
Writing in the late 1970s, when direct elections to the European 
Parliament was first introduced, thus making the question of the 
legitimacy of the European Community more pressing, Juliet Lodge 
highlighted the central importance of “loyalty transfer” in functionalist 
and neofunctionalist theory.371  Lodge teased out the major assumptions of 
the neofunctionalist notion of loyalty transfer: 
 
First, loyalty is believed to depend upon an instrumental stimulus-
response relationship between the governed and government. 
Second, this relationship is conceived of as an exchange: citizens 
owe loyalty to an authority-centre in exchange for it undertaking to 
safeguard their socio-economic welfare interests. Third, the 
satisfaction of citizens’ utilitarian needs is believed to stimulate the 
growth of affective-identitive links with functionally specific 
organizations. Fourth, the process is supposed to culminate in a 
zero-sum game in which citizens’ fixed primary loyalties are 
transferred from the nation state to the supranational functionally 
specific agency.372 
 
 
 
Underlying this view of loyalty is, as Charles Pentland also has noticed, a 
liberal theory of the state.373 To be more specific, a distinctly liberal social 
contractarian theory of the state underlies neofunctionalism. Social 
contract theory is distinctly liberal in that it takes the individual as the 
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ultimate subject of political community. Hobbes’s Leviathan, one of the 
major statements of social contract theory, could be read as an attempt to 
reconcile the sovereign individual with the sovereign state.374 On Hobbes’s 
account, self-interested and rational individuals grant absolute power to 
the sovereign in order to enter political society and abolish the horrors of 
the pre-political state of nature. Hence, the state’s authority is ultimately 
derived from the individual’s own rational decision; thus the individual is 
the ultimate subject of the state. But as often noted, the Hobbesian self-
interested individual poses a problem for creating a stable political 
community. As Jean Hampton has argued, Hobbes needs a changed 
individual psychology inside political society to support his account of 
sovereignty.375 Since Hobbes expects to use the same broadly egoist 
psychology in the state of nature and in political society there is a serious 
tension in his argument. According to Hampton, Hobbes needs a 
“rousseauean” conversion contract.376 If loyalties are primarily generated 
by the sovereign’s satisfaction of the individual’s material needs, as 
neofunctionalism has it, neofunctionalism runs into the same well-known 
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problem as Hobbes’s social contractarianism: if loyalty rests upon 
perceived individual utility, individuals will withdraw their loyalties as 
soon as the sovereign fails to satisfy material needs.  
 
However, Haas does recognize the need for a source of communal 
obligation that goes beyond mere utilitarian self-interest. In The Uniting 
of Europe, one of Haas’s main purposes is to determine “whether and why 
developments leading to the evolution of a community are in place.”377 
One indicator of a “community sentiment” is whether a “new nationalism” 
is emerging among interest groups and political parties.378 Haas then puts 
forth his often-cited definition of political integration: “Political 
integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct 
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or 
demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states. The end result of 
a process of political integration is a new political community, 
superimposed over the pre-existing ones.”379  
 
Crucial to Haas’s conception of political community is the development of 
a “new nationalism” that may underpin the emerging community. 
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Nationalism, in Haas’s conception “leaps over class barriers, it defies age 
differences, shows itself stronger than regional differences within nations 
and–most important of all–it often has an external referent against which 
it can be turned in justifying a proposed set of policies.”380 Haas describes 
integration as a process rather than a condition, and as integration 
deepens it is assumed that “the erstwhile set of separate national groups 
values will gradually be superseded by a new and geographically larger set 
of beliefs.”381  
 
What, however, would be the content to a European-wide “new 
nationalism” that has to emerge if European integration is to take off 
seriously, and stable loyalties are to emerge? Haas devotes a fair amount 
of space to discuss various conceptions of “Europeanism” or a European 
identity, and ends up concluding that “’Europeanism now does not provide 
a doctrine useful for the study of the integration process. A doctrine which 
means all things to all men, while useful in explaining convergences, is 
hardly a significant tool for the study of structured social action.”382 Haas 
goes so far as to endorse Raymond Aron’s assertion that the “European 
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idea is empty.”383 In a later work, Haas will further distance himself from 
the “mythmakers” of Europe, invoking Europe’s past as somehow 
inevitably leading up to a European political community: “we cannot use 
some previous historical experience which involved the notion of 
community as an argument for assuming the natural and inevitable re-
emergence of this happy state of affairs.”384 As Haas explicates: 
 
This focus precludes attention to what may be called the "immanent 
myth" of European unity which owes its inspiration to cultural-
historical antecedents considered equally relevant to the 
contemporary process of integration. It appears to me that 
European unity under the Roman, Frankish, and medieval Roman-
German imperial realms has no more analytical importance than 
the unity of all Islam in the eighth century, the domains of the Ming 
Empire in the fifteenth or the Guptas in the fifth. The mere fact that 
specific regions were unified politically and culturally at one time 
seems not to prevent them from subsequently dividing into warring 
nations denying in their conduct the cultural unity the historian 
wishes to impute to them: they do not then constitute any kind of 
political community.385 
 
It is not that Haas discounts historical and cultural sources of identity as 
important in sustaining political community. But the social scientist Haas 
is primarily interested in human agency in regional integration; that is 
according to Haas the proper domain of social science: “Naturally, in the 
political advocacy of integration by some specific movement, the ‘memory’ 
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of a historical community may play its part in the construction of a myth; 
but this does not make the past an active causative agent.”386 As he puts it 
in another work: “decision makers are the true heroes and villains of the 
integration process.”387  
 
Haas would in the decades to come wrestle with the concept of political 
community initially set forth in The Uniting of Europe.388 During the 
1960s, Haas self-consciously sought to elaborate an understanding of 
political community that simply did not reproduce the state at a bigger 
level. In Beyond the Nation-State, Haas elaborates on the idea of 
supranationality, and tries to argue that a supranational community falls 
somewhere in between a national political community and international 
society in terms of denseness of social relations.389 The process of 
integration is directed towards such a community.390 Again, however, a 
supranational community is still assessed against the yardstick of the 
modern state, and although not as socially and culturally dense as the 
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nation state, it nevertheless amounts to little more than a “thinner” 
version of the state. 
 
A persistent problem in Haas’s neofunctionalism concerns precisely the 
end state of integration, or the “dependent variable” of neofunctionalist 
theory. To what is integration supposed to lead? How to know if 
integration has occurred if the condition to be achieved is not clearly 
specified? 391 And how to postulate an end state without slipping into a 
teleology? Haas came to doubt that integration would lead to the 
“pluralistic-democratic state writ large.”392 In fact, in his later writings he 
was trying hard to find a term that could describe postulated end states of 
integration, without slipping into a statist teleology: “verbally defined 
single terminal conditions with which we have worked in the past—
political community, security community, political union, deferral union—
are inadequate because they foreclose real-life developmental 
possibilities.393 In one of his last writings on neofunctionalism, Haas 
proposed three possible dependent variables, i.e. outcomes of regional 
integration: regional state, regional commune, and asymmetrical regional 
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overlap.394 As a new master variable, Haas proposed measuring degrees of 
“authority-legitimacy transfer,” to the new regional center, which again 
showed the difficulties of ridding neofunctionalism of statism.  
 
Other neofunctionalist writers also grappled with the “dependent-variable 
problem.” Leon Lindberg sought to bypass the problem of the dependent 
variable by focusing more on process than end state, and to that end 
turned to systems-theory. Lindberg did however agree with Haas’s 
definition of political integration as denoting “the process whereby 
political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their 
expectations and political activities to a new center.”395 And as Pentland 
notes: “Lindberg does not prevent a notion of the end-product from 
creeping into his analysis. The implication of his two-part definition of the 
integrative process is a federal system, if not in terms of constitutional 
structure then certainly in terms of political processes.”396 Lindberg and 
Scheingold were also preoccupied with how to avoid the conceptual 
dependency on the nation state.397 Interestingly, Lindberg still in a 
footnote admits that his systems theory model is derived from the nation 
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state.398 As Pentland sums it up: “To the last Lindberg is, quite justifiably, 
unwilling to accept the easily-conceived model of the supranational state 
as the goal of integration. And yet all his invocations of systems theory 
seem unable to rid his analytical framework of its presence.”399  
 
Haas came to express serious doubts about the wisdom of regional 
integration as a means to global peace. Having initially written positively 
about the West European experience of regional integration as a possible 
model for other regions, even calling such a development a “happy state of 
affairs,”400 Haas seemed increasingly aware of the dangers to peace that 
the development of integrated regional blocks might pose. In the early 
1970s, Haas wrote that “regional integration may lead to a future world 
made up of fewer and fewer units, each a unit with all the power and will 
to self-assertion that we associate with classical nationalism. The future, 
the, may be such as to force us to equate peace with nonintegration and 
associate the likelihood of major war with successful regional 
integration.”401 Ultimately, and in one of his final writings on 
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neofunctionalism, this fear led, somewhat surprisingly, Haas to endorse 
fragmentation and disintegration, rather than integration: 
Suppose that local national movements in Wales, Scotland, Bavaria, 
Brittany, Nagaland, West Irian, Biafra, the Ogden desert, Quebec, 
and in dozens of other ethnically complex places succeed in 
obtaining cultural and linguistic – and much political  - autonomy. 
Suppose further that the same states enter into tighter economic 
relationships with their regional neighbors. Suppose further still 
that they ally themselves with states other than their economic 
partners. Not only will the state decline as an autonomous 
decisionmaker, but the power to make decisions will be given to 
many other units, some smaller and some larger than the present 
state. This, I believe, would be a wholesome development for world 
peace whereas the concentration of all power in a few regional units 
would endanger it.402 
 
Thus, Haas’s awareness of regional integration theory’s failure to entirely 
remove itself from the statist imagination that Haas understood to be the 
root problem of violence in global politics, eventually caused him to 
abandon the neofunctionalism that he had been instrumental in 
establishing. In the following section, I argue that the statism of 
neofunctionalism has not been surpassed by more contemporary theorists 
of European integration. 
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The lingering statism of the political theory of the European Union 
 
In the early 1990s, European integration was once again revived. The 
Berlin Wall came down in November 1989, opening up the door for 
German reunification. The prospects of a reunified Germany brought 
about the return of “the German question” to prominence for European 
integration. At the Strasbourg summit in December 1989, French 
president Mitterrand, who was torn between his desire for further 
European integration and his concern about German reunification, forged 
a link between European integration and German reunification. The link 
was to deepen European integration in order to make sure that Germany 
remained an allied country. It was thought that a Germany firmly 
integrated with the other European states would not resort to 
unilateralism and nationalism again. Two parallel intergovernmental 
conferences started in December 1990, one on economic and monetary 
union and one on political union. The outcome was the so-called 
Maastricht Treaty, or the Treaty on European Union as it was also called, 
which was signed in 1991 and was certainly one of the most important 
events in the history of European integration. The treaty established the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and member states approved new 
arrangements for foreign and security policy as well as for judicial and 
home affairs. The treaty extended Community powers to a range of issues 
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such as education, training, cohesion, culture, consumer protection, and 
development cooperation.  
 
 
Following the Maastricht Treaty, it became increasingly difficult to see the 
EU as “merely” an enhanced international organization, as 
intergovernmentalist commentators had tended to do. So for about two 
decades, the EU has more often than not been seen as an entity to be 
analyzed in its own right.403 With the gradual turn to approaching the EU 
as something more than an international organization, a number of 
normative issues surrounding the best known entity to modern liberal 
political theory, namely the modern state, began to emerge.404 What could 
notions of democracy, citizenship, and legitimacy be taken to mean in the 
context of the European Union? For better and for worse, political theory 
encountered the European Union, and a new academic industry was 
born.405 In at least one respect, this was a welcome development. In 
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contrast to what “theory” could be taken to signify in International 
Relations, where impressive attempts for decades had been made to 
resituate the discipline in the wider fields of social and political theory, 
“theory” had in the context of EU studies previously largely been 
synonymous with somewhat sterile debates between neofunctionalists and 
intergovernmentalists on the causes of European integration. This turn to 
political theory has not, however, been without its problems. The question 
of the nature of the EU, as a preliminary issue to normative analyses of the 
Union, has most often been framed in terms of how similar or how 
different it is to that of the state. As I discussed in the second chapter, even 
though hardly any scholar conceptualizes the EU as a state, the language 
of modern political theory conjures up the measure of the state. Hence, the 
turn to political theory in EU studies has largely tended to reinforce a 
discourse about the EU that is firmly wedded to the state, hence 
reproducing many of the problems associated with “the state” in modern 
political theory. 
 
 
Within European integration studies, the theorization that has taken place 
has almost exclusively been in the mold of liberal political theory. A 
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central question for this scholarship is, as Heidrun Friese and Peter 
Wagner have identified, to explore “the contribution that political theory 
and philosophy have to make in understanding the European Union, and–
possibly–in investigating the normative underpinning for that specific 
polity.”406 The majority of this scholarship borrows concepts from political 
theory and seeks to apply those to the European Union, often attempting 
to device institutional solutions at the European level to problems and 
tensions identified with the aid of the discourse of political theory at the 
national level, i.e. at the level of the state. The language of modern liberal 
political theory is, to a large extent, the language of the state, hence, again 
listening to Friese and Wagner: “Naturally, one may be inclined to say, the 
elaboration of a political philosophy for Europe starts out from that 
political philosophy that underlies the nation-state.”407 
 
Given the prominent place of the state within the discourse of modern 
political theory, it is hardly surprising that every attempt to define the EU, 
to infuse it with a certain is-ness, ends up employing the state as a 
yardstick against which the EU is judged. The first volume that gathered a 
set of political theorists to write on the EU, thus describes its aim: “We 
need to clarify the meaning of key terms that are used in the debates about 
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the political future of the EU.”408 As an example, they raise the question of 
how to characterize the democratic deficit in the EU: “Is it identical to a 
deficit that might exist in a nation state, or does it have some distinctive 
features?”409 Clearly then, the vocabulary of traditional theory constrains 
theorizing about the EU in the sense that a certain type of solution to the 
set of problems identified in this discourse, will necessarily follow.  
 
In the tradition of Western political theory, where the question of 
foundation has played a prominent role, the issue of legitimacy was a 
familiar one, and turned into the question of how Europe could be 
legitimately, i.e. securely, founded. The EU was widely perceived as 
lacking a shared history, an unchallenged cultural identity, and a common 
language, which had underpinned the modern nation-state’s claim to 
authority. In short, Europe was thought to lack a demos, widely perceived 
as the only legitimate foundation for a democratic community.410 As a 
resolution to this conundrum, many scholars took what one might loosely 
call a Habermasian route: instead of trying to construct a European thick 
cultural identity as foundation for Europe (most often due to its 
exclusionary consequences), Europe was to be founded upon and within a 
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public sphere, where free and equal citizens would inter-subjectively reach 
a consensus on European norms, which in turn would act as a foundation 
for Europe, albeit a foundation always subject to re-negotiation.411 Hence, 
democracy at the European level was only thought to be possible if a 
community of (undistorted) communication emerged. Integration, then, 
as a precondition to the legitimate exercise of power at the European level 
became primarily conceptualized not as cultural but as communicative 
integration. 
 
Among the first political theorists to write on legitimacy and the EU, 
Christopher Lord and David Beetham argued that the same standards of 
legitimacy that one applies to the liberal democratic state should also 
apply to the EU. Let us closely follow the logic of their argument. They 
start by considering the concept of political legitimacy, and argue that it 
has three main dimensions: 1) legality (that political power is exercised in 
accordance with established rules), 2) normative justifiability (that it is 
possible to normatively justify the rules), and 3) legitimation (that the 
subjects of the exercised political power expressly consent).412 Then, they 
apply this notion of political legitimacy to the setting of liberal democracy 
and argue that, along the second dimension of their definition of 
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legitimacy, i.e. normative justifiability-which is perhaps most interesting 
for the normative political theorist- the legitimacy of a liberal democracy 
depends on three criteria: “an agreed definition of the people or ‘political 
nation’ as defining the rightful bounds of a polity, representativeness and 
accountability; and the maintenance by government of defensible 
standards of rights protection.”413  
 
They then go on to argue that since the EU is more than an international 
organization, it requires more than the political legitimacy that one may 
derive from its member states; the EU needs its own sources of political 
legitimacy.414 The solution then automatically follows to the legitimacy 
deficit of the Union as defined by Lord and Beetham: a construction of a 
European people with a European identity. As is commonplace for most 
liberal political theorists, Beetham and Lord qualify their advocacy of a 
European identity with assertions that they prefer a thin, non-ethnically 
based, and constitutional type of identity.415 However, since any social 
identity depends upon processes of boundary-drawing, and their analysis 
of the problem of legitimacy in the EU ends up in an affirmation of 
identity-building at the European level, it is difficult to interpret their 
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solution as anything but an affirmation of the logic of nation-building writ 
large.  
 
It is instructive to reiterate their discursive strategy since, although I 
restrict myself to the concept of legitimacy, the logic of Lord and 
Beetham’s argument could be extrapolated and generalized to a number of 
texts where notions borrowed from political theory are applied to the EU. 
They first postulate that the EU is an entity of some sort, and without 
further seeking to define it, they claim that it is something qualitatively 
different from an international organization. Hence, the EU needs its own 
normative justification in order to legitimately exercise power. Further, 
since a precondition for democratic legitimacy is the existence of a self-
consciously existing people, the solution follows from the premises of their 
argument: the Union needs to conjure up a European people. This 
discursive strategy, derived from liberal political theory in whose language 
the state is central, will invariably lead to the proposal of a firmer 
inside/outside distinction, historically the way in which the nation-state 
sought to mitigate its problems of legitimacy, particularly evident in times 
of crisis. To use the identity/difference binary, in order to assert identity, 
difference has simultaneously to be asserted and one is back at the 
traditional logic of differentiation characteristic of the (modern) state.416 
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Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have sought to highlight the statism of neofunctionalism 
as well as the lingering statism of more contemporary theorists of 
European integration. I will conclude this chapter with a few observations. 
Whereas functionalist authors such as David Mitrany sought to think of 
post-territorial modes of governance, neofunctionalism was primarily not 
interested in any such schemes but firmly wedded to a cultural-
geographical understanding of Europe. Neofunctionalism emerged as a 
self-conscious challenger to realist International Relations theory, which 
assumed the impossibility of large-scale transfers of sovereign 
competences from state to a supranational entity, and postulated a notion 
of a fixed, national interest.417 However, as a challenger to realism, 
neofunctionalism did not prove particularly effective. On many occasions, 
Haas acknowledged that little would be won if the logic of realpolitik were 
simply transferred and played out at a regional instead of a national 
level.418 What is also worth emphasizing is that Haas undermined any 
secure ground, i.e. a secure doctrine of Europe, a new European 
nationalism that would place the integration process on firm ground. 
Instead, the content of Europe–the referent to which Europe is supposedly 
referring–is simply an empty space. So to what are the newly generated 
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loyalties supposed to attach themselves? Haas has himself undermined 
any secure and stable ground for the political community of “Europe,” thus 
opening up for a genuinely democratic contestation about the meaning of 
Europe. 
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Chapter 6 
EURO-CRAFTING AT BORDER ZONES: DESIRES FOR EUROPE AT 
THE GRECO-TURKISH BORDER 
 
A clip uploaded by an anonymous user on YouTube shows how a group of 
thirteen migrants are being pursued by a unit of EU’s first land border 
patrol operation⎯a so-called RABIT419 team⎯in November 2010.420 The 
short film is shot from a helicopter that evidently helps the ground patrol 
to track down the migrants. A telescopic infrared sight follows the small 
group of people, and the migrants are clearly differentiated as white 
figures against a dark background. At 7:17 pm, according to the clock on 
the helicopter’s dashboard, the helicopter detects the group of migrants. At 
7:25 pm, seemingly unaware of being under surveillance, the group stops 
for a few minutes. Two minutes later, the group encounters a border patrol 
team. One person is apprehended and the remaining twelve run away. But 
their running is in vain. The helicopter never loses sight of them. The 
migrants briefly stop and hide in some bushes. And at 8:08 pm, a police 
team apprehends the group. The little group is surrounded by what 
appears to be armed guards, and bow down on their knees, stretching their 
arms up in the air. These are 13 out of some 47 000 people who irregularly 
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crossed the tiny 12.5 kilometer land border between Turkey and Greece in 
2010 and for most of them, this is their first encounter with Europe.421 
Many of their fellow travellers would not make it, but die on their way to 
what they thought would be a better life, 45 of those drowning in the Evros 
river that marks Europe’s border with Turkey.  
 
In this penultimate chapter, I examine the crafting of Europe through the 
lens of migration. In the previous chapters, I have critically examined the 
crafting of Europe by looking at various elite discourses of European 
integration. In this chapter, I seek to broaden the outlook by examining 
discourses of Europe that are circulating at marginal sites. In view of the 
understanding of statecraft presented in the first chapter, I will in this 
chapter explore the workings of the desire for Europe in a highly delimited 
spatio-temporal setting: the recent humanitarian crisis in Greece 
precipitated by a huge influx of migrants. In the first chapter, I argued that 
practices of European integration should be understood and thought 
through as an on-going problematic of analogy between a critical 
understanding of statecraft and what I called Euro-crafting, i.e. the 
discursive crafting of Europe. In this chapter, I examine this basic analogy 
in the case of the recent humanitarian crisis precipitated by irregular 
migration into the European Union through Greece.  
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Taking what the UNHCR in 2010 called a “humanitarian crisis”422 at EU’s 
border to Turkey as a case study, the chapter draws on field research 
undertaken 2011 in Greece among members of what is arguably one of the 
most destitute migrant communities recently arrived to Europe⎯the 
Somali community in Athens. I also draw on interviews with members of 
EU’s border force team, FRONTEX, stationed in the border area between 
Greece and Turkey, as well as newspaper accounts, human rights reports, 
and other published material. Here I examine the contestation of the 
signifier “Europe” in a highly concrete setting. I show how the desire for 
Europe is constitutive of subject positions ranging from that of “European 
border guard” to “migrant wishing to come to Europe” and argue that far 
from challenging the characteristic gestures of statecraft, practices of 
European integration rather appears to be solidifying them. What is being 
done in the name of Europe mirrors the characteristic gestures of 
statecraft, namely; practices of ordering, bordering, and identification.  
 
The chapter unfolds as follows. In the first section, I briefly examine some 
of the anthropological writings on the question of European integration in 
relation to the state, in particular the writings of Cris Shore, in order to 
highlight some of the affinities between critical anthropologists and the 
                                                   
422 “UNHCR says asylum situation in Greece is 'a humanitarian crisis,'” UNHCR, Briefing 
notes, September 21, 2010, accessed March 12, 2012, 
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textual deconstructive approach of this dissertation. The following section 
introduces the case of the chapter, namely the migrants entering the 
European Union at the Greco-Turkish border. The third section details the 
study and in the conclusion, I summarize the findings. 
 
 
Anthropology, European integration and the question of the state 
 
In addition to the works discussed in the first chapter of the dissertation, 
there are some anthropological works that deal with the question of 
European integration in relation to the modern state. In addition to the 
writings by Cris Shore, one of the few works that employ anthropological 
perspectives to European integration is an anthology published some 12 
years ago.423 The introductory chapter notes that “special attempts 
have…been made at the EU level to clarify and promote the notion of a 
common European identity.”424 And the editors argue that anthropologists 
have much to offer in examining European institutions as cultural 
artifacts, rather than simply as economic, political, and social institutions. 
The editors also notice the difficulty of thinking about European 
integration “beyond the state:” “In fact, although the EU is a political 
entity with no clear prescriptive framework, its leaders and elites borrow 
                                                   
423 Irene Bellier and Thomas Wilson, eds, An Anthropology of the European Union: 
Building, Imagining and Experiencing the New Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000). It should 
be emphasized however, that there are a lot of anthropologists working on various aspects 
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424 Ibid., 3. 
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heavily from the models of nation and state building, precisely because 
many do not know how to escape intellectually and linguistically from the 
dominant model of the nation state.”425 This observation is then, rather 
uncritically, used as a justification that similar methods the 
anthropologists have used to study the state might be used in studying the 
EU. That anthropologists are then themselves partaking in the 
reproduction of the state model at the European level is not 
problematized. 
 
 
From a more critical anthropological perspective, Cris Shore has written 
several pieces on the European Union. In Shore’s many contributions, 
several affinities are brought out between critical anthropological 
approaches to the European Union, and the deconstructive textual 
practices approach taken in this dissertation.426 Signifiers such as 
“identity” and “culture” are not understood as distinct and self-enclosed 
entities that simply exist; on the contrary, such signifiers are understood 
as messy, fluid and above all contested. In 1993, Shore published a piece 
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which critically investigated the European Commission’s attempt to 
construct a common European identity, which would sustain economic 
and political integration in Europe. He examined the Commission’s 
discourse about European identity, and how the Commission has sought to 
promote a common European identity that would legitimate the political 
institutions of the EU. Here, Shore expressed the case for an 
anthropological approach to European integration thus: “By emphasizing 
the ‘imagined’ and ‘invented’ character of collective identities, they alert us 
to the fact that all communities–European as well as national–are 
culturally constructed. They also highlight the fact that identity-formation 
is an ambiguous and dualistic process involving the manipulation of 
boundaries and the mobilization of difference for strategies of inclusion 
and exclusion.”427 
 
More specifically, Shore examined how the European Commission, 
starting in the early 1980s, engaged on a campaign to construct a 
European identity. The so-called “Adonnino Committee” was created in 
1984 by the European Council to device strategies of promoting European 
identity and highlight a European common culture and heritage. The 
Commission’s proposals resulted in the introduction of a European flag, 
anthem and standardized passport. Shore summarizes the view of the 
Commission as follows: “What is needed is not simply greater 
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‘consciousness of Europe,’ but the creation of a ‘European consciousness’ 
that will transcend national divisions and mobilize Europe’s 370 million 
citizens towards a new image of themselves as ‘Europeans’ rather than 
nationals.”428 Shore is rather critical of the way in which the Commission 
engages and promotes talks of a European identity. He argues that “that 
EC policy-makers tend to privilege a static, bounded and exclusivist 
definition of ‘European identity.’”429 This is problematic, since it will make 
it harder for various minorities to feel at home on the European continent. 
Using the analytical categories of this dissertation, the Commission has 
sought to particularize Europe. 
 
What is more, on the basis of his investigation, Shore questioned the 
prevalent view that the EU was successfully “transcending” the logics of 
nation-building: “despite the EC’s claim to be forging a new entity that 
‘transcends’ the nation-state, the new Europe is being constructed on 
precisely the same symbolic terrain as the old nation-states themselves. 
Flags, anthems, passports, trophies, maps and coins all serve as icons for 
evoking the presence of the emergent state, only instead of ‘national 
sovereignty’, it is the legitimacy of EC institutions that is being emphasized 
and endorsed.”430 Shore would later return to the question of a “post-
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national” European Union in a piece on European citizenship, which was 
introduced by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Shore questioned 
Habermas’s ideal of “constitutional patriotism,” i.e. that citizenship may 
be decoupled from identity and culture and instead linked solely to rights 
and institutions. Focusing less on legal questions, Shore argued that one 
should understand European citizenship as “an identity-marker for 
‘branding’ those who belong to the polis and are subject to its laws, and 
those who are aliens or ‘extracommunitari’ and do not.”431 And on such an 
understanding, it seems rather clear that the legitimation discourses of 
European integration are not so much challenging the operating logics of 
the state as seeking to emulate it on a larger scale. This chapter takes up 
the question of Euro-crafting in the case of migration into the European 
Union. 
 
The crafting of Europe at border zones: the case of the Greco-Turkish 
border 
 
There is certainly something to be said for the accuracy of the imagery of a 
“Fortress Europe,” or, as Henk van Houtum and Roos Pijpers have aptly 
called it, “Gated Community,”432 descending over Europe in the recent 
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decade. Ever since the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 brought immigration 
policy into the orbit of European integration, immigration policy—
especially dealing with so-called irregular migration—has been 
increasingly dealt with at EU, rather than national, level. At the same time 
as geographical borders within the EU have been broken down, most 
notably with the gradual extension of the passport-free Schengen Area, 
they have been steadily tightened vis-à-vis third countries. An overview 
from 2010 concludes: “it is reasonable to argue that today we have an EU 
policy on irregular migration that addresses most aspects of the 
phenomenon and attempts to harmonize national policies and practices.” 
433 The question of migration into the European Union has also within a 
relatively short amount of time acquired much significance in European 
public discourse, which often represents migration as a threat to societal 
security rather than as an opportunity to revitalize ageing societies within 
Europe.434 
 
European countries have, individually and collectively, increasingly 
resorted to what Aristide Zolberg has called “remote control” immigration 
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policy.435 This refers to practices of “extending border controls away from 
the wealthiest ‘countries of destination’ and closer to what official 
discourse designates as ‘countries of transit’ and ‘origin.”’436 This 
“externalization” of migration policy, has as Human Rights Watch notices, 
at least four components.437 First, migrants who arrive in the EU from 
countries designated as “safe countries of origin” or arriving via designated 
“safe third countries” are refused entry. Second, migrants at sea are 
prohibited to reach EU territory. Third, EU has concluded a number of 
“readmission agreements” with states bordering the EU, which means that 
those countries assent to having transiting migrants returned there. 
Finally, the EU has supported border control mechanisms and detention 
centers in “transit countries” that border the EU. Taken together, these 
measures have had a significant impact on the direction of migration flows 
into the EU. 
 
As south European governments have concluded various border 
enforcement agreements with several African governments in recent years, 
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the flow of migrants has shifted accordingly. In 2006, many migrants 
arrived at the Spanish isles of Ceuta and Melilla as well as on the Canary 
Islands. However, after the Spanish government concluded agreements 
with some key Western African transit countries, the flow of migrants 
shifted to the Italian and Greek coasts and in the latter case, land border. 
Dissatisfied with this shift, the Berlusconi government concluded border 
enforcement and repatriation agreements with Khadaffi’s Libya, which 
almost entirely stopped the flow of migrants to Lampedusa in Italy as well 
as to Malta by late 2009. In addition, the European Commission signed an 
agreement with Libya in October 2010 to increase border controls despite 
the fact that the detention facilities in Libya where migrants were held 
were widely criticized as inhumane.438 In response, the flow of migrants 
shifted direction once again. In 2009, some 75% of all detected irregular 
border crossings into the EU occurred through Greece.439 And in the 
following year, a staggering 90% of all irregular border crossings into the 
EU took place at Greek land and sea borders. The majority of those 
migrants entered Greece along a tiny 12.5 km land border stretch close to 
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the Greek city of Orestiada. Some were also trying to cross the Evros river. 
In 2010, at least 45 migrants died when attempting to cross the border.440  
 
The inhumane conditions in the Greek Evros detention facilities have been 
severely criticized by a number of human rights organizations, including 
UNHCR, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN Special Rapporteur 
on Torture, Human Rights Watch, and Doctors Without Borders. In 2009 
the UNHCR went so far as to call the situation at the Evros border a 
“humanitarian crisis.”441 EU’s own agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) 
claimed the following year that “living conditions there can only be 
described as inhuman.”442 A temporary overcrowding of such facilities is 
to be expected when a large number of people arrive in a very such amount 
of time. But despite a widespread acknowledgement of the dire conditions 
at Evros, Greek authorities have been slow to act. This lack of political will 
has been widely noticed in the human rights community, and as a 
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diplomat in Athens from another EU member state puts it: “the refugee 
situation has not been prioritized by the Greek authorities.”443 
 
Due to the awareness raising activities of various human rights 
organizations, several EU members stopped returning refugees to Greece, 
thus violating the Dublin II agreement.444 In January 2011 The European 
Court of Human Rights ruled that returning an asylum seeker from 
Belgium to Greece constituted a violation of article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, i.e. that the conditions in the detention 
centers were so inhumane that they constituted a breach of the ban on 
“torture or inhuman or degrading treatment.”445 Greek authorities have 
repeatedly referred to the situation as a “European problem,” thus calling 
for a “European response.” And what is more, EU aid has been 
forthcoming. However, the emergency funds channeled through the 
European Refugee Fund have not managed to significantly mitigate the 
humanitarian crisis. The EU’s own agency for fundamental rights, found 
                                                   
443 Interview, Athens, March 2011. 
 
 
444 The so-called Dublin II convention stipulates that an asylum seeker cannot seek 
asylum in more than one EU member state, and has to seek asylum in the country of 
entry. 
 
 
445 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, application no. 30696/09, Council of Europe, 
European Court of Human Rights, 21 January, 2011. 
 
 
  211 
“no evidence that these resources are used to improve the current situation 
at the Evros border.”446  
 
In October 2010, the Greek government requested assistance from 
FRONTEX447 with help to manage the border. It was the first time in 
FRONTEX’s and EU’s history that a EU force was deployed to patrol a 
member state’s land borders. A so-called Rapid Border Intervention Team 
(RABIT) was assembled and deployed in November 2010. All EU member 
states contributed to this armed police force, which for all intents and 
purposes amounts to a European border patrol force. EU’s agency for 
fundamental rights, FRA, claims that the RABIT team “has had an overall 
positive impact on the initial processing of individuals. In particular, 
procedures in place seem to have reduced the risk of informal push-backs 
to Turkey for persons who have crossed irregularly into Greece.”448 
UNHCR shares this assessment of the RABIT teams’ overall positive 
impact for the refugee situation at the border.449. However, as FRA notes, 
FRONTEX has had no impact on what is causing the most concern in the 
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human rights community, namely the degrading conditions in the 
detention centers and the abysmal conditions of the asylum seekers living 
on the streets of Athens and Patras. Human Rights Watch has rather 
criticized FRONTEX for continuing assisting the Greek government in 
bringing refugees into detention centers whose conditions were 
denounced by the European Court of Human Rights.450  
 
 
 
Ordering, bordering, and identifying Europe: Tracing the workings of 
desire  
 
How is the desire for Europe that is circulating in this border area 
constitutive of subject positions involved in the performative constitution 
of Europe? And to what extent does such desire mirror the practices of 
identification, bordering, and ordering characteristic of modern statecraft? 
I will in what follows show how the desire for Europe constitutes a number 
of subject positions, which solidify rather than challenge the characteristic 
practices of modern statecraft. “Europe,” much like the modern state, 
emerges as an effect of practices of ordering, bordering, and identification. 
 
Migrant. Greece has one of the lowest refugee recognition rates in Europe. 
In 2007, for instance, some 0.04 percent of all asylum seekers were 
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granted refugee status in first instance, and some additional two percent in 
the second instance.451 The few migrants who are granted the status of 
refugee often leave Greece for other European countries, where it is easier 
to find work and make a living. Many of the migrants also do not wish to 
lodge asylum applications in Greece, since the rejection rate is staggering 
and once asylum has been denied in one EU member state, the claim 
cannot be tried in another state. Having experienced the Greek Byzantine 
bureaucracy, few migrants wish to remain there but are prevented to leave 
due to EU migration law (the so-called Dublin II Convention); the asylum 
seeker may only apply for asylum in the country where s/he first entered 
the EU. 
 
When a migrant crosses the border, s/he is supposed to report to a Greek 
police station. At the station, the migrant is given a notice saying that s/he 
has 30 days to leave Greece. Since there is no way of gaining legal 
recognition as a non-EU migrant worker, the migrant who wishes to stay 
has two options: stay illegally or seek asylum. If s/he chooses to remain in 
Greece illegally, s/he receives no healthcare, has no right to work, and will 
everyday face the threat of deportation. Thus many migrants seek asylum. 
The asylum process is complex and it is difficult even to physically lodge a 
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claim for asylum since there is only one place in Greece where one may 
register one’s asylum claim, namely at the overcrowded Police Directorate 
for Aliens in Athens.452 When the migrant has filed an application for 
asylum, s/he is then issued a document by the authorities, to which many 
asylum seekers refer as a “pink card.” This document grants the person 
access to healthcare and authorizes him or her to work, even though the 
right to healthcare is hampered by a lack of interpreters, and the right to 
work is often ineffective due to a combination of high unemployment, 
language barriers, and blatant discrimination. The asylum process may 
take up to several years⎯in some instances as long as seven years⎯even 
though the recently passed new asylum legislation is supposed to speed up 
the process.  
 
I spoke to some fifteen Somali migrants in the Somali community center 
in Athens. The community center was located on one of the worst streets 
in Athens, infamous for its prostitution and drug peddling. The center 
functioned as a day center, where Somalis come to eat and spend time. 453 
On the streets in the neighborhood, many migrants slept in shifts. Several 
of the refugees I interviewed had a hard time recollecting their previous 
                                                   
452 Ibid. 
 
 
453 Two weeks after my visit, a gang of up to 300 right wing extremists attacked the 
center, destroyed much of the things inside, sprayed the walls, and injured ten of the 
Somalis. Reportedly, the police stood by and watched. Shortly thereafter, the center 
closed down.  
 
 
  215 
experiences, and as they spoke of their life in Somalia, their journey to 
Greece, and their life in Athens, many showed signs of severe anxiety. One 
man in his early 30s confessed: “when I think a lot, I think of throwing 
myself in front of a train.” Some common themes emerged from their 
stories. Many of them had been threatened by the Islamist militant rebel 
movement al-Shabaab. Almost all of them had embarked on strenuous and 
dangerous journeys in order to reach Europe. The story of Abdulrashid, a 
man in his early 20s, is in many ways representative. His father was killed 
by al-Shaabab and he fled Somalia in 2008. He entered Greece through 
Turkey and managed to make his way to Finland. However, since he was 
fingerprinted in Greece, according to the Dublin II Convention, he was 
obliged to ask for asylum in Greece, his point of entry. Fearing deportation 
from Finland, he ran away to Norway, where he spent some 9 months. 
Again under threat of being deported back to Greece, he went to Sweden, 
where the Swedish police finally deported him back to Greece. Having 
spent nearly two years adrift in Europe, Abdulrashid was thus returned to 
Greece in late 2010. He lodged his application for asylum in Athens, and 
has since then been trying to make do as well as he can. He describes the 
Greek authorities as “very nasty,” adding that “you can feel the hatred 
from their faces:” 
 
What I wanted was to get protection. They totally failed to give me 
and all the refugees whether Somalis, Afghans…Europe is good 
because it is very stable, it is not dangerous. But the system of 
getting into Europe is hard. They should differentiate [between] 
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those who are in real need of protection. They couldn’t fail them 
like this. If Europe has a genuine intention to better the situation 
here about the refugees they can do it. Before I came to Europe, I 
was always pro-Western, and that is the reason why I fled from al-
Shabaab. Because I was always against any extremist ideology 
whether Islamism or Christianism or whatsoever. But when I have 
looked very deeply about the treatment we are getting from Europe 
right now, I think [many refugees] are becoming closer to the same 
ideology that so many Islamists have. Once I saw Europe as pro-
freedom, pro-democracy, pro-transparency but now while I am here 
in Europe, I cannot see anything. It is totally not there.  
 
 
 
A 24-year-old woman told another typical account. She had spent 3.5 years 
in Greece, thus arriving in 2007 at a time when there were few Somalis in 
Athens. On her way across the Mediterranean Sea, several of her fellow 
travellers died due to disease. When approaching the Greek shore, the 
coastguard told the ship to go back where it came from. The survivors 
nevertheless got to Greece and her claim to asylum was, like almost 
everybody else’s, rejected. When trying to leave Greece, she was arrested 
and a court sentenced her to one year and seven months in prison for 
forging travel documents: “in prison you will find foreigners who have 
done drugs etc., and even they were amazed since we were only with false 
papers and still have to be here.” She tried to leave Greece six times 
altogether. She described life in Athens as arduous, sharing a small place 
with some twenty other migrants: “in hospitals, they don’t treat you. If you 
are trying to get a job, they say that you are Muslim and black.” When she 
was younger, she used to dream of moving to Canada. Realizing that was 
too expensive she heard some roommates talking about Italy: “but we 
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never got to Italy. I am stuck here. I can never understand when I can get a 
normal life [not having to be] running from country to country.” 
 
A 26-year-old woman said that she did not have an idealized view of 
Europe before arriving; she just wanted to find a place where she could be 
safe. A 52-year-old man, who had been in Greece for one and a half year 
eating leftover food from trashcans to survive, had no specific country in 
Europe on his mind either, but wanted to go somewhere he could find 
peace, stability, and in a position to give his children a better life. A woman 
in her fifties likewise had no specific country on her mind when she fled 
Somalia for Europe. She was eventually returned from Sweden back to 
Greece, despite that her son was hospitalized there: ”I thought Europe 
[would be] a better thing, but [the Europeans] are merciless people.” Ali, a 
man in his 40s whose children are living as refugees in Ethiopia said: “I 
only came because I wanted protection from Europe.” Adawe, a man in his 
late 20s, who used to work as a journalist in Somalia and had been in 
Greece for seven months said: “I thought that if I reached Europe, I’d find 
a better place to live in. I wanted to get more education, learn, work, and 
do my own life.” Thus, most of the migrants I spoke to used “Europe” to 
describe the place they wanted to go to, rather than any of the old nation 
states. Moreover, severe disappointment with this “Europe” characterized 
their stories. A Moroccan migrant, taking part in a hunger strike in March 
2011 in Athens summed up this mood of despair: “Europeans hate 
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immigrants even though we helped build their economies…but Europe has 
to help because Europe in the past was the colonial power, it supported 
those dictators. Today it is reaping what it sowed.”454 
 
In the stories of the migrants, “Europe,” is, much like a traditional state, 
ordered, bordered, and identified. In their stories, “Europe” is being 
constituted as a unified entity to which they at first ascribed much 
promise, but which has now let them down. The understanding of Europe 
many of them initially held mirrors cosmopolitan, humanitarian Europe, 
in which subjects, be it collective or individual, are treated with respect 
and state power is circumscribed. The Europe that many of them now talk 
about, however, has failed to live up to this ideal. The borders around 
Europe are not only of a geographical nature, but are also symbolic, where 
Europe is constituted as a space that does not let outsiders in. 
 
European Commission and FRONTEX: De-fending Europe’s territory. 
The Commission’s Directorate-General for Home Affairs, headed by 
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, is charged with providing direction for 
EU’s border management strategy, which is in turn coordinated and 
increasingly implemented by FRONTEX. The Commission has taken an 
active role in migration management, and called for “solidarity” with 
Greece in light of the huge influx of migrants. Malmström thus spoke after 
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the deployment of the RABIT team: “We have shown European 
solidarity… Within ten days, officers from 25 countries have arrived here 
in the Orestiada area to assist the Greek authorities. This is also thanks to 
the excellent work of FRONTEX.”455 The Commission has mildly rebuked 
Greece for failing to provide adequate detention facilities for migrants. It 
has also expressed reservations about the Greek government’s plans to 
build a wall: “Walls of fences are short-term measures that are not meant 
to deal with the question of illegal immigration in a structural way.”456 
 
It should be noted that FRONTEX is not directly answerable to the 
European Commission, but is an independent agency of the EU, whose 
board of management consists of both Commission representatives and 
representatives from the Member states. FRONTEX was established by a 
Council Regulation in October 2004, and became operational in the 
following year.457 In face of mounting pressure that something should be 
done about high levels of irregular migration, it was established in order to 
co-ordinate border management among the Member states, or in EU 
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language, due to “the need for creating an integrated management of 
operational cooperation at the external borders of the Member States of 
the European Union.”458 Having better integrated external borders was 
presented as a “necessary corollary” to the passport-free Schengen Area. 
The Regulation asserts: “Effective control and surveillance of external 
borders is a matter of the utmost importance to Member States regardless 
of their geographical position. Accordingly, there is a need for promoting 
solidarity between Member States in the field of external border 
management.”459 
 
The main tasks of FRONTEX are to 1) coordinate joint operations to 
manage EU’s external borders; 2) assist Member States on training 
national border guards; 3) conduct risk analyses; 4) monitor research 
regarding management of borders; 5) assist Member States in 
circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at 
external borders; and 6) assist Member states in returning third country 
nationals.460 Every year, FRONTEX’s Risk Analysis Unit, draws up an 
Annual Risk Assessment, detailing patterns and forecasts of irregular 
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migration into the European Union, and provides recommendations for 
how to deal with those: 
 
Based on these recommendations, the Joint Operations Unit may 
start the process of formulating an Operational Plan. The first stage 
of this is a Tactical Focussed Assessment, prepared by RAU, which 
paints a much more detailed picture of the situation at a specific 
point at the external border. Once identified as a potential joint 
operation, the unit then approached the potential host country 
(which will always lead any Frontex‐ coordinated operation) with a 
proposal. Once accepted in principle, the initiative is then presented 
to other potential EU partners for participation, after which a 
document is prepared that is binding at EU level and which details 
the cooperation required, including technical equipment, specialist 
personnel and other operational details.461 
 
 
 
Europe is thus constituted as one territory in need to be secured from 
irregular migration. Just like the modern state, the European Union comes 
to depend upon the perpetuation of a desire for its being, and FRONTEX 
partakes in conjuring up such desire, in the guise of manifold external 
“risks,” from which the European Union offers protection and security. An 
extra “layer” of statecraft is thus added onto that of Greek statecraft; 
namely European statecraft. The European subject is constituted by 
practices of bordering, ordering, and identification just like the modern 
state. And the intra-European “solidarity” that FRONTEX as well as 
Malmström refer to is one, like in the case of traditional statecraft, where 
the compassion for some literally spells death to others. 
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European border guard. On 24th October 2010, FRONTEX received a 
request from the Greek government to deploy a so-called RABIT team. 
Just a little more than a week later, a force of 175 FRONTEX personnel 
was deployed on Greece’s border to Turkey. And the RABIT team did seem 
to meet its objective, already in January 2011, FRONTEX reported of 
significant decreases in levels of undocumented migration through the 
border area. In December 2010, the average detection rate had fallen by 
57%.462 In March 2011, the RABIT team became part of the so-called Joint 
Operation Poseidon, with the same objectives as the RABIT operation. The 
FRONTEX force assists the Greek authorities in patrolling the border area, 
interviews and screens migrants seeking to determine the nationality of 
refugees, and collects information about networks of human traffickers 
that help the migrants to cross the border areas. The patrol forces ambush 
the arriving migrants but do usually not, as of the summer of 2011, detain 
the migrants. The migrants are told to go to the nearest police station 
whereas the facilitators are arrested. Chief Inspector Gennaro Di Bello 
confirms this policy: “If we follow the refugees, it’s only to ensure that 
nothing happens to them.”463 
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The main FRONTEX contingent is stationed in the small town of 
Alexandroupoli, and I interviewed several members of the force in July 
2011. All EU member states have a pool of people available for deployment 
with FRONTEX. Their missions last for a month, they then go back to their 
home country, and may return in a few months for another mission. 
During FRONTEX field operations, a Greek officer is always in command. 
FRONTEX personnel (known as “guest officers”) wear their national 
uniforms with both their national flag and EU’s flag on them. Motivations 
for joining FRONTEX vary. A Finnish dog handler and team leader, who 
has been deployed at the border four times, says that he wanted to join 
FRONTEX to get some experience in a “target rich area.” He takes part in 
a special operations’ team that ambush and apprehends facilitators, and to 
a lesser extent migrants, at night at the Evros delta: “First priority is to 
arrest facilitators, if we can apprehend migrants, we do it.” The migrants 
react differently when being apprehended. Some of them are happy and 
some of them are scared. It depends on what the facilitators have told 
them, he says. Since the apprehensions take place at night, and the 
facilitators sometimes are armed, even heavily so, the situation is often 
quite tense and sometimes migrants try to run away.464 
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Several of the guest officers were touched by the human hardship they 
encountered. A Romanian guest officer recounted the story of how he 
performed first aid on a Muslim woman who was minutes from dying. A 
Finnish guest officer described the situation as “unworthy of Europe.” 
Many of them also speak of the futility of their work. As a self-described 
“grunt” put it: 
It doesn’t really matter what we are doing here. It is in a way kind of 
frustrating. This cannot be solved by increasing border control. 
There are always people willing to come to Europe from Africa and 
Asia. Even if we put a very big fence around Greece, they will go to 
Bulgaria, and Italy. Propose for Cecilia Malmström open border 
crossing points for immigrants with documents, and then a big 
place where migrants are taken pictures dna, blood samples etc. 
And then if they don’t want to integrate they can go home. [It makes 
no sense having] a Somalian woman trying to cross the river in a 
rubber boat, with a one-year-old baby…running as hell like in a 
jungle next to a river…The problem is not here but in Brussels, they 
are out of touch with what is going on. 
 
The FRONTEX police officers were in agreement that they are not only 
working on behalf of their own state, but rather for Europe. A German 
border guard says “I think it is important to support the Greeks. This is 
Europe’s border, after all.”465 or as a Romanian guest officer puts it, “not 
so many migrants are willing to establish their families in Romania, but it 
affects us, because we are European Union. In the second hand we are 
here to support Greek authorities, in the first hand the European Union.” 
An Austrian guest officer, who is a forged documents and stolen car expert 
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and has been working on one of the border crossing check points says “I 
feel I am working for Europe. We are more or less a big country.” 
 
So what has the presence of FRONTEX done to avert, or at least mitigate, 
the humanitarian crisis in Greece? Since the arrival of FRONTEX there 
have been no reports of informal pushbacks, in which migrants would 
simply be pushed back to Turkish territory. FRONTEX has also devoted a 
considerable amount of attention to what they refer to as the ethics of 
border management. In 2010, FRONTEX commissioned a rather extensive 
research study undertaken by the Center for the Study for Global Ethics at 
University of Birmingham, which identified common European standards 
of ethical conduct in border management.466 And before FRONTEX 
members are deployed, they have to undergo training in human rights. 
 
However, a much more fundamental ethical problem remains. From the 
beginning, voices critical of the establishment of FRONTEX were heard. 
The European Council on Refugees and Exiles stated: ”Any decreases in 
the number of irregular entries into the EU stemming from the 
implementation of immigration control measures are presented as a 
success by the EU and as a factor that contributes to saving human lives. 
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This interpretation fails to acknowledge the consequences of these 
measures for individuals fleeing persecution.”467 
 
Indeed, in a document released by FRONTEX, its first joint sea operation, 
a mission called Hera, aimed to deter irregular migration from Western 
Africa to Europe, is described as a significant success. With aid from West 
African countries, the route from Senegal, Mauritania, and Cape Verde, to 
the Canary Islands was entirely shut down. FRONTEX believes that this 
closure “without doubt prevented countless deaths.”468 However, the 
circumstances that the potential migrants were facing at their respective 
homelands are left out of the assessment. The fundamental raison d'être 
of FRONTEX is undoubtedly to prevent migrants from coming to Europe, 
at least in the numbers they do now. This purpose is not always stated in 
plain language. The “prime objective” of the deployment of the RABIT 
team in Greece in 2010, is according to FRONTEX to “assist Greek border‐
control authorities in securing the land border with Turkey from a heavy 
influx of irregular migration.” 469 The purpose of FRONTEX is thus clearly 
to limit the amount of migrants entering Europe, or, as the FRONTEX 
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executive director Ilkka Laitinen puts it in more oblique language “to have 
an impact on the migratory flows in the area.”470  
 
The Greek government: Europeanize the Situation. Greece did not 
become a migrant receiving country until the 1990s, when large numbers 
of Albanians entered, following the fall of the Communist dictatorship.471 
The timing for the huge influx of migrants into Greece this time is poorly 
chosen with the Greek state currently undergoing the worst recession since 
the Second World War. Social unrest is widespread and extremist groups 
and xenophobic sentiments are on the rise. An employee of a small NGO, 
seeking to help migrants lamented: “Our neighbors are not too happy 
about what we do. ‘Why don’t you help Greek people?’ they ask. ‘You have 
turned our neighborhood black’. ‘I cannot find a job, why has a black man 
my job?’”472 
 
The Greek government has consistently sought to “Europeanize” the large 
migration influx. The influx of migrants is presented as a “European 
problem” which calls for a “European solution.” The enforcement of 
Greece’s border to Turkey is cast as a “European responsibility.” Greece’s 
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borders are presented as not just that but rather as Europe’s borders. As a 
Greek police officer in Alexandroupolis put it: “It [the influx of migrants] 
is a European problem first of all. They don’t want to stay in Greece. 
European politicians will find some problem. Not Greek politicians. 
Someone has to accept the problem.”473 And as we have previously seen, in 
the name of Europe, such a responsibility has been assumed. 
 
In early 2011, the Greek government announced it would build a razor 
wire fence along the Evros border. As Greek minister for citizen 
protection, Christos Papoutsis, puts it: “If we could have it up tomorrow, 
we would…Greece is not a paradise…it is in the midst of economic crisis, 
wages are going down, unemployment is surging and there is not enough 
work for our own people or the migrants who are already here. Our hope is 
that the fence will send a message.”474 The police chief in the border town 
of Orestiada, Giorgos Salamangas, shares this sentiment: “Some days 
we’ve had 300 pour in. It’s an uncontrollable wave, and the only way to 
stop it is to erect a fence.”475 At the same time, it is widely acknowledged 
that a wall won’t solve any problems. 12.5 km wall won’t make much of a 
difference, but only divert the problem to the remaining 200 km land 
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border with Turkey. Having spoken out in favor of a fence, Salamangas 
admits the ineffectiveness of it: “The problem is a bit like water. If 
stopped, it will always flow another way.”476 Given the rather obvious 
futility of building a fence, some commentators think that the 
government’s interest in doing so has more to do with diverting attention 
from unpopular budget cuts. 477 The message Papoutsis hopes the fence 
will send, whether primarily intended for a domestic or foreign audience, 
seems to be impossible to misinterpret: migrants are not welcome. 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Alright. Let me ask you something. 
If the rule you followed brought you 
to this, of what use was the rule? 
—Anton Chigurh, No Country for Old Men. 
 
 
 
 
The first chapter of this dissertation opened by posing the question of why 
one should bother studying practices of European integration at a time 
when they—at least among European populations—seem to inspire less 
enthusiasm than perhaps at any previous time in postwar European 
history? The introduction answered that question in rather general terms 
by arguing that deconstructive textual analysis is ultimately concerned 
with ethics. Thus, I have in the chapters pointed to some potential dangers 
inherent in foundationalist desires for a European bounded identity—a 
European Union which just like the modern state is enacted by practices of 
ordering, bordering, and identification. In this concluding chapter, I start 
by making two general points in relation to the timeliness of the 
dissertation; the first point has to do with the increasing diversity on the 
European continent, and the second point concerns the rapid 
militarization of the European Union. The second section concludes the 
dissertation by summarizing the main argument and the major findings of 
this dissertation.  
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Before doing so however, a far more preliminary point needs to be raised. 
This dissertation has interrogated some important legitimation discourses 
of European integration. The extent to which those discourses exert a 
hegemonic force in Gramsci’s sense of instilling a set of norms and values 
that effectively underpin a social order—i.e. their power in producing 
subjectivity on a European scale that may legitimize a European-wide 
social, political, and moral order, is ultimately an empirical question, 
which I have not dealt with here.478 Let it suffice to point out that the 
discourses of European integration that I have examined aspire to 
hegemonic status, i.e. understood discursively with Laclau and Mouffe as 
associating discursive elements and trying to impose a dominant meaning 
on social practices that sets the limits for possible articulations within a 
certain chain of significations.479 What I have been attempting to do in this 
dissertation is to pre-emptively interrupt and question a discourse, whose 
power of dissemination is under-explored, rather than to simply assume 
that such discourses exert a powerful signifying force.  
 
But to what end at this particular time in history? Let me make two points 
about the timeliness of critically addressing discourses of European 
                                                   
478 See for example Antonio Gramsci, The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 
1916-1935, ed. David Forgacs (New York: The NYU Press, 2000). 
 
 
479 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
 
  232 
integration. First of all, in the past decades the European continent has 
rapidly become increasingly diverse, with migrants arriving from a 
plethora of different shores. At the same time, xenophobic sentiments 
have been on the rise all over the European continent. The problem of how 
to craft the European subject in relation to difference has become one of 
the most serious ethical problems facing the project of European 
integration. Any such discussion would have to take seriously not only the 
carnages of the two 20th century continental wars and the Holocaust, 
which (rightly) serve as powerful legitimizing narratives for European 
integration480—and instead of making us uncritically celebrate European 
integration as it now stands should rather make us attentive to the risks of 
the prevailing statist imagination—but also Europe’s colonial past, which 
is still often neglected in the scholarship on European integration.481 What 
is important here is to point out that a deconstructive understanding of 
European identity, points us in a direction away from an essentializing and 
exclusive historical narration of the European subject, towards one which 
also recognizes the not only manifold contributions, but rather 
constitutive character, to whatever goes under the name of “European 
identity” from sources often deemed as “other” to Europe proper. As 
others to Europe; Islam and “the Orient,” Turkey, Russia and “the East,” 
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the United States, as well as Europe’s own troubled history are sometimes 
posited. Positively deconstructive histories of the European subject would 
not seek to denigrate or denounce the European heritage, nor altogether 
give up on the many often unfulfilled promises of enlightenment 
modernity. Instead, such histories would help to highlight the constitutive 
nature to European cultural life that come from those aforementioned 
sources often deemed as others to Europe, so that those altogether cease to 
be “foreign” to the European tradition. But instead of seeking to violently 
appropriate such sources for a celebratory narration of unbroken 
European progress, the inclusion of them would rather seek to show the 
open-ended, multiple and always unfinished character of Europe itself. 
Finally, the writing of such histories would also seek to attune us to what is 
yet to come on the European continent, the wholly other to the other 
heading, as Derrida once wrote.482  
 
Another factor contributes to the timeliness of a critical, albeit not 
dismissive, approach to European integration. It should be noted that 
alongside the general legitimation crisis in European integration, the 
militarization of the European Union has continued at a rapid pace.483 The 
evolution of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) has shown 
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that European cooperation in this area is clearly not about defense in the 
traditional sense: the “D” has remained a dead letter. Instead, the ESDP is 
all about power projection outside the EU’s geographical borders, often 
portrayed as “policing activities.” Starting with the end of the Cold War 
and accelerated by the “war on terrorism” following 9/11, there was in the 
Western world a clear shift from the concept of defense towards the 
concept of security. As Hardt and Negri point out, this conceptual change 
signaled a much higher degree of interventionism: “Both within and 
outside the nation … the proponents of security require more than simply 
conserving the present order–if we wait to react to threats, they claim, it 
will be too late. Security requires rather actively and constantly shaping 
the environment through military and/or police activity. Only an actively 
shaped world is a secure world…Whereas ‘defence’ involves a protective 
barrier against external threats, ‘security’ justifies a constant martial 
activity equally in the homeland and abroad.”484  The European Security 
Strategy, adopted by the European union in 2003, directly echoes this shift 
from defense to security: “Large-scale aggression against any Member 
State is now improbable. Our traditional concept of self-defence–up to and 
including the Cold War–was based on the threat of invasion. With the new 
threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad.”485  
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It is in the context of the European Union’s rise to global power status 
important to be aware of the many dangers associated with the European 
Union’s new interventionism, not least in the historical context of the 
European colonial past as well as the highly unequal postcolonial world 
that sets the conditions for the present global landscape. The European 
response to the Arab Revolutions in 2011, for example, conjured up the 
specter of European (colonial) gunboat diplomacy, where European 
interventionism carried serious risks to delegitimize the (for the most part) 
progressive forces it sought to assist. However, to insist on understanding 
the present constitution of the European subject against the historical 
backdrop of colonialism should not involve lapsing into a facile and 
pernicious relativist quietism, which is often as irresponsible as liberal 
triumphalism. It should rather make Europe more responsive and 
sensitive to the aspirations, histories, and demands of voices historically 
marginalized by European expansionism. 
 
The argument revisited 
 
This dissertation put forward, and then elaborated on, a rather simple 
idea: since European integration came about as a result of a 
thoroughgoing discrediting of the modern state as a way of organizing 
political life, an important task would be to examine whether European 
integration really could be said to decisively break with modern statecraft. 
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To undertake such an investigation, the first chapter put forward a way of 
conceptualizing what modern statecraft was about. Most other studies that 
have dealt with the EU’s alleged difference in relation to the modern state 
have employed an understanding of the state, which confers a certain 
ontological standing or status on its purported object of study. When 
comparing the EU to such an understanding of the modern state, it is clear 
that the EU cannot be understood as a state. However, I argued that a 
critical approach to European Integration Studies needs to go beyond the 
representationalist, ontologizing understanding of the state, where there is 
an identity already formed and the leadership represents the inner identity 
and interest of that political entity.  
 
Instead, in order to start addressing the question of state violence that 
European integration emerged as a response to, the crafting of the Europe 
Union needs to be problematized in relation to practices of statecraft. The 
performative understanding of statecraft that I put forward in this 
dissertation⎯where the realm of performativity is always prior to the 
realm of constativity⎯understands states as effects. I proposed that 
instead of evaluating European integration discourse against an 
ontologizing understanding of the state, on which the state “is” something 
determinate, one might read European integration discourse against a 
performative understanding of statecraft. I argued that the characteristic 
performances of modern statecraft, could be conceived of as interrelated 
practices of ordering, bordering, and identification, animated by a desire 
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for foundation. “The state” then I proposed, could be conceptualized as an 
effect of a plethora of practices of identification/bordering (i.e. statecraft), 
animated by a desire for order, stability, and foundation, which are 
constitutive of a wide variety of subject positions, but never traceable back 
to a single origin. In chapter six, I examined the crafting of the European 
Union in a concrete setting. When examining what is being done in the 
name of Europe in Greece, I attempted to demonstrate that much like the 
modern state, Europe is being ordered, bordered, and identified. Thus, the 
way the signifier “Europe” is deployed and circulated by migrants as well 
as members of EU’s border force in many ways mirrors modern statecraft. 
 
Second, I argued that most previous treatments of European integration in 
relation to the state have neglected engaging the broader normative 
horizon in which the modern Westphalian state is inscribed. The 
Westphalian system of states—which rests on a specific form of organizing 
space into fixed and mutually exclusive containers—might best be 
described as a collection of particularities that are mutually recognized as 
entitled to the universal within their borders.  The practices that craft the 
modern state perpetually oscillate between bordering (particularizing 
gestures) and de-bordering (universalizing gestures) practices. To examine 
the possibilities of “moving beyond” the state in the crafting of the 
European Union, European integration discourse needs to be read against 
the background of this normative horizon.  
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In the third and fourth chapters of the dissertation, I offered a close 
reading of two legitimation discourses of the European Union: the failed 
Constitutional Treaty and Javier Solana’s collected speeches. I argued that 
one might in those discourses identify two major gestures between which 
the crafting of Europe continuously oscillates. The first gesture is one of 
particularizing Europe. On this gesture, clear boundaries of 
differentiation are imposed upon Europe; Europe is bordered, identified, 
and ordered. The second gesture is one of universalizing Europe. Here, 
the particularizing gestures are resisted and Europe is understood as 
identical to the rest of the world. Or, at least, “beneath” layers of whatever 
passes as culture, tradition, and history, there is no essential difference 
between Europe and its others. In those two chapters, I suggested that 
Europe is being crafted in a pendular oscillation between its paradoxical 
claim to being both particular and yet also universal. This oscillation 
reveals that the European Union is crafted in a way akin to that of the 
modern state: in a constant movement and mediation between the 
universal and the particular. Hence, I contended, the crafting of Europe 
involves similar ethical risks to those of the modern state; which is either 
to expel (the particularizing gesture) or to interiorize (the universalizing 
gesture) difference. 
 
So what is really at stake then, when we consider this pendular movement 
between particularizing and universalizing Europe in its proper historical 
context? To be sure, many politicians, intellectuals, and scholars would 
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like to conceive of the European Union as more inclusive and accepting of 
difference than the modern state. As Bahar Rumelili has framed the 
question in more academic parlance, couldn’t the EU avoid replicating the 
mode of differentiation that the modern nation-state is often portrayed to 
have relied upon, with a clearly demarcated inside and an equally clearly 
demarcated, marginalized, and expelled outside? The obvious risks of the 
particularizing practices is that such practices perpetually have to create 
various constitutive outsides, which will be cast as not properly belonging 
to Europe. The perhaps most well known political manifestation of the 
particularizing gesture is nationalism, which is precisely what European 
integration wanted to get away from since National Socialism can be 
understood as an extreme form of nationalism. In fact, Europe’s past is 
replete with conflict brought about and exacerbated by Europe’s petty and 
manifold nationalisms. Thus, if European integration merely reproduced 
the particularizing gestures of the state at a higher level, and conjured up a 
European nationalism, the many well-known problems of nationalism 
would still remain. Solidarity is in the nationalist script primarily cast as 
something one owns to a particular in-group, whereas various others are 
deemed to have a lesser moral standing. 
 
At the same time however, if a major ethical problem with the various 
modalities of statecraft associated with the modern western state was the 
violent practice of boundary drawing and the coupled inside/outside 
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dynamic that critical scholarship has repeatedly demonstrated, the 
problem of Europe in relation to localities outside its geographical borders 
has historically been precisely just the opposite. Europe’s bloody colonial 
past ought to serve as a constant reminder of the continent’s failure to 
acknowledge boundaries of differentiation at all. The problem here, 
postcolonial literatures have taught us, was not so much exclusion as 
practices of differential inclusion. The colonial other was most often 
treated as a would-be, but never quite, European. In some distant and 
always ultimately deferred future, having been lifted up to the level of the 
European, History would affirm the essential identity between Europe and 
her others. In Kiplinguesque lore, it was Europe’s historical burden to 
domesticate the whole world and make it safe for the universal values that 
Europe exemplified to prosper therein —a logic no doubt highly forgiving 
of the innumerable violences committed by European countries in other 
peoples’ lands. As I made clear in the discussion of Solana’s foreign policy 
discourse on Europe, the universalizing gesture always risk slipping into 
the idea of European exemplarity, where universal values are attached to 
specific agents. And neither does the universalizing gesture mean that the 
necessity of a constitutive outside in subject formation has been done away 
with. Most often, the constitutive outsides to a subject that is 
universalizing itself are forms of otherness deemed to be “backwards” or 
“regressive,” to be found either in distant localities, or carried by elements 
deemed “foreign” at home. Thus, the European subject, just like the 
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modern state subject, is crafted in a pendular oscillation between the 
particularizing and the universalizing gestures, both of which carry their 
own distinct risks. 
 
In the fifth chapter, I turned to another European integration legitimation 
discourse, namely neofunctionalism. I argued that neofunctionalism does 
little more than to reproduce the modern state at a bigger level, a concern 
that Ernst Haas became increasingly aware of in his later writings. This 
state measure problematic, has, as in the case of neofunctionalism, 
seriously limited the possibilities of thinking critically about the EU and 
wedded European Integration Studies to a statist conceptual universe. I 
went on to demonstrate the limitations of a statist imagination by 
examining how two prominent political theorists have theorized about the 
EU’s legitimacy. One of the most serious problems with a discourse which 
treats the EU as an entity, be it a state, a quasi-state, etc., i.e. to 
essentialize and ontologize the EU, is that it will inevitably end up 
reiterating the logic of an inside/outside conceptual schema (as well as a 
centre/periphery schema). To put it slightly differently, to essentialize the 
European Union will firmly implicate its normative discourse in what lies 
at the heart of modern political theory: the identity/difference binary, 
which, as argued above, the modern state provides an uneasy response to. 
 
On a final note then, one should think twice before announcing the 
construction of the European Union as something qualitatively new and 
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different from—let alone better, or more ethical than—modern statecraft. 
In fact, the crafting of the European Union is plagued by similar ethical 
dilemmas as the modern state, and ultimately animated by a similar desire 
to either expel or interiorize difference. Taking this point seriously could 
impel us to start exploring new and innovative ways of organizing social 
and political life on the European continent—beyond the facile and rather 
disturbing celebration of the proclaimed “novelty” of the European Union. 
Such inquiry would re-connect European integration studies with the 
noble spirit that inspired European integration in the first place: an 
acknowledgement of the profound linkages between the modern state and 
violence, coupled with a desire to think of ways of organizing political, 
social, and economic life in non-violent ways.  
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